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North Korea has been criticized not only for manufacturing weapons of mass 
destruction but also for denying its people the most basic rights.  In response to the 
North Korean crises, there have been two different approaches: economic 
sanctions or engagement. This study is to analyze whether and how the 
international community could change the North Korean behavior effectively 
under international norms.  
 The U.N. Charter expressly contemplates that economic sanctions may be 
imposed in order to maintain or restore international peace and security. Sanctions 
under the United Nations can be imposed when there is a threat of or breach of the 
peace. If the Council determines gross violations of human rights as a threat to peace, 
it can play a pivotal role in protecting.  
Humanitarian causes limit the scope and types of economic sanctions. 
Economic sanctions are limited by humanitarian causes.  Further, comprehensive 
economic sanctions are not effective.  
North Korea has an extremely authoritarian political structure and it would 
make economic sanctions less effective. Sanctions might contribute directly to the 
economic hardship of North Koreans. There is no hope that sanctions may 
strengthen NGOs, opposition groups or movements in North Korea. The elite and 
the military do not suffer while the rest of the population starves.    
On the other hand, economic engagement would strengthen reformer groups 
within the North Korean government, empower entrepreneurs, produce a middle class 
 
 
and interest groups, and eventually stimulate some form of civil society. Engagement 
with North Korea will weaken the regime’s authority to control the people. It would 
directly secure the right to food. Engagement expands the international community's 
alternatives.  
Engagement with North Korea should be encouraged. North Korea finds that 
the only way to ensure its security is to change its relationship with the U.S. from 
hostility to reconciliation. An effective international strategy to force North Korea to 
respect international norms is to fully engage the country.  A package deal with North 
Korea can be considered. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1. Background of the North Korean Crises 
Until the 1990s, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), or North Korea, 
had remained a silent and remote country. North Korea, however, had never been a 
primitive society. Bruce Cummings depicts Pyongyang of the 1980s as “one of the 
most efficient, best-run cities in Asia.”1 Gavan McCormack describes North Korea as 
“a largely urban, highly educated society, and modern industrial state.”2 Through the 
1970s and 80s, the international community was more concerned with the human 
rights violations by the South Korean military regime rather than by those of North 
Korea.3 During the Cold War, there was no evidence that the record of human rights 
violations in North Korea was worse than that of other comparable oppressive 
capitalist or communist countries.  
Through the 1990s, North Korean issues became a major part of the 
international agenda. These included such issues as nuclear and human rights 
violations. North Korea was often criticized not only for manufacturing nuclear 
weapons, abducting foreigners, terrorism, drug trafficking, and currency counterfeiting, 
but also for denying its people the most basic rights and freedoms, operating a 
comprehensive surveillance system, performing public executions and managing 
political prison camps. 
 
                                                 
1 Bruce Cummings, Korea’s Place in the Sun 405 (2005). 
2 Gavan McCormack, Target North Korea 3 (2004). 
3 South Korea had been under a military rule from 1961 to 1987 and the human rights violations by the 
regime had been a frequently discussed issue in U.S. politics. As for the U.S. economic sanctions 
against South Korea based on human rights, see Gary Clyde Hufbauer et al., Institute for International 
Economics, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered: Supplemental Case Histories (2nd ed. 1990). See also 
Cummings, supra note 1, at 352-392. 
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Especially, during the mid-1990s, North Korea experienced severe food 
shortages and appealed to the international community for food aid; hundreds of 
thousands of North Koreans flooded China trying desperately to avoid mass starvation 
in North Korea. The international community, including the U.N. and human rights 
NGOs, provided humanitarian aid to North Korea and the starving North Koreans. By 
the 1990s, the realities of the human rights situation in North Korea began to be 
known to the world through the testimonies of North Korean defectors and 
humanitarian relief staffs in North Korea. Subsequently, many reports and articles on 
the widespread and systematic human rights violations in North Korea were published.  
The collapse of the North Korean economy not only threatened the social and 
economic rights of the North Koreans, causing a lot of people to die; it also led to the 
regime's even greater curtailment of the already suppressed civil and political rights. 
Pyongyang tried to cope with the crisis caused by the collapse of the economy through 
the harsh control over its people. In a totalitarian state, a state typically withstands 
“any amount of internal pressure as long as it possesses the coercive power to 
maintain control and the political will to employ it” by the use of terror and 
repression.4 North Korea took this approach, which resulted in more gross human 
rights violations. 
Further, in March, 1993 Pyongyang announced its withdrawal from the Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT).5  Pyongyang justified its withdrawal as a self-defense 
measure against the U.S. nuclear threat. The Agreed Framework, a comprehensive 
deal compensating North Korea in return for the abandonment of the program, broke 
down in 2001 after President George Bush’s inauguration. On 9 October 2006, North 
Korea tested its nuclear device and the Security Council imposed economic sanctions 
against North Korea.6 North Korean nuclear issue still remains unresolved.          
                                                 
4 Andrew Heywood, Politics 198 (1997). 
5 Hy-Sang Lee, North Korea: A Strange Socialist Fortress 183 (Praeger, Westport, Connecticut, 2001). 
6 S/RES/1718 (2006). 
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2. Need for Comprehensive Policy against North Korea 
During the 1990s, after the dissolution of the Eastern bloc, many scholars and U.S. 
policy makers predicted that North Korea would no longer receive the aid or favorable 
trading arrangements that it needed to survive and would soon collapse. They urged 
the international community to prepare for this collapse.7 In their view, it would be 
unnecessary to establish a long-term strategy for North Korea;8 all that the world 
needed to do was “just wait and see” or “facilitate the collapse.” Interestingly enough, 
the collapse scenario was not new. For many decades, scholars and policy makers had 
predicted that, because of its extreme dependability on Kim Il Sung, the regime would 
collapse as soon as he died.9         
However, the prediction turned out to be wrong. Even though North Korea's 
circumstances today seem harsher than anytime since 1948, the regime has remained 
stable after Kim Il Sung 's death and his son's succession to power.  More than a 
decade after experts predicted its imminent collapse, the Pyongyang regime is still in 
control and there are no signs of its collapse.10  
Therefore, the international community should formulate a long-term policy 
towards North Korea, including a review of its current policy. 
 
3. Sanctions or Engagement? 
In response to the North Korean crises, the strategy that states have taken varies state 
by state. Washington’s policy toward North Korea aims to denuclearize the country by 
“implementing fully the U.N. sanctions to penalize and isolate the regime.”11 In 2006 
                                                 
7 Nicholas Eberstadt, Why Hasn’t North Korea Collapsed? North Korea: The Politics of Regime 
Survival 268 (Young Whan Kihl et al. ed.); He argues “there is no reason at present to expect a reign by 
Kim Jong Il to be either stable or long.” 
8 Michael O’Harlon and Mike Mochizuki, Toward a Grand Bargain with North Korea, in Reshaping 
Rogue States 159 (Alexander T.J. Lennon & Camille Eiss, 2004) 
9 Cummings, supra note 1, at 447. 
 10 L. Gorden Flake, Paved with Good Intentions: the NGO Experience in North Korea 45 (2003). 
11 Nicholas Burns, The U.S. Policy toward North Korea (Testimony to the House International 
Relations Committee, November 16, 2006). . 
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the U.S. asked South Korea to cut its Mt. Keumgang Tour Project and the Kaesong 
Industrial Project that bring valuable foreign currency to the North Korean regime, 
only to have the request declined.12 Washington argues that if North Korea wants to be 
a part of the international community, it should satisfy the international standard of 
human rights.13 Further, it insists that North Korean defectors should be encouraged or 
welcomed under the international refugee conventions.14 The U.S. policy toward 
North Korea can be described as the “sanction or isolation approach.”  
Seoul considers that a better approach is to engage North Korea fully, and to 
help it become a part of the international community. Seoul argues that preventing 
people from becoming refugees is better than providing relief after they become 
refugees. Therefore, it emphasizes the need for humanitarian aid to North Korea.15 
South Korea hopes that this approach will decrease the hostility of North Koreans 
toward South Korea.16 South Korea's policy toward North Korea can be called an 
“engagement approach.” 
The U.S. and South Korea have been allies on the Korean peninsula ever since 
the Korean War. During the Cold War they had shared a common goal: to defend the 
peninsula from communism. After the collapse of the Eastern bloc and the dissolution 
of the Cold War, however, they have found it more and more difficult to have a 
common goal on the Korean peninsula. The differences between the two are evident in 
their approach toward the North Korean nuclear and human rights issues. The gap 
widened after the inauguration of President George W. Bush in 2001.  
                                                 
12 Time, October 19, 2006. 
13 The U.S. wants the discussion of the human rights record to be part of any future normalization 
process. supra note 11. 
14 The Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration, The Status of North Korean Asylum Seekers and 
U.S. government Policy towards Them (March 11, 2005). Available at 
http:www.state.gov/prm/ris/rpt43271.htm (last visited October 10, 2006). 
15Ministry of Unification, Unification Policy, available at 
http://www.unikorea.go.kr/english/EUP/EUP0207R.jsp (last visited on December 4, 2006). 
16 Id. 
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For many years, the South Korean government has been of the opinion that 
raising human rights issues against North Korea will not help improve North Korean 
human rights. In November 2005, the South Korean government abstained from 
voting on a U.N. General Assembly resolution, despite expressing “serious concern at 
continuing reports of systematic, widespread and grave violations of human rights” in 
North Korea.17 Under the “Sunshine Policy” of engagement with North Korea, the 
foreign ministry of South Korea defended its position, arguing that “the resolution 
could put at risk rapprochement efforts between the two Koreas and attempts to 
resolve the crisis over Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons program peacefully.”18  
Some civic organizations in South Korea have criticized the United States for 
using the North Korean human rights issues as a pretext to attack North Korea 
politically.  People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy (PSPD), a South Korean 
NGO group, even called the U.N. General Assembly resolution condemning North 
Korean human rights situations “a political approach” and demanded that “all states 
involved should also show the intention to improve their own human rights situation,” 
referring to the U.S. military prison at Guantanamo Bay and the war against Iraq.19  
The U.S. has raised the North Korean human rights issues at the international 
and national level since the beginning of the 2000s as well as the North Korean 
nuclear issues. The nuclear issues and human rights have been two main bases that 
rationalize the U.S. pressure against North Korea. 
It seems undesirable that the long-lasing allies that have direct critical interests 
with North Korea take opposite approaches against North Korea. The imminent tasks 
that the international community faces should focus on how it should coordinate its 
efforts effectively, multilaterally and individually, to deal with the North Korean 
                                                 
17 Statement of South Korea’s U.N. delegate Shin Kak-Soo, available at 
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Korea/GK23Dg02.html (last visited on January 3, 2007). 
18 Id. 
19 Id. 
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issues. There are big gaps among the major states’ policies and strategies regarding 
these tasks. Analyzing the North Korean issues from the perspective of international 
law is necessary for better coordination and cooperation within the international 
community to cope with the crises. 
 
4. Purpose of the Study  
I will focus primarily on one main international law topic: whether economic 
sanctions are legitimate and effective measures to force North Korea to comply with  
international norm and if not, what is the alternative? Under Chapter VII of the U.N. 
Charter, the Security Council may determine the existence of a threat to peace, breach 
of peace and an act of aggression.20 Then, to maintain international peace and security, 
it may make recommendations,21 adopt enforcement measures not involving the use of 
force,22 and authorize the use of force.23 Among them, economic sanctions which are 
one of measures according to Article 41 of the Charter are the most frequently used 
tools by the U.N. Security Council. Before 1990, the Council imposed mandatory 
economic sanctions only twice against Rhodesia and South Africa. After the Cold War, 
the Security Council has actively adopted mandatory economic sanctions.24 However, 
the comprehensive economic sanctions against Iraq authorized by the Council caused 
severe civilian sufferings without forcing Iraq to comply with the international norms 
and their legitimacy was deeply questioned. With regard to sanctions against Iraq, the 
arguments that economic sanctions are illegal or should be restricted are raised. 
Moreover, the Iraqi sanction case and later on other international sanctions have been 
                                                 
20 Article 39 of the U.N. Charter.  
21 Id. 
22 Id. Article 41. 
23 Article 42 of the U.N. Charter. 
24 Gary Clyde Hufbauer et al, Peterson Institute for International Economics, Economic Sanctions 
Reconsidered 131- 132 (3rd ed., Washington, DC, 2007). 
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criticized to have failed in bringing about desired policy changes in the target 
countries.25   
In response to the North Korean nuclear test, the Security Council has imposed 
economic sanctions against North Korea.26 The Council has not imposed economic 
sanctions against North Korea because of the gross violations of human rights. The 
imposition of economic sanctions against North Korea under Chapter VII is already in 
effect. Therefore, in respect to economic sanctions against North Korea, analyzing 
legality and effectiveness of economic sanctions would be of great importance. In this 
study, I will focus on four points. 
First, I will clarify two main international law issues that North Korea has 
presented: the North Korean nuclear program and human rights violations. With 
respect to the North Korean nuclear program, the Council already found that 
proliferation of nuclear weapons constituted a threat to international peace and 
security.27 As far as the North Korean human rights situations are concerned, the 
Council has not yet determined that there exists a threat to peace. However, there is a 
possibility that human rights violations in North Korea constitute a threat to peace and 
take mandatory measures such as economic sanctions or the use of force under 
Chapter VII of the Charter. In the near future, the possible collapse of the North 
Korean regime may trigger humanitarian disaster in North Korea or force North 
Koreans to flee into neighboring states. This scenario may also trigger the Council’s 
invocation under Chapter VII. Therefore, general information on the North Korean 
nuclear program and human rights violations may help understand the legal issues 
thereof. This will be discussed in Chapter 2.  
Second, at issue is the question of whether economic sanctions are permitted in 
international law. Although, if found a threat to peace, the Security Council has 
                                                 
25 Id. 
26 S/RES/1718 (2006). 
27 Id. 
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imposed economic sanctions, the legality of economic sanctions or their possibility of 
reconciliation with the many human rights instruments are one of the hotly debated 
issues in international law and politics.28 Whether unilateral economic sanctions are 
legitimized under international law is more controversial. Although the Council has 
the power to impose economic sanctions under Chapter VII and states can apply 
sanctions, their power cannot be unlimited. Bossuyt argues that human rights and 
humanitarian law limit the right to impose economic sanctions.29 He argues that 
sanctions must not result in undue hardships for the people of a country and otherwise 
it would be violations of the right to life.30 The legality and scope of economic 
sanctions will be discussed in Chapter 3. 
Third, at issue is the question of whether economic sanctions are effective in 
changing target country’s behavior. There are many alternatives available for the 
international community to address violations of international law. The collapse of the 
Cold War resulted in more frequent use of economic sanctions.31 The international 
community frequently has imposed economic sanctions to address a threat to peace, 
breach of peace or an act of aggression and individual states have imposed unilateral 
sanctions as their foreign policy tools. Scholarly groups, however, unlike policy 
makers, are more skeptical on the effectiveness of economic sanctions.32 David 
Barnhizer states that, “the possibility of strong and predictable sanctions is integral to 
any effective human rights system.”33 He argues: “It is vital to begin the process of 
intervention and putting pressure on emerging violators before the worst of the 
                                                 
28 Geoff Simons, Imposing Economic Sanctions: Legal Remedy or Genocidal Tool? 163 (Pluto Press, 
1999). 
29 Marc Bossuyt, Commission On Human Rights, Working Paper on the adverse consequences of 
economic sanctions on the enjoyment of human rights, E/CN.4/Sub.2/2000/33. para 18. 
30 Id., para 26.  
31 David Cortright, George A. Lopez, The Sanctions Decade: Assessing UN Strategies in the 1990s 1-2 
(Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder, Colorado, 2000). 
32 Id. 
33 David Barnhizer, Effective Strategies for Protecting Human Rights 21 (David Barnhizer ed. 2001). 
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violations arise.”34 On the other hand, Richard Falk argues that “the difficulty with 
economic sanctions is that they cannot be effective, or that it is hard to make them 
effective.”35  
My assumption is that the goals of sanctions, the political structure of the 
target country, the relationship between the target country and sanctioning states, and 
the sanctions’ possibility of strengthening opposition movements determine the 
success and failure of economic sanctions. A comparative study will be used. I will 
analyze sanction cases against South Africa, Iraq, Cuba and Myanmar. The reasons 
behind the sanctions against the four countries vary: e.g. restoring international peace 
and security in Iraq,36 restoring civilian rule and preventing human rights violations in 
Haiti,37 the national security threat to the U.S. in the case of Cuba38 and human rights 
in the case of South Africa.39 This will be discussed in Chapter 4. 
Fourth, the final issue is the question of how the international community 
should respond to the North Korean violation of international law. Therefore, I will 
discuss whether, by applying economic sanctions, the international community can 
address the North Korean violations of international norms. It will be performed by 
analyzing the factors that made the sanctions against the target countries effective or 
ineffective. My argument is that comprehensive economic sanctions against North 
Korea could trigger humanitarian disaster, and ineffective because North Korea lacks 
those factors that make sanctions effective. Craig Forcese argues that “[e]conomic 
engagement and the promotion of human rights-sensitive development are generally 
compatible objectives” and “the need for continued economic integration is strongly 
                                                 
34 Id. at 1. 
35 Recited in supra note 31, at 13. 
36 S/RES/661 (1990). 
37 S/RES/841 (1993) and S/RES/940 (1994). 
38 Hossein G. Askari et al, Case Studies of U.S. Economic Sanctions 111-112 (Praeger, Westport, 
Connecticut, 2003). 
39 S/RES/418 (1977). 
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supported by the contemporary international legal apparatus.”40 The fourth purpose of 
the study is to argue that in addressing the North Korean situation engagement policy 
is more effective. I will argue that an effective strategy to deal with the North Korean 
situations will help resolve the North Korean nuclear crisis and human rights crises 
simultaneously as well. This will be discussed in Chapter 5.      
In Chapter 6, I will summarize the discussions and present conclusions. 
 
5. Methodology of the Study 
First, I will examine archival to research. In order to understand the international law 
issues that are related to North Korea, especially in studying human rights situation in 
North Korea, it would be most desirable to do research in North Korea. However, it is 
almost impossible for any researchers to visit North Korea. North Korea has not 
allowed even the U.N. human rights Rapporteur to visit.   
Fortunately, over 10,000 North Korean defectors have been living in South 
Korea since the mid-1990s and many human rights NGOs have documented their 
testimonies, which describe all kinds of human rights violations including public 
executions and starvation.  In general, they are reliable; they are consistent and vivid. 
Risking their lives, some NGO activists even went to North Korea to document North 
Korean human rights violations. Various governments and international organizations 
also have relied on the documents prepared by NGOs. 
Until recently, documents released by the North Korean government were hard 
to obtain. These include official North Korean statutes, codes and statistics. 
Fortunately, it is getting easier to access those materials as a result of many scholars’ 
efforts mainly from South Korea. My study was made possible in part due to their 
efforts.       
                                                 
40 Craig Forcese, Globalizing Decency: Responsible Engagement  in an Era of Economic Integration, 5 
Yale H.R. & Dev. L.J. 1, 54 (2002). 
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Second, I will adopt a comparative method to analyze various factors that 
make sanctions effective or ineffective. I will analyze the sanctions against South 
Africa, Iraq, Cuba and Myanmar, the study of which reveals the mechanism behind 
sanctions. Imposing sanctions against states is different from punishing individual 
criminals. While in violations of domestic laws by criminals, the focus may be on 
punishing the criminals, in violations of international laws by a state, the focus is on 
altering the state’s behavior. However, a state is not an individual; and multiple 
interests come into play: the existence and relative power of various groups, NGOs, 
corporations, opposition activities or movements, and the interaction between elite 
groups and the people. All of these determine the response of the target country. The 
U.S. diplomatic normalization and economic engagement with China, once a 
communist country hostile to the U.S., present one example of dealing with a 
communist country. I will attempt to suggest an effective international strategy toward 
North Korea by analyzing the factors that determined the effectiveness of the 
sanctions in the other cases. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
NORTH KOREA: INTERNATIONAL CONCERN 
 
1. Introduction 
Bruce Cummings describes North Korea as “a singular and puzzling nation that resists 
easy description.”1 North Korea is a socialist country and therefore has characteristics 
common to the communist world, e.g. concentration of power, which legitimizes the 
dictatorship of the proletariat.2 The North Korean Constitution3 declares that, “the 
state shall stick to a policy of class, and secure people’s democracy and socialism from 
our enemies by strengthening people’s democratic dictatorship.”4 All of North Korea’s 
activities are performed under the leadership of the Korean Workers' Party.5 
Further, North Korea is more dependent on its leader than any other socialist 
country. The Constitution declares itself a Kim Il Sung Constitution.6 It is a tool to 
secure the smooth transition of the dynastic leadership to Kim Jong Il, the son of Kim 
Il Sung. Absolute loyalty and obedience to the leader are supreme virtues in North 
Korea.7 While before the dissolution of the Eastern bloc and the Cold War, North 
Korea had been one of the communist countries; nowadays, it is a totalitarian country 
with unique ideology.  
                                                 
1 Bruce Cummings, Korea’s Place in the Sun 404 (2005). 
2 Korea Institute for National Unification (KINU), White Paper on Human Rights in North Korea 6 
(2005). 
3 On the history of the North Korean constitution, see Dae-Kyu Yoon, North Korea: Legal Perspectives 
and Analyses: The Constitution of North Korea: Its Changes and Implications, 27 Fordham Int’l L.J. 
1289 (2004).  
4 Article 12 of the North Korean Constitution of 1998 (adopted September 5, 1998 by the Supreme 
People’s Council, hereinafter ‘the Constitution”). Id. 
5 Article 11 of the Constitution.. 
6 Id. 
7 ‘The 10 Great Principles of the Unitary Ideology System,’ proclaimed in 1974, stress the absolute 
loyalty to Kim Il Sung.  See U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, Thank You Father 
Kim Il Sung: Eyewitness Accounts of Severe Violations of Freedom of Thought, Conscience, and 
Religion in North Korea 85 and Appendix 2. 
 
 
13
A great famine and widespread violations of human rights in other countries 
would have generated regime changes, or at least riots or massive social unrest. Even 
an economic failure or depression, or minor human rights violations could result in 
regime changes. For example, in 1960 the corrupt dictatorial South Korean regime 
was toppled by student protests when Kim Chu Yol, a middle school student, who had 
been killed in a police shooting, was pulled out of Masan harbor.8 However, the 
massive starvation in the mid-1990s and gross human rights violations in North Korea 
have not resulted in any social unrest or civil disobedience, let alone regime change. 
The main reason that any social unrest or civil disobedience is not likely to happen in 
North Korea is a lack of a private sector. No private companies, no private news media, 
no NGOs, no opposition party and no private associations are allowed in North Korea. 
The regime owns and controls everything. Under these circumstances, North Korea 
has been an international concern mainly for two reasons: weapons of mass 
destruction and security, and human rights concerns, both threatening international 
peace and security. 
Since the North Korea’s invasion into South Korea in 1950, North Korea has 
been criticized for being a threat to international peace and security.  North Korea 
joined the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) system in 1992 but refused special 
inspections access to two sites by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). 
Responding to international pressures requesting special inspections, in March 1993, 
North Korea announced its intention to withdraw from the NPT. Although in October 
1994 the United States and North Korea reached an agreement to freeze the North 
Korea’s nuclear program, it broke after the inauguration of President George W. Bush 
in 2002. North Korea along with Iran and Iraq, was labeled as “an axis of evil, aiming 
to threaten the peace of the world”9        
                                                 
8 Cummings, supra note 1, at 349. 
9 George W. Bush, Union address of 2002, available  at  
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html (last visited on May 1, 2007) 
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North Korea has ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (ICESCR), and, therefore, is under the obligation to respect the human rights of 
North Koreans under the Covenants. It has formally insisted that the ICCPR has the 
same effect as a domestic law.10 North Korea claims it actively enforce the human 
rights recognized by the ICCPR and ICESER its duty.11 In reality, however, human 
rights violations in North Korea are widespread and systematic. The regime has a 
unique mechanism to maintain its power, which produces widespread human rights 
violations. In this Chapter, I will clarify several facts and issues that make North 
Korea an international concern. 
 
2. Act of Aggression  
North Korea has been an international concern for many years. It has engaged in 
aggression as well as the development of weapons of mass destruction and gross 
human rights violations.  
On June 25, 1950, North Korea invaded South Korea. On the same day, the 
Security Council adopted a resolution calling for the immediate cessation of hostilities 
and calling upon North Korea to withdraw its armed forces.12 The resolution also 
called upon all members to render assistance to the U.N. in the execution of the 
resolution and to refrain from giving assistance to North Korea.13  
The U.S. considers North Korea a threat to its national security. In December 
1950, President Truman declared national emergency in connection with the Korean 
War under the Trading with the Enemy Act. When the Korean War ended in 1953, 
520,000 North Korean soldiers and 36,000 U.S. soldiers had been killed or wounded.14 
                                                 
10 CCPR/C/PRK/2000/2, para 12. 
11 CCPR/C/PRK/2000/2 para 26. 
12 S/RES/83 (1950). 
13 S/RES/84 (1950). 
14 Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas 9-10 (2001). 
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On July 27, 1953, an armistice was reached. With the end of the war, the U.N. 
Security Council resolution fulfilled its mandate but the U.S. has continued to prohibit 
all U.S. economic contacts with North Korea. Technically, North Korea has been at 
war with the U.S. and South Korea for the last 50 years because a peace treaty has 
never been signed. The U.S.- North Korea relations were generally hostile after the 
war. In January 1968, the North Koreans seized the U.S. spy ship Pueblo together with 
its crew. In August 1976, two U.S. officers were killed by North Korean soldiers in the 
Demilitarized Zone.15  
During the Clinton administration, however, the U.S. and North Korea pledged 
“no hostile intent” toward one another.16 North Korea wanted to have normal relations 
with the U.S that would protect the country from the U.S. threat.17 Many policy 
makers in the U.S argued that a summit between the U.S. and North Korea, which 
might have normalized the relations, would legitimize North Korea’s evil leaders.18 
North Korea is still considered a threat to the U.S. national security.       
 
3. Weapons of Mass Destruction 
 The North Korean nuclear program is one of the main issues that the international 
community has been dealing with for many years. The nuclear issue has determined 
the image of North Korea in the eyes of the international community. It is complex 
and has a long history. In 1991, South and North Korea signed the Korean Peninsula 
Non-Nuclear Agreement, pledging not to “test, manufacture, produce, import, possess, 
store, deploy, or use” nuclear weapons and not to use waste processing or uranium 
enrichment facilities for those purposes.19 It appeared that the Korean peninsula would 
                                                 
15 Cummings, supra note 1,  494-495. 
16 Madeleine Albright, Madam Secretary, 584 (2003). 
17 See, the Agreed Framework of 1994,  Ian Jeffries, North Korea: A guide to economic and political 
developments 113 (Routledge, New York, NY, 2006). 
18 Supra note 16, at 596. 
19 Gavan McCormack, Target North Korea 152 (2004). 
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be free from nuclear threats. However, in March 1993 Pyongyang announced its 
withdrawal from the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).20 In response, the Clinton 
administration planned to destroy North Korea’s nuclear facilities by bombing. The 
operation was stopped at the last minute.21  
In June 1994, the Geneva “Agreed Framework” was concluded. It provides 
that North Korea will stay in NPT and freeze its nuclear reactor program; the Korean 
Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) will provide North Korea with 
two light-water reactors by 2003 and an annual supply of 3.3 million barrels of heavy 
oil until the completion of the reactors;22 the United States and North Korea will move 
towards full normalization of their political and economic relations; the United States 
will provide formal assurances to North Korea against the threat or the use of nuclear 
weapons.23  Faced with strong opposition by a Republican-dominated Congress, the 
Clinton administration was reluctant to commit.24      
Under the administration of President George W. Bush and after September 11, 
2001, the U.S. view toward North Korea changed completely. In January 2002, 
George W. Bush declared North Korea part of the “axis of evil” together with Iran and 
Iraq.25 On January 9, 2002, North Korea announced its withdrawal from the NPT. On 
October 9, 2006, Pyongyang announced that it had successfully tested a nuclear 
device.26 The U.N. Security Council adopted resolutions urging North Korea27 to 
abandon its nuclear program and imposed economic sanctions against North Korea.28 
                                                 
20 Cummings, supra note 1, at 488.  
21 Id.  
22 McCormack, supra note 19, at 154. 
23 Id. 155. 
24 Id. 156. 
25 See Harold Hongju Koh, Jefferson Memorial Lecture Transnational Legal Process After September 
11
th, 22 Berkeley J. Int’l L. 337, 344-345 (2004). 
26 JoongAng Daily, October 10, 2006. 
27 S/RES/1695 (2006). 
28 S/RES/1718 (2006).  
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As of December 15, 2006, the U.S., China, Japan, Russia and both Koreas have been 
having six-way talks to solve the North Korean nuclear issue. 
The North Korean nuclear program is the key issue that the international 
community has engaged for many years. It has had priority over the human rights 
issue, which is to be approached after the nuclear issue is cleared. Without the 
resolution of the nuclear question, the North Korean human rights situation also 
appears hard to resolve. 
 
4. Violations of Civil and Political Human Rights 
The severity of the general human rights situation in North Korea has been known 
through the testimonies of North Korean defectors to China and South Korea since the 
mid-1990s. Because Pyongyang has not allowed human rights NGOs or international 
organizations to visit North Korea and gather information on various human rights 
issues, a lot of controversy surrounds the exact state of human rights in North Korea. 
Knowing the North Korean human rights situations are important for the purpose of 
providing better options to the international community, individual states and NGOs 
for solving North Korean nuclear issues and improving human rights in North Korea. 
While the human rights violations by the regime are severe and widespread, 
the North Korean regime has remained stable even after the collapse of communism. 
The regime uses both physical force and psychological propaganda to control and 
alienate the people. The main tactic that supports the regime to remain in power is the 
complete isolation of the people from the outside world and their repeated 
indoctrination by the Juche ideology. North Koreans come to know that they have 
been deceived by the regime only after coming to China or hearing about the outside 
world.  
One of the North Korea’s arguments against the international criticism of the 
North Korean human rights situation is based on cultural relativism: i.e. the standard 
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of human rights in a country should not be judged by comparison with that of a 
Western democracy. Pyongyang insists: “No people in the world fully enjoy true 
human rights as the Korean people do under the man-centered socialist system of 
Korean style, where the popular masses have become genuine masters of the country 
and everything in the society is made to serve them.”29 Pyongyang also claims that it 
would consolidate the Korean-style, man-centered system of ensuring socialist human 
rights “under the banner of the Juche idea.”30 North Koreans are allegedly “enjoying 
genuine rights and freedom under the man-centered socialist system where the whole 
country forms a big harmonious family and the leader, the Party and the masses are 
single-heartedly united.”31 
Pyongyang sees human rights through their own eyes and denies their 
universality. The peculiarity of the North Korean concept of human rights is that it is 
based on the “principle of collectivism.”32 The North Korean Constitution stipulates 
that the rights and the duties of the citizens are based on the principle of “one for all 
and all for one.”33 They do not want to recognize the reality of their human rights 
situation and they see things only through the Juche ideology.  North Korean people 
and their society have never been exposed to the international community and 
democracy.    
Therefore, the effective strategies to improve the North Korean human rights 
situation, I think, should be to free North Koreans from the Juche ideology, to reduce 
the level of isolation from the outside world, and to provide North Koreans with 
information on democracy and universal values and beliefs, while not turning a blind 
eye on the immediate human rights violations in the country. The isolation of North 
                                                 
29 Korean Central News Agency, July 4, 2003. 
30 Korean Central News Agency, October 31, 2004. Statement by North Korean delegate at the 3rd 
Committee of the 59th UN General Assembly on October 26, 2004. 
31 Korea Central Agency, April 20, 2004.  
32 Article 63 of the Constitution. 
33 Article 63 of the Constitution.  
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Korea is only strengthening the regime because even in extreme hardship, the North 
Korean people do not know how to oppose the regime, and the regime will use foreign 
isolation or sanctions as a pretext to tighten its control over the people. Now, I will 
analyze the general North Korean human rights situations. 
 
4. 1. Death Penalty 
Article 6(1) of the ICCPR declares that, “every human being has the inherent right to 
life. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life. This right shall be protected by 
law.”34  The right to life is the supreme right and no derogations are allowed. The 
death penalty may be imposed “only for the most serious crimes.”35 The death penalty 
can only be carried out by a final judgment of a competent court.36  
The North Korean Criminal Code of 1987 stipulates that the death penalty can 
be imposed for: activities in collusion with the imperialists to suppress the national-
liberation struggle or acts of betraying the state;37 betrayal of the country and defection, 
espionage or helping the enemy;38 instigating, masterminding or being a principal 
participant in a plot to overthrow the Republic; acts of terrorism with a view to 
opposing the Republic;39 particularly serious cases of murder and other offences.40  
In August 1999, North Korea reduced the number of crimes punishable by 
death from 33 to 5, conspiracy to overthrow the state, treason against the fatherland, 
terrorism, treason against the people and premeditated murder.41 In April 2004, it 
defined the crimes punishable by death even more precisely.42 Nonetheless, the 
                                                 
34 Article 6(1) of the CCPR. 
35 Article 6(2) of the CCPR. 
36 Article 6(2) of the CCPR. 
37 Article 52 of the North Korean Criminal Code of 1987.  
38 Id., Article 47. 
39 Id., Article 45. 
40 Id., Article 141. 
41 CCPR/C/PRK/2000/2, para.40. 
42 Korea Institute for National Unification (KIINU), White Paper on Human Rights in North Korea 38-
39 (2005). 
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definition of the crimes punishable by the death penalty is likely to be subjected to 
arbitrary interpretation.  For instance, the Criminal Law states that the death penalty is 
mandatory in the case of a “particularly serious participation in activities against the 
country.”43 North Korea reported, without disclosing bases of the death sentences, that 
6 death sentences were handed down and 5 executions were performed in 1998; 4 
death sentences were imposed and 4 executions were carried out in 1999; and 5 death 
sentences were issued and 4 executions were administered in 2000.44  
North Korea declares that the death penalty is imposed only for five types of 
extremely grave crimes stipulated in the Criminal Code.45 It claims that it is headed in 
the direction of completely abolishing the death penalty.46 In North Korea, however, 
there are some doubts that, during the North Korean famine of 1995-1998, the practice 
of extra-judicial killings or sentencing to death not based on the Criminal Code were 
performed. A number of reports have mentioned several cases of sentencing to death 
for economic crimes.47 A man was executed for having stolen rice.48 A proclamation 
of the Social Safety Agency in 1997 threatened that criminals found guilty of stealing 
grains would be executed by a firing squad.”49 
Death penalty is administered by a court. In 1976, North Korea enacted “the 
Law Concerning the Composition of Courts.” There are three levels of courts: the 
Central Court, Provincial Court, and People’s Courts. People’s Court deals with 
ordinary cases not belonging to Provincial Court. Provincial Court deals with cases 
involving anti-state, anti-people cases and cases to result in the death sentence. A 
judge and two people’s jury render a court’s decision.50 The Higher Court consists of 
                                                 
43 Supra note 37, Article 59. 
44 KINU, supra note 42, at 40. 
45 CCPR/C/PRK/2000/2, para 35. 
46 CCPR/PRK/2002, page 13 para 40. 
47 See, Good Friends, Human Rights in North Korea and the Food Crisis 65-68 (2004). 
48 Amnesty International, Public Executions: Converging Testimonies 4 (2004).  
49 KINU, supra note 42, at 41-42 (2005). 
50 Article 4 of the Law Concerning the Composition of Courts 
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three judges. Court decisions shall be determined by a majority vote.51 The criminal 
procedure is based on mass principle. Article 3 of the Criminal Procedural Law 
stipulates that “in handling criminal case, the state shall rely on the power and wisdom 
of the masses.” The independence of the court is not fully secured.  
The United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) Safeguards 
Guaranteeing Protection of the Rights of Those Facing the Death Penalty states that, 
“where capital punishment occurs, it shall be carried out so as to inflict the minimum 
possible suffering.”52 The North Korean Criminal Procedure Law states that the death 
penalty is carried out in the presence of a prosecutor and with the approval of the 
Supreme Peoples’ Assembly (SPA) Presidium.53 Pyongyang has never admitted to 
public executions. However, the regime uses public executions “as a means of ruling 
for the purpose of planting fear among the populace and spurring awareness of 
specific social problems” without following established standards.54 Trials take place 
immediately before execution or several weeks before.55 The North Korean Criminal 
Procedural Law has the provision that allows public execution to take place 
immediately after trials. Article 286 of the Criminal Procedural Law stipulates that “in 
an effort to prevent crimes and make the masses aware of the consequences, the 
Courts may organize on-site trial procedures.” In this case, the heads or leaders of 
agencies, work places, and unions involved, could bring accusation and reveal the acts 
of criminal perpetrators.56 Posters are put at workplaces with the time, place of 
execution, and the name of the defendant.57  
                                                 
51 Id. Article 17. 
52 Safeguard 9.of the Safeguards Guaranteeing Protection of the Rights of Those Facing the Death 
Penalty, adopted by the UN Economic and Social Council. 
53 Article 297 of the North Korean Criminal Procedure 
54 Human Rights Without Frontier Int, Public Executions (2004). 
55 Amnesty International, Public Executions: Converging Testimonies 4 (1997). 
56 Article 286 of the North Korean Criminal Procedural Law 
57 Id. 
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Public executions are carried out where a lot of people gather, such as schools 
and farms. “Everyone is welcome to attend.”58 One North Korean defector testified 
that he had witnessed his first public execution when he was in fourth grade, and that 
generally, public executions were attended by large numbers of children “who came 
out of curiosity.”59 Sometimes, family members of the accused are forced to appear at 
the scene of execution to publicly denounce the accused.60  
Public executions of Christian believers have been reported several times.61  
On November 20, 1996 five Christians were executed; in 1997, a young woman in her 
twenties carrying a Bible was executed along with her father.62 Public executions were 
carried out frequently during 1996-1998 when famine was severe in North Korea.63 
Public executions by shooting were widespread during the period.64  
 
4. 2. Right to Liberty  
The ICCPR declares that, “no one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention. 
No one shall be deprived of his liberty except on such grounds and in accordance with 
such procedures as are established by law.”65 Anyone arrested must be notified at the 
time of arrest of the reasons for the arrest and be informed of any charges against 
him.66 All detained persons must be treated with humanity and with respect for the 
inherent dignity of the human being.67  
The North Korean Constitution stipulates that, “citizens are guaranteed 
inviolability of the person and the home, and privacy of correspondence. No citizens 
                                                 
58 Id. 
59 Id. 
60 Human Rights Without Frontier Int. supra note 54.   
61 Id.. 
62 U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, Thank You Father Kim Il Sung: Eyewitness 
Accounts of Severe Violations of Freedom of Thought, Conscience, and Religion in North Korea, 49-50. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. 
65 Article 9 of the ICCPR. 
66 Id., Article 9(2). 
67 Id., Article 10(1). 
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can be placed under control or be arrested, nor can their homes be searched without a 
legal warrant.”68  
Punishment under the North Korean penal code is classified as “basic 
punishment” or “additional punishment.” There are four types of punishment: the 
death penalty, the unlimited term of correctional labor, the limited term of correctional 
labor, and labor training.69 The unlimited term of correctional labor sentences are 15 
years or longer. The limited term sentences range from one to 15 years. Those 
sentenced to unlimited or limited correctional labor punishment, are detained in 
“correctional centers” called “kyohwaso” and undergo corrections through labor.70 
Labor training is a new form of punishment and ranges from six months to two years 
of sentences.71 They are typically economic criminals rather than political criminals.  
“Collection points” are detaining centers for defectors, those transgressing the 
designated areas. If a person is caught traveling without a traveling permit, he/she is 
sent to a “collection points.” 
North Korea has been criticized for operating concentration camps and labor 
training camps for political prisoners. They are called “Gwalliso” and often called 
“control district” or “special district for dictatorial control.” In fact, persecutions 
against political prisoners are legitimatized in the North Korean Constitution. Article 
12 of the Constitution states: “The state shall adhere to the class line, strengthen the 
dictatorship of the people’s democracy and firmly defend the people’s power and 
socialist system against all subversive acts of hostile elements at home and abroad.”72 
After the establishment of the North Korean regime, religious leaders and 
those who had collaborated with the Japanese during the occupation were detained in 
                                                 
68 Article 79 of the Constitution. 
69 Article 28 of the North Korean Criminal Law 
70 Id. Article 30. 
71 Id. Article 31.  
72 Article 12 of the Constitution. 
 
 
24
detention camps.73 These facilities have evolved into political prison camps. In 1972 
Kim Il Sung declared: “Factionalists or class enemies, whoever they are, their seed 
must be eliminated through three generations.”74 Consequently, those people are put 
into prison camps, mostly with other family members, without a trial. They have to 
endure extremely hard labor with below- sustenance food rations because the regime 
does not want them back in society. Kang Chol Hwan, a North Korean who, when he 
was nine was taken with his family to one of the political camps in North Korea and 
later defected to South Korea through China, testified in his book about several public 
executions without proper legal process.75  
Gwalliso are located in the Northern Provinces in valleys between high 
mountains.76 It is estimated that approximately 200,000 prisoners are detained in all 
the gwalliso camps throughout North Korea.77 The living conditions in the prison 
camps are extremely poor,78 and family members are also detained through guilt by 
association.79 
Torture and inhumane treatment is not uncommon, especially in political 
camps and detention camps where repatriated North Koreans are also held.80 Torture 
and inhumane treatment are inflicted upon women and children alike. Labor in prison 
camps is extremely hard. It is a tool for the creation of a new citizen who is obedient 
and full of the spirit of the revolution.81  
 
 
                                                 
73 U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom,  supra note 62, at 69-78. 
74 Heo Man-Ho, North Korean Human Rights in “Cooperative Antagonistic Relations”: Intervention 
and Education, Sungkok Journal No. 35, 188 (Sungkok Science and Culture Foundation, 2004). 
75 Kang Chol Hwan, the Aquariums of Pyongyang, 137-144 ( 2001). 
76 Id. 
77 Id. 
78 See, Kang Chol Whan, supra note 75, at 124. 
79 KINU, supra note 42, at 117. 
80  Joanna Hosaniak, Prisoners of Their Own Country: North Korea in the Eyes of the Witnesses, A 
Report of Citizens’ Alliance for North Korean Human Rights (NKHR) 37.  
81 Id. at 44. 
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4. 3. Right to Freedom of Movement and Freedom of Residence 
Article 12 of the ICCPR stipulates that everyone has the right to liberty of movement 
and freedom to choose his residence, and should be allowed to leave any country.82 
Article 75 of the North Korean Constitution stipulates that “citizens have freedom of 
residence and travel.” Although Pyongyang insists that North Koreans are free to leave 
or come back to the country,83 they are not allowed to go abroad freely. 
The right to travel is extremely restricted in North Korea. Travelers should file 
an application with the supervisors of their workplaces two weeks in advance and have 
a travel certificate issued by people’s committees.84 The regime has absolute control 
over the movement of the people through its power to issue a traveler’s certificate. 
Article 6 of the North Korean Regulation of Travel stipulates that the citizens who 
want to travel have traveler’s certificate issued by people’s committees. Persons, 
including foreigners, who want to move their residence, must have their move 
registered.85 This prevents the exchange of information, and consequently, the 
formation of political opinions harmful to the regime. North Koreans do not know the 
country's internal affairs because the flow of information and people are restricted. 
North Korea maintains strict government control over “the flow of information, 
the movement of people, and the means of production.”86 These are important tools to 
control the people, isolating them internally and internationally.87 After the collapse of 
the Eastern bloc, China and Russia started to improve their relationship with the 
outside world. North Korea, on the other hand, limits the exposure of its citizens to 
“the polluting influences” of the outside world.88 North Koreans are not allowed to 
                                                 
82 Article 12 of the ICCPR. 
83 CCPR/C/PRK/2000/2, para 78. 
84 Id. para 76. 
85 Id. para 77. 
86 L. Gordon Flake et al.eds. The Experience of U.S. NGOs in North Korea, Paved with Good 
Intentions: The NGO Experience in North Korea 36 (2003). 
87 Id. 
88 Id.  
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travel abroad; they cannot meet foreigners even inside the country. Contacts with 
foreigners or foreign information are completely banned or controlled by the central 
government. Even during the extreme famine crisis in the mid-1990s, Pyongyang 
insisted that food-aid NGOs should notify the authorities of their intended site visits 
outside of Pyongyang at least a week in advance, and that Korean-speaking staff could 
not be assigned to North Korea. These requirements made the food aid operations 
ineffective and the monitoring of food deliveries difficult.89 Maintaining the regime by 
controlling foreign information and influences was more important from the 
perspective of the North Korean government, than saving the starving population by 
allowing and facilitating the monitoring process. 
Pyongyang has denied access to the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Human Rights 
and on the Right to Food.90 It does not allow independent human rights observers to 
monitor or investigate the human rights situation in North Korea. Scot Snyder argues 
that, “the primary North Korean objectives in dealing with U.N. organization 
representatives and NGO monitors in the country were clear: minimize contact and 
channels of communication with ordinary people and control access to the broader 
North Korean public, while drawing in as many resources as possible.”91         
Further, North Korea forcibly relocates people depending on the needs of the 
regime or for political reasons.92 The disabled are not allowed to live in major cities 
such as Pyongyang and Kaesong, and have no right to reproduction.  
The restriction on the right to movement contributed to the aggravation of the 
famine in the mid-1990s. People could not move freely in search of food during the 
famine while the Public Distribution System (PDS) could not provide them with food 
                                                 
89 Id., at  6. 
90 See, the report of Special Rapporteur on the North Korean human rights, A/60/306 (29 August 2005). 
91 Flake et al. supra note 86, at 3. 
92 KINU, supra note 42, at 132. 
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any more.93 North Koreans had to bribe party officials or security guards to get a 
certificate or to avoid being punished.94 
 
4. 4. Right to Fair Trial  
Article 14 of the ICCPR stipulates that “everyone shall be entitled to a fair and public 
hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by law.” In 
order for the right to fair trial to be guaranteed, the independence of the court should 
be secured; trials should be conducted openly; the suspects should have the right to an 
attorney and the right to appeal unfair trial procedures.  
Article 160 of the North Korean Constitution stipulates that, “in administering 
justice, the court is independent, and judicial proceedings are carried out in strict 
accordance with the law.”95 In reality, however, the fair trial is not secured in the 
North Korean criminal procedures. 
Structurally, the North Korean court system is placed below the Supreme 
People’s Assembly, the National Defense Commission, and the Cabinet.  The Central 
Court is accountable to the Supreme People’s Assembly under article 162 of the 
Constitution; the Constitution limits the tenure of judges to five years.96 Article 255 of 
the North Korean Criminal Procedural Law mandates punishment of judges for unfair, 
unjust and/or arbitrary judgment or decisions.        
In North Korea citizens are tried in open courts, but officials and party staffs 
are tried in secret because trying party official openly will have a negative impact on 
the society. Typically, one judge and two peoples’ jurors participate in the sentencing. 
However, this is totally different from the American jury system. Only workers such 
as farmers and laborers can qualify to serve as jury. They play a nominal role. Further, 
                                                 
93 Id. 
94 Id.   
95 Article 160 of the Constitution. 
96 Article 154 of the Constitution. 
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article 230 of the Criminal Law states that “whenever representatives of workers and 
farmers are present in the trials, they will be asked to make initial accusations of the 
crimes.” The impartiality of courts could not be expected.  
Right to fair trial can be effectively secured by the attorney’s independence 
from the state. Attorneys in North Korea, however, play the role of a political educator. 
Article 11 of the Legal Representation Law provides that one of the attorney’s 
responsibilities is to “explain the nation’s laws and regulations to the people, and to 
help the people obey these laws and regulations.” North Korea does not have bar 
examinations, and attorneys, judges and prosecutors are appointed by the state from 
law school graduates. In short, North Korea lacks a legal system that guarantees the 
impartiality and independence of the judiciary, which is essential in securing equal 
protection under the law.97 
 
4. 5. Right to Privacy 
Article 17 (1) of the ICCPR declares that “[n]o one shall be subjected to arbitrary or 
unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to 
unlawful attacks on his honor and reputation.”98  
Article 79 of the North Korean Constitution says: “Citizens are guaranteed 
inviolability of the person and the home and privacy of correspondence.”99 However, 
the invasion of privacy and private life, including wiretapping, is widespread in North 
Korea.   
The North Korean regime performs widespread surveillance through public 
networks. The Korean Workers' Party, the People’s Safety Agency and the State 
Security Protection Agency keep an eye on the individual’s everyday life and prevent 
                                                 
97 CCPR/CO/72/PRK, para 8. 
98 Article 17 (1) of the CCPR. 
99 Article 79 of the Constitution. 
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any opposition to the regime or anti-revolutionary acts from happening.100 People do 
not know who would report their behavior to the authorities. One North Korean 
testifies: 
 
   My husband was a teacher. One day, while drinking with his friends, he 
said, ‘When on earth are we going to be able to get out of this suffering? It 
would be better if the state falls as soon as possible if it is doomed to go 
away.' This remark was reported by some of his friends, so he was taken to 
a detention camp and was tortured for 40 days there.101  
 
Here is another testimony: 
 
       My father was working in a company. He said, ‘if it is like this, all our North 
Korean people will starve to death.’ Someone reported this to a person from 
an upper class. Then my father was accused of ‘complaint against the 
nation.’ It has been two months since he was arrested, but he has not come 
back.102 
 
All North Koreans are required to join various organizations throughout their 
lives.103 These are not interest groups or pressure groups, but “primary control 
mechanisms over the people.”104 Employment assignments, food rationing, and travel 
constraints are all tied to a political system of comprehensive surveillance.105 North 
Koreans are classified into 3 classes and 51 categories according to their family 
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background and loyalty to the regime.106 The social classification in North Korea has 
contributed to the strengthening of the core class's loyalty to the regime. 
Amid reports of spreading corruption, bribery, pilfering, absenteeism, and 
noncompliance, North Korea’s repressive system may well be loosening. As systems 
of production and reproduction break down, the control system too comes under heavy 
pressure.107 However, the regime seems to be maintaining full control over the 
population. 
The regime and the Korean Workers’ Party have all the background 
information, such as family circumstances and ideological or political inclination. The 
information in possession of the regime and the Party determines a person’s future, 
including education and work assignment.108 Informants working for the regime or the 
Korean Workers’ Party are everywhere at work and in private lives. The continual 
ideological and self-criticism sessions in workplaces, schools and political prison 
camps are a method of obtaining information on a person and the activities of family 
members or neighbors.109  
 
4. 6. Freedom of Religion 
Article 18 of the ICCPR states: “Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion.”110 The freedom of thought is a fundamental basis for a 
democratic society. Coercion that would impair the right to have or to adopt a religion 
or belief such as the use of threat or physical force or penal sanctions, or to recant 
one's religion or to convert is not allowed.111  
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North Korea considers religion as a tool for the ruling class to exploit the 
masses and has persecuted religious activities. Christians were purged because they 
were regarded as tools of imperialist aggression. Religion almost disappeared because 
of severe persecution. In 1972, North Korea recognized in its constitution “the 
freedom of religion” along with “the freedom to launch anti-religious campaigns.”112 
Freedom of religion was practically denied by the freedom to launch anti-religions 
campaigns. 
As the international criticism on the North Korean persecution against religion 
mounted, North Korea relaxed its policies towards religion. Article 68 of the North 
Korean Constitution of 1998 stipulates: “Citizens have freedom of religious belief. 
This right is granted by the permission to build religious buildings and have the legal 
freedom to select any religious ceremonies.” Although the hostility of the constitution 
toward religion has decreased recently, the freedom of religion is perceived only as 
freedom of building religious buildings or having religious ceremonies. North Korea 
advertises internationally the fact that religious facilities have been established.  
North Korea insists that there is no limitation in organizing religious bodies 
and conducting religious activities,113 religion is completely independent of the state, 
and all religions are equal.114 Pyongyang explains that in North Korea the number of 
religious believers is small because many of them were killed during the Korean War, 
and young people do not have an interest in religious groups.115  
In North Korea, Kim Il Sung is “the sun of the nation,”116 and “the eternal 
president of the nation”.117 Consequently, the freedom of religion in North Korea is 
very narrow.118 Freedom of religion is “granted” and includes “the construction of 
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religious buildings and the holding of religious ceremonies.”119 It is not inherent in 
every human being and does not include freedom to change one's religion, and 
freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest 
one's religion in teaching, practice, worship and observance.120 
Further, North Korea considers religion an obstacle to the establishment of a 
communist society. The North Korean Constitution states: “Religion cannot be used to 
draw in foreign forces or for harming the State and social order.”121 This is a 
significant limitation of the freedom of religion because many religions, especially 
Buddhism and Christianity, are of foreign origin.    
Pyongyang, in order to prevent Christianity from entering North Korea, 
severely punishes those who get in touch with South Korean religious groups in 
China.122 This shows the real condition of freedom of religion in North Korea. It 
allows religious activities only for political and economic purposes, such as decreasing 
international criticism, and securing humanitarian assistance from the international 
community.  One North Korean defector testifies: “The North Korean ideology is the 
single-leader doctrine. The central theme of the ideology is Juche. Kim Il Sung is the 
center of things, so nothing else can exist.”123 The worship of Kim Il Sung and Kim 
Jong Il is specifically stipulated in “The Ten Great Principles of Unique Ideology.” 
For example, article 3 of the Principles reads: “Make absolute the authority of the 
Great Leader Kim Il Sung.” Article 4 of the Principles reads: “Accept the Great 
Leader Kim Il Sung’s revolutionary thought as your belief and take the Great Leader’s 
instructions as your creed.” 
Freedom of religion is not likely to be fully recognized in North Korea while 
the Juche ideology is operative. The North Korean regime demands of its people to be 
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absolutely loyal to its Great Leader. Worshiping any other entity but Kim Il Sung 
contradicts his absolute power of a Creator. The Juche ideology as a nationalistic 
ruling ideology has replaced religion. 
 
4. 7. Freedom of Expression 
Article 19 of the ICCPR stipulates: “Everyone shall have the right to freedom of 
expression; this right shall include the freedom to seek, receive and impart information 
and ideas of all kinds regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the 
form of art, or through any other media of their choice”124 The right to freedom of 
expression, press, publication, association, demonstration and assembly is essential in 
modern democratic society. Article 67 of the North Korean Constitution provides: 
“Civilians shall have the freedom of press, publication, association, demonstration, 
and assembly.”125  
In North Korea, the press is owned and controlled by the regime. All news 
media in North Korea belongs either to the state or to public organs. North Koreans 
who own radio or television sets cannot listen to or watch South Korean or Chinese 
broadcasts because the stations are pre-set and the radio and television sets sealed only 
to receive North Korean broadcast.126 North Koreans can only get information 
screened by the regime and are completely excluded from other information.127  
“Many journalists are in fact high ranking government officials or members of the 
Party.”128  
The North Korean press does not provide critical information and commentary 
to citizens. It focuses on the propaganda of Kim Il Sung based on the Juche ideology 
and upon indoctrinating the population. Information is provided, omitted, exaggerated, 
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or fabricated by the government. The press in North Korea is an advertiser, instigator 
and organizer for Korea Workers’ Party designed to help achieve its goals. Under any 
circumstances, the North Korean press may not engage in any type of criticism of the 
leadership or instructions of the Great Leader Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il.  Reports 
on the two Kims occupy the front pages of newspapers, and their names are printed in 
special bold fonts.  
All news is for the express purpose of embedding the supremacy of the North 
Korean system in the minds of the people. There are no critical reports or discussions 
on sensitive issues regarding the system. North Korans do not have any meaningful 
information to compare their political, social, and cultural situation with the outside 
world. The sale of foreign newspapers and magazines is also prohibited in North 
Korea.129 
The external and internal isolation contribute to the strengthening of the regime. 
This, in combination with government propaganda about the threats from foreign 
forces, strengthens the people’s reliance on the current regime.130         
In North Korea, the right to freely express one’s opinion is subject to strict 
controls. Article 195 of the North Korean Criminal Law of 2004 stipulates that 
“people who systematically listen to broadcasts opposing the North Korea, or who 
have collected, retained or disseminated their contents, shall be punished by up to two 
years of labor training.” Article 222 stipulates that “anyone found spreading 
unfounded lies that could contribute to the distrust of North Korea would be punished 
by up to two years of labor training.”  
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4. 8. Right of Political Participation 
Article 25 of the ICCPR stipulates that “every citizen shall have the right and the 
opportunity…without unreasonable restrictions, to take part in the conduct of public 
affairs, directly or through freely chosen representatives:[and] to vote and to be elected 
at genuine periodic elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall 
be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the electors.”  
The right to political participation include the right to participate directly in the 
formation of their country, to join in the election and voting process as election 
candidates or voting members and to be elected to public office.  
Article 6 of the North Korean Constitution stipulates: “The organs of state 
power at all levels, from the county People’s Assembly to the Supreme People’s 
Assembly, are elected on the principle of universal, equal and direct suffrage by secret 
ballot.”131 Article 66 of the Constitution also declares: “All citizens above the age of 
17 shall have the right to vote and the right to elective office.”132 North Korea claims 
that North Koreans “enjoy the right to participate in government according to their 
wishes.”133        
In its second report to the Human Rights Committee, North Korea states: 
“[North Korea] does not have separate legislation for the organization of political 
parties, for the existing parties have been in activity for over 50 years since their 
formation” and “there is actually no public force that requires the formation of a new 
party.”134 On the other hand, it admits that several parties exist in North Korea: the 
Korean Workers’ Party, the Korean Social Democratic Party and the Korean 
Chondoist Chongu Party.135 In reality, the law forbids the formation of new political 
parties. The North Korean Constitution declares that North Korea performs its 
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activities under the leadership of the Korean Workers’ Party.136 Under the North 
Korean Constitution, it is impossible for those parties to win elections. Those parties 
are established for the purpose of propaganda that democracy is being practiced.  
       
5. Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in North Korea 
5.1. Right to Work  
Article 6 of the ICESCR stipulates that everyone has the right “to gain his living by 
work which he freely chooses or accepts.”137 The ICESCR also demands that states 
take appropriate steps to safeguard this right.138  Article 70 of the North Korean 
Constitution provides: “People have a right to the choice of employment according to 
their desire and talent.”139 North Korea insists that “[u]nemployment or semi-
unemployment is never found” because the means of production are owned by the 
public.140 North Korea claims that “working people have no need to hold more than 
one full-time job to secure an adequate standard of living for themselves and their 
families,”141 because the state provides all working people with every condition for 
obtaining food, clothing and housing. 
In North Korea, labor is considered as “responsibility.”142 Article 83 of the 
Constitution also states that “the people must voluntarily and diligently engage in 
labor and strictly obey labor regulations and labor hours.” Labor is not for the 
individual’s benefit, bur a group activity for the benefit of everyone.143 
Free labor unions that protect and represent the interests of laborers do not 
exist in North Korea. The only labor union in North Korea is the General Federation 
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of Korean Trade Unions, which does not have the right to collectively organize, 
bargain, or strike. Labor activities are severely restricted by the penal code. Article 59 
of the North Korean Criminal Law provides that “any person who uses his or her 
employment to destroy or damage the state’s industry, transportation, commerce will 
be executed.” Further, Article 61 of the Criminal Law stipulates that “people who 
carry out their work in an inattentive manner will be sentenced to at least five years 
imprisonment and cannot vote for four years after the completion of their sentence.”  
Workers are assigned to their jobs according to the central economic plan and 
individual talents and/or wishes are secondary considerations. In order to resign from a 
job, one has to obtain the approval of the manager and the party secretary. North 
Koreans are assigned on a group basis to factories, mines or various construction 
facilities. For example, in 2001, high school students and soldiers discharged from the 
military were group-assigned to the Pyongyang Textile Factory and Ranam Coal Mine 
Collective. The authorities awarded service medals and held send-off ceremonies to 
praise their resolutions to work there.144 Group-assignment means that one has to live 
there for life. Refusal to obey a group-assignment means being excluded from all 
rations.    
Family background and party loyalty determine the assignment of workers.145 
Students without a good family background are assigned to a field that demands 
physical labor; children of party cadres or government officials are assigned to better 
work places. Work assignments are susceptible to personal favoritism or bribes.146  
In North Korea, production quotas are very often assigned to a group of 
workers and the group members are collectively responsible for the result of the work. 
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Workers must attend collective meetings and study sessions including self-criticism 
and ideological study sessions.147  
 
5. 2. Right to Education  
Education should be directed “to the full development of the human personality and 
the sense of its dignity, and shall strengthen the respect for human rights and 
fundamental freedoms.”148 Further, education should “enable all persons to participate 
effectively in a free society, promote understanding, tolerance and friendship among 
all nations and all racial, ethnic or religious groups.”149 Article 73 of the North Korean 
Constitution recognizes the right to education.150  
The goal of education in North Korea is to train solid revolutionaries for the 
future who will fight for the society and for the people, and to educate new communist 
citizens. The Constitution provides that “the state shall put the principles of socialist 
education into practice and raise a new generation of steadfast revolutionaries who 
will fight for the society and the people, people of a new communist type who are 
knowledgeable, morally sound and physically healthy.”151 Article 27 of the Family 
Law stipulates that parents should raise their children to be steadfast revolutionaries 
and new communists.152 
At early stages of elementary and secondary schools, infusing students with the 
ideology of the Great Leader Kim Il Sung and the Dear General Kim Jong Il is the 
primary process of education.153 Kim Il Sung's life and revolutionary struggle are 
school subjects. The textbooks are full of propaganda idolizing Kim’s family.154  
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There is a systematic policy of discrimination against the lower classes. No 
matter how good one’s academic achievements are, one is unable to get college 
education if one’s personal or family background is low. Since the food crisis of the 
mid-1990s, the compulsory education system has not been working. Both teachers and 
students spend more time in search of food rather than in schools. 
 
5. 3. Right to Food 
In September 1995, the North Korean government appealed for food aid to the United 
Nation’s World Food Program (WFP) and the international community. The collapse 
of the Eastern-bloc economic system and natural disasters are allegedly the main 
reasons for North Korea’s food shortage.155 
First, North Korea has had a close relationship with China and the Soviet 
Union since the regime was established on the Northern part of the Korean peninsula. 
It received food subsidies from China and the Soviet Union, for which it paid in goods. 
China and the Soviet Union also provided North Korea with oil.156  The Eastern 
economic bloc collapsed around 1990-1991.157 North Korea lost its sources of food aid 
and oil supply, which resulted in an economic catastrophe. With the dissolution of the 
Eastern economic bloc North Korea also lost its market for goods through which it 
could earn foreign currency.158 This reduced its buying capabilities. The North Korean 
government launched a “let’s eat two meals a day” campaign in 1991 and the Public 
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Distribution System (PDS) rations were reduced by 10 percent in 1992.159 It appears 
that the food shortage or famine had begun long before natural disasters hit North 
Korea in the mid-1990s.  
Second, the North Korean government claimed that the food shortage was 
caused by natural disasters such as flooding and drought.160 Severe flooding occurred 
in successive years and a drought followed in 1997.161 The country had to cope with 
the catastrophic famine years of 1995-98, which claimed hundreds of thousands of 
lives. The number of estimated victims of the North Korean famine in 1995-1998 
ranges from 200,000 to three million. Nicholas Eberstadt estimated the famine 
casualties to be around three million based on a survey conducted by the North Korean 
government.162 Good Friends, a South Korean humanitarian aid group, also estimated 
the casualties to be three million.163 In May 1999, an official of the North Korean 
Foreign Ministry admitted that 220,000 people had died during the famine.164  Despite 
the launch of a large-scale international relief effort, especially targeting children, 
there were many deaths, especially among the most vulnerable members of the 
population. Malnutrition and stunting of growth among children became chronic.  
Other fundamental human rights were also violated or aggravated as a result of 
the violations of the right to food. First, public executions were used to control the 
population. They had been reported even before the famine. North Korea frequently 
used public executions to suppress the public unrest caused by the famine. A 
proclamation by the Social Safety Agency during the famine warned people not to 
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engage in grain-selling activities. It declared, “[t]hose who are engaged in grain-
selling activities for the purpose of illicit accumulation of wealth shall be sternly 
punished under the law, including execution by firing squad.”165 
Second, the famine aggravated especially the human rights of women and 
children and the effects on them were long-lasting. The famine had an enormous 
impact on women and children. Women were exposed to trafficking after they crossed 
the Chinese border in search of food.166 Children were left behind without parental 
care because parents died of hunger or were away from home searching for food. The 
number of abandoned children increased.167 
Third, the famine forced many North Koreans seeking food into China. A 
number of them returned, while some remained in China or made their way to South 
Korea. Returning North Koreans have faced various forms of human rights violations 
by the regime, while those seeking shelter in China are easily exposed to human rights 
violations including forced marriage and prostitution by the Chinese.168  
Fourth, the famine had disastrous effects on prisoners because they had no 
other alternatives to find food other than what was given them through the prison 
system. The combination of hard labor and below-subsistence-level food provisions 
resulted in malnutrition and disease, and even death from starvation.169  
 
6. Rights of Women  
In February 2001, North Korea joined the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW).170 Under the Convention, North Korea 
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is under the obligation to eliminate discrimination against women and to take all 
appropriate measures to ensure the full development and advancement of women.171  
Article 77 of the North Korean Constitution stipulates:  “Women are accorded 
an equal social status and rights with men,” and the Law on Sex Equality says: 
“Women shall have equal rights with men in all spheres of the state’s economic, social, 
cultural and political life.”172 The Constitution provides that the state shall afford 
special protection to mothers and children by providing maternity leave, reduced 
working hours for mothers with several children, a wide network of maternity 
hospitals, nurseries and kindergartens, and other measures.173 According to the 
Constitution, the state should provide all conditions for a woman to play a full role in 
society.”174 Pyongyang insists that since the Law on the Equality of Sexes was 
promulgated on July 30, 1946, “women’s equality has been fully realized and there is 
no legal discrimination against women” in North Korea.175  
In practice, however, the status and the role of North Korean women have not 
improved as much as the regime claims. Although women participate in various 
political organs, their participation is arbitrarily prescribed by the Korean Workers’ 
Party according to its political considerations.176 For example, about 20 percent of the 
people’s deputies at the Supreme People’s Assembly have been female, but they are 
not elected through free elections. Only very small number of women is appointed to 
cabinet positions.  
Further, trafficking in women and sexual assault have been reported very 
often.177 Women trafficking in North Korea include forcible abduction, enticement by 
intermediaries, and voluntary submission for the purpose of supporting the family, 
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which is the result of the economic hardships and food shortage in North Korea. 
Women, in order to survive and support their families in North Korea, volunteer for 
arranged marriages with Chinese farmers. When women in search of food are caught 
in China and deported to North Korea, they would routinely be detained, tortured or 
mistreated.      
        
7. Rights of Child 
 The ICCPR guarantees every child, without any discrimination, the right to such 
measures of protection as are required by his status as a minor, on the part of his 
family, society and the state.178 North Korea joined the Convention on the Rights of 
the Child (Child Convention) in 1990.179 According to article 6 of the Convention, 
North Korea should ensure to the maximum extent possible the survival and 
development of the child. Further, North Korea must secure that “all children be 
entitled to enjoy the standard of living adequate for the physical, mental, intellectual, 
ethical and social development.”180 In 1999, North Korea established National 
Committee for the Rights of the Child.  The North Korean Childrearing Guideline 
Law stipulates that, “the state and social cooperative organizations shall guarantee all 
necessary measures for childrearing under the principle of best interests for the 
children.”181  
In its second periodic report to the Convention, Pyongyang insisted that “the 
youth and children of [North Korea] are filled with pride, joy and optimism of life,”182 
and at the same time admitted that the successive natural disasters severely damaged 
the education and public health facilities, and millions of children were severely 
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affected with regard to education and medical services.183 The child mortality rate has 
been continuously increasing since 1993.184 
North Korean children’s living conditions have deteriorated since the mid-
1990s due to the food crisis and economic hardship. Due to hunger and disintegrating 
families, many children were thrown into the streets begging for food. According to 
the Nutrition Assessment carried out in 2002 by UNICEF and WFP, the prevalence of 
wasting and stunting in children less than 7 years of age was 9 percent and 42 percent 
respectively. An estimated 70,000 children were severely wasted and required 
hospitalization. 185 According to the UNICEF and WFP survey, one third of mothers 
were suffering from anemia and the under-nutrition of mothers was the main cause of 
poor nutrition of newborn babies.186        
        
8. North Korean Refugees 
The exact number of North Koreans who have crossed or are crossing the Chinese-
North Korean border into China is unknown because they are constantly moving, 
some returning to North Korea, others staying in China, and still others coming to 
South Korea. It is estimated that as many as 300,000 North Koreans were living in 
China187 during 1995-1998 when the famine peaked in North Korea.188 In March 2005, 
the U.S. Department of State estimated that number to be between 30,000 and 
50,000.189 The legal status of the North Koreans who defect to China or other 
                                                 
183 CRC/C/65/Add.24. para 24. 
184 Id., para 80. 
185 http://www.unicef.org/dprk/nutrition_assessment.pdf 
186 Id. 
187 The term “migrant” stands for a person who leaves his or her country mainly for economic reasons; 
“refugee” is someone who is entitled to protection from repatriation because of a well-founded fear of 
persecution in his or her home country, as defined in the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees 
of 1951; I also use “defectors,” meaning those who have escaped from North Korea, regardless of their 
motivation. Human Rights Watch, The Invisible Exodus: North Koreans in the People’s Republic of 
China 8.  
188 Supra note 183, at 1. 
189 U.S. Department of State, A Report of the State Department to the U.S. Congress under the North 
Korean Human Rights Act of 2004, “The Status of North Korean Asylum Seekers and the U.S. Policy 
 
 
45
neighboring countries190 and the question how to protect them from being further 
victimized is one of the key issues in the international human rights law.  
China is party to the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and 
its 1967 Protocol (Refugee Convention). The fundamental obligation of states under 
the Convention is to honor the principle of “non-refoulement.”191 According to the 
principle, states are not allowed to forcibly return people to a country where their life 
or freedom would be endangered. China considers the North Korean defectors in 
China as illegal, economic migrants or trespassers, not as refugees in the meaning of 
the Refugee Convention. A spokesperson for the Chinese Foreign Ministry said: 
       
       [a]s for some North Koreans entering China illegally, judged from their 
plight, they are not refugees. Rather, they are illegal trespassers. Therefore, 
we are always treating them in accordance with the International law, the 
relevant laws of China and in a humanitarian spirit.192  
 
Between the end of the Korean War in July 1953 and September 2006, nearly 
10,000 North Koreans have entered South Korea. South Korea accepts all North 
Koreans and facilitates the procedure through silent negotiations with relevant states. 
The South Korean position is that they should not be returned to North Korea against 
their consent. However, Seoul opposes direct involvement in a North Korean exodus 
and believes that promoting economic cooperation and providing financial support to 
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travel as far as Thailand, Vietnam and Mongolia. 
191 Dennis Mcmara, The Protection of Refugees and the Responsibility of States: Engagement or 
Abdication, 11 Harv. Hum. Rts. J. 355, 356. 
192 Press conference on May 22, 2003, in Beijing, Xinhua News Agency, June 25, 2003. 
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North Korea can provide a permanent solution to the problem of North Korean 
defectors.193   
The Special Rapporteur for North Korean human rights has noted that there are 
lapses in the compliance with the principle of non-refoulment in some countries that 
are receiving North Korean asylum seekers.194 He argues that in determining refugee 
status “a key test is whether they are protected by the country of origin.”195  
 
9. Conclusion 
 After the end of the Cold War, the former Soviet Union collapsed and China 
essentially abandoned its socialist system and pursued economic reform and openness. 
The North Korean regime was facing serious threats internally and internationally 
because its economy began to collapse and the regime became isolated from the 
international community. Under these circumstances, the North Korean regime 
considers its nuclear program as the last resort that would guarantee its survival.196 
The regime started its nuclear program in 1993 when the economic collapse threatened 
the survival of the people, and eventually the regime itself. Having been labeled part 
of the “axis of evil” in 2002 along with Iraq and Iran,197 and having seen the invasion 
of Iraq by American troops in 2003, North Korea resumed its nuclear program. On 
October 9, 2006, it announced that it had successfully conducted an underground 
nuclear test.198  
There are three main bases on which the international community can possibly 
adopts international measures against North Korea: act of aggression, weapons of 
                                                 
193 Ministry of Unification, Humanitarian Support for North Korea: Significance and Impact, available 
at http://www.unikorea.go.kr/english/EUP/EUP0207R.jsp (last visited on October 10, 2006). 
194 E/CN.4/2005/34, para 46-47. 
195 Id. 
196 On the history of the North Korean nuclear program, see Bruce Cummings, supra note 1, at 479-491. 
197 The President’s State of Union Address, on January 29, 2002, available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html. 
198 Korean Central News Agency, October 9, 2006. 
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mass destruction and violations of human rights. One of the measures that can be 
adopted to alter the North Korean behavior is imposing economic sanctions. The U.N. 
Security Council may impose economic sanctions under Chapter VII of the Charter 
and individual states may impose sanctions as one of their foreign policy tools. 
Imposing economic sanctions against North Korea, however, would be limited by two 
factors: its legality, in other words, the scope of economic sanctions permitted by 
international law, and its effectiveness.  
With regard to effectiveness of sanctions, it should be noted that without 
Washington's clear guarantee for the survival of the regime, Pyongyang might not 
relinquish the program, despite its great economic difficulties. The U.N. Security 
Council imposed economic sanctions on North Korea after Pyongyang performed a 
nuclear test.199 Well-planned economic sanctions can accomplish the proposed goal. 
For example, banning the export of nuclear technology or parts necessary for 
developing nuclear weapons can foil the nuclear program of a country that pursues 
nuclear weapons. However, if the country has already secured nuclear technology and 
materials, and already has nuclear weapons, it would be almost impossible to 
denuclearize it by imposing economic sanctions unless the very threat that has caused 
it to engage in the nuclear program has been completely removed.  
The first assumption of this study is that economic sanctions cannot dismantle 
the North Korean nuclear program. The North Korean regime has remained stable 
even after the collapse of communism. The North Korean nuclear program has 
remained as threats to international peace and security and the human rights violations 
by the regime are severe and widespread. It is urgently needed that an effective 
strategy to solve the North Korean nuclear threats and promote the North Korean 
human rights should be established.  
 
                                                 
199 S/RES/1718 (2006). 
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CHAPTER THREE 
LEGALITY OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS 
 
1. Introduction 
The previous chapter focused on the various international concerns caused by North 
Korea, which might trigger actions by the international community. Now, attention 
turns to the possible measures the international community can take against North 
Korea. When faced with violations of international law, a lot of options are available 
for the international community. These include: public statements, restrictions on 
cultural and sports contacts, embargoes on arms sales, cessation of aid, breaking 
diplomatic relations, and economic sanctions, and use of force.1 Sanctions have been 
most frequently adopted. Generally, sanctions have been classified into: travel,2 
military,3 diplomatic4 or cultural,5 and economic.         
Machael P. Malloy defines economic sanctions as “any country-specific 
economic or financial prohibition imposed upon a target country or its nationals with 
the intended effect of creating dysfunction in commercial and financial transactions 
with respect to the specified target, in the service of specified foreign policy 
                                                 
1 Evan Luard, Human Rights and Foreign Policy 26-27 (Oxford: Pergamon Press 1981), pp-26-27. 
2 Travel sanctions can include both sanctions against the travel of certain individuals or groups and 
sanctions against certain kinds of air transport. In its Resolution 1267 (1999), the Security Council 
prohibited taking off or landing of any aircraft owned, leased or operated by or on behalf of the Taliban. 
S/RES/1267 (1999).     
3 Military sanctions include arms embargos or the termination of military assistance or training. Marc 
Bossuyt, Commission On Human Rights, Working Paper on the adverse consequences of economic 
sanctions on the enjoyment of human rights, E/CN.4/Sub.2/2000/33 (2000), para 14. Arms embargos 
are analyzed as economic sanctions in this study. 
4 Types of diplomatic sanctions vary. They can prohibit diplomats and political leaders of the target 
country from participating in international bodies and organizations. They also may include the 
withdrawal of diplomatic personnel and international organizations from the target country. See 
generally, Gary Clyde Hufbauer et al., Peterson Institute for International Economics 91-98 (3rd ed, 
2007), pp. 91-98.      
5 Cultural sanctions may include banning the athletes of the target country from international sports. See, 
Neta C. Crawford & Audie Klotz, How Sanctions Work: Lessons from South Africa 213-228(St. 
Martin’s Press, New York, 1999), pp. 213-228. 
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purposes.”6 States and the international community, by applying economic sanctions, 
confirm international standards, monitor international behavior, and express 
dissatisfaction over violations of human rights norms.7 
Economic sanctions are imposed to accomplish various foreign policy goals 
such as warfare, destabilization of foreign governments, and denuclearization as well 
as promoting human rights.8 Even when economic sanctions fail to change the target 
country’s behavior, they could demonstrate unified disapproval and resolution by 
those applying the sanctions and may deter other countries which would otherwise 
violate international norms.9  Economic sanctions also can serve important domestic 
political purposes.10 A frequent aim is to please domestic constituencies, providing a 
satisfying effect on them. In that case, sanctions are usually weak and ultimately 
ineffective because proposed policy goals are not toward the target country and 
therefore, not meant to be achieved.  
Economic sanctions can be applied simultaneously with other kinds of 
sanctions, for example, diplomatic or cultural sanctions. They can be applied under the 
authorization of the U.N. Security Council, which is usually called multilateral 
sanctions. The United Nations imposed collective sanctions twice, against Rhodesia in 
196611 and South Africa in 197712, before the end of the Cold War. Since the collapse 
of the Cold War, the number of the U.N. approved sanctions has increased. Post-Cold 
                                                 
6 Michael P. Malloy, United States Economic Sanctions: Theory and Practice 10-11 (Kluwer Law 
International, Hague, 2001), pp. 10-11. 
7 Sarah H Cleveland, Norm Internalization and U.S. Economic Sanctions, 26 Yale J. Int’l L. 1, 87 
(2001). 
8 Id. 
9 David Cortright & George A. Lopez, The Sanctions Decade: Assessing UN Strategies in the 1990s 14-
17 (Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder, Colorado, 2000), pp. 14-17. 
10 Gary Clyde Hafbauer et al, Peterson Institute for International Economics, Economic Sanctions 
Reconsidered: History and Current Policy 5-7 (Washington DC, 2007), pp.5-7. 
11 U.N. Doc. S/Res/232 (1966). 
12 U.N. Doc. S/Res/418 (1977). 
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War U.N. sanctions include those against Iraq,13 former Yugoslavia,14 Haiti15 and 
Libya.16  
Economic sanctions can be applied unilaterally, without the authorization of 
the U.N. Security Council. Unilateral sanctions are considered to be less effective than 
multilateral sanctions.17 Haass argues that “unilateral sanctions will be little more than 
statements or expressions of opposition” unless the sanctioning and target countries 
have close ties each other.18 The U.S. has frequently used unilateral economic 
sanctions, alone or with other countries.  
The issue of legal basis of economic sanctions poses the question as to what 
extent the international law permits economic sanctions. This question is important to 
find legally permissible measures against North Korea by the international community.  
 
2. Economic Sanctions under the U.N. Charter 
The U.N. Security Council has the primary responsibility of maintaining international 
peace and security.19 Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter gives the Council the power to 
adopt mandatory decisions which are biding on all member states.20 The U.N. Charter 
expressly contemplates that multilateral economic sanctions, which mean sanctions 
approved by the U.N. Security Council, 21  may be imposed in order to maintain or 
                                                 
13 U.N. Doc. S/Res/661 (1990). 
14 U.N. Doc. S/Res/713 (1991). 
15 S/Res/841 (1993) and S/Res/875 (1993). 
16 S/Res/883 (1993). 
17 Hossein G. Askari, John Forrer, Hildy Teegen, and Jiawen Yang, Economic Sanctions: Examining 
Their Philosophy and Efficacy 32 (Praeger, 2003). 
18 Richard N. Hass,  Lessons and Recommendations, in Economic Sanctions and American Diplomacy 
200 (A Council on Foreign Relations Book, Richard N. Haass ed., 1998). 
19 Article 24 of the U.N. Charter. 
20 Article 25 of the U.N. Charter. 
21 Article 41 of the U.N. Charter stipulates: “The Security Council may decide what measures not 
involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon 
the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial 
interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of 
communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.” 
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restore international peace and security.22 The Security Council, under Article 39 of 
the U.N. Charter, may determine the existence of a threat to the peace or breach of the 
peace, and an act of aggression23 and may ask member states to call for non-military 
measures, including “complete or partial interruption of economic relations.”24 These 
provisions are the legal bases on which the U.N. can impose economic sanctions in the 
U.N. mechanism.         
During the Cold War, multilateral economic sanctions25 were hard to be 
adopted because of the difficulty obtaining a consensus among the Security 
members.26 In 1965, the U.N. Security Council authorized economic sanctions against 
Rhodesia after its unilateral declaration of independence.27 In 1977, after hundreds of 
blacks were killed in Soweto, it imposed a limited arms embargo on South Africa, 
finding arms trade with South Africa, not apartheid per se, a threat to peace.28 The 
United Nations efforts to impose broader economic sanctions against South Africa 
were unsuccessful for nearly a decade by the Western veto powers.29 
After the Cold War, the Council began to employ economic sanctions more 
actively. In 1990 the Council imposed the first mandatory comprehensive sanctions 
against Iraq in response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.30 In 1990 the Council adopted 
an arms embargo against former Yugoslavia by prohibiting the supply of any weapons 
and military equipment to any of the constituent parts of former Socialist Federal 
                                                 
22 Article 39 and 41 of the U.N. Charter. 
23 Article 39 of the U.N. Charter.  
24 Article 41 of the U.N. Charter. 
25 Multilateral sanctions can mean sanctions with the Council’s authorization, or literally sanctions by 
multi-states. In this study, multilateral sanctions mean sanctions with the Council’s authorization. 
26 See, David Schiweigman, The Authority of the Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter: Legal Limits and the Role of the Internatinonal Court of Justice 1-4 (Kluwer Law International, 
The Hague, 2001). 
27 U.N. Doc. S/Res/232 (1966). In 1962, U.N. General Assembly affirmed that South Rhodesia was a 
non-self governing territory. The sanction resolution was adopted after Ian Smith, white minority 
regime in South Rhodesia, declared independence in 1965.  
28 U.N. Doc. S/Res /418(1977). 
29 Schiweigman, supra note 26, at 52-56. 
30 U.N. Doc. S/Res/661(1990). 
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Republic of Yugoslavia.31 The collapse of the Cold War enabled the Council to cope 
with new challenges on a common ground.    
Basically, the Security Council enjoys broad discretion in determining the 
existence of “a threat to the peace”, “breach of the peace”, or ‘act of aggression” 
necessary for invoking Article 39 and 41 of the Charter. The Charter recognizes its 
discretionary power by stipulating its authority to determine the existence of any threat 
to the peace32 and decide what measures are to be employed.33 If the Council 
determines that a certain situation constitutes a threat to the peace, it can intervene, 
through sanctions or the use of force, despite the principle of non-intervention of 
internal affairs under Article 2(7) of the Charter. Therefore, the question of what 
constitutes a threat to the peace to or breach of the peace is critical.34  
The first question relating to the Council’s power under Article 39 of the 
Charter is whether the Council has absolute discretion on the determination of the 
existence of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, and an act of aggression.      
There are two opposite arguments. One argument is that the Security Council has an 
absolute discretion in determining the existence of the conditions under Article 39. 
This argument is based on the assumption that there is no direct judicial review of 
Security Council jurisdiction by the International Court of Justice (ICJ).35 Kelsen 
states that the determination under Article 39 is an outcome of political deliberations 
by a political United Nations organ and therefore the Council may impose economic 
sanctions at its discretion for the purpose of Chapter VII.36 Derek Bowett also argues 
that the Security Council is a political organ composed of five major powers and 
                                                 
31 U.N. Doc. S/Res/713 (1991). 
32 Article 39 of the U.N. Charter. 
33 Article 41 of the U.N. Charter. 
34 The notion of an act of aggression is relatively clear. See, Erika De Wet, The Chapter VII Power of 
the United Nations Security Council 145-149 (Hart Publishing, 2004). 
35 L. Picchio Forlati, L.A. Sicilianos, Les sanctions economiques en droit international: Economic 
Sanctions in International Law 332 (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Boston, 2004). 
36 Hans Kelen, The Law of the United Nations, A Critical Analysis of its Fundamental Problems 733 
(Frederick A. Praeger, New York, 1964). 
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therefore decisions in the interest of peace and security are fundamentally of political 
considerations.37 
Judge Weeramantry explains that the determination under 39 of the existence 
of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace or an act of aggression is “one entirely 
within the discretion of the Council.”38 He states: 
 
 The Council and no other is the judge of the existence of the state of affairs 
which brings Chapter VII into operation. That decision is taken by the Security 
Council in its own judgment and in the exercise of the full discretion given to it 
by Article 39.39  
 
Others argue that the Security Council’s power under Chapter VII is not 
unlimited and vagueness of Article 39 is no different from any other legal 
provisions.40 Article 39 stipulates three criteria that is the basis of binding resolutions 
of the Council, and this means that its power is not unlimited. This argument asserts 
that the three criteria in Article 39 play “the role of checks and balances that prevents 
the Council from becoming the world government.”41  The Council could impose 
biding measures only under Chapter VII, whereas it could recommend under Chapter 
VI only non-binding measures. If the Council’s power under Chapter VII is not 
unlimited, these distinctions would be meaningless.42   
Considering the distinction of the Council’s power between under Chapter VI 
and Chapter VII, and the Council’s careful practice in determining the existence of a 
                                                 
37 Derek Bowett, The Impact of Security Council Decisions on Dispute Settlement Procedures, 
European Journal of International Law 93 (1994). 
38 Separate opinion of Judge Weeramantry in Case Concerning Questions of Interpretation and 
Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan 
Arab Jamahiriya v United States of America), Provisional Measures, ICJ Rep 1992, at 176. 
39 Id. 
40 De Wet, supra note 34, at 136. 
41 Id., at 137. 
42 Id., at 137. 
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threat to the peace, the Council’s discretion is not unlimited. Sanctions under the 
United Nations must be imposed only when there is a threat of or breach of the peace, 
and an act of aggression. Therefore, economic sanctions under the Chapter VII of the 
Charter may not be imposed for economic benefits or undue political interference.  
The argument that the Council’s discretion is not unlimited, however, does not 
exclude the possibility that in its practice the Council interprets the existence of a 
threat to the peace with flexibility to meet new challenges. In reality, the Council, to 
cope with new challenges threatening international peace and security, has been 
expanding the meaning of “a threat to the peace.” In this Chapter, after reviewing the 
meaning of Article 39 of the Charter, I will turn to the limits of the power of the 
Security Council. 
  
2. 1. Threat to the Peace    
The term “peace” can be defined negatively as “the absence of an organized use of 
force between states.”43 According to this view, a threat to the peace means to 
potentially provoke armed conflicts between states.44 Supporters of this view argue 
that the Security Council is basically ‘a reactionary organ’ and not required to prevent 
all, possible long term tensions.45 They also argue that the structure and composition 
of the Security Council limits its mandate. According to this view, for example, 
human rights violations cannot be a threat to the peace unless they have some effect 
causing armed conflicts beyond national boundaries.46  The Security Council is not 
allowed to address, under Article 39, human rights violations committed internally.       
Some argue, however, that peace means “friendly relations between states and 
other economic, social, political and environmental conditions which are needed for a 
                                                 
43 The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary edited by Bruno Simma, 608 (Oxford University 
Press, 1994). 
44 De Wet, supra note 34, at 138. 
45 Id., 139. 
46 Id., 140. 
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lasting, conflict free society.”47 According to this view, the notion “threat to the 
peace” can be more flexible and human rights violations can be a threat to the peace 
even without direct impact on neighboring countries.  The Security Council can be 
more active in responding to the violations of international law and maintaining 
international peace.   
In the Council’s practice, a threat to the peace involves many types of activities. 
The Council, in its Resolution 748, determined that “the failure by the Libyan 
Government to demonstrate by concrete actions its renunciation of terrorism 
constituted a threat to international peace.”48  In its Resolution 1540, it confirmed that 
“proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as well as their means of 
delivery, constitutes a threat to international peace and security.”49 In 2000, Al Gore, 
the then vice-President of the United States, suggested that the Council’s agenda 
should include the global environmental challenge, drugs and corruption, terrorism 
and HIV/AIDS.50 The notion of a threat to the peace is a very flexible concept that can 
be changed and developed by the subsequent practice of the Council.51  In this respect, 
the notion of peace cannot be understood as a simple absence of use of force.                 
               
2. 2. Breach of the Peace and an Act of Aggression 
Breach of the peace means a serious outbreak of armed conflicts, not amounting to an 
act of aggression.52 In practice of the Security Council, however, breach of the peace 
includes a substantial act of aggression. The Security Council has determined the 
existence of a breach of peace in four cases, the North Korean invasion of South 
                                                 
47 Simma, supra note 43, at 608. 
48 U.N. Doc. S/Res/748 (1992). 
49 U.N. Doc. S/Res/1540 (2004). 
50 Vice President Al Gore, Opening Statement in the Security Council Meeting on AIDS in Africa, 
SC/6791 (2000), on 10 January 2000, www.un.org/News/Press/docs/. 
51 De Wet, supra note 34, at 167. 
52 Simma, supra note 43, at 609. 
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Korea,53 the Argentinean invasion of the Falklands,54 the war between Iran and Iraq,55 
and the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.56 In these cases, the Council determined that there 
had existed breaches of the peace, not an act of aggression. In the Korean case, the 
Soviet Union unsuccessfully argued that the situation in Korea was a civil war and 
therefore was not breach of the peace, which was a threat to international peace.57    
The General Assembly Resolution 331458 defines an act of aggression as “the 
use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political 
independence of another State, or in any other manner” with the Charter. An act of 
aggression includes the invasion or attack, bombardment, blockade of the ports or 
coasts of a State.59The notion of aggression includes indirect aggression, meaning use 
of force short of full-scale armed invasion across national borders.60 ICJ, in Nicaragua 
v. United States, finds that the arming and training of the contra rebels by the United 
States as the use of force and interference in internal affairs, but not the mere 
supplying of funds to them.61  
 
2. 3. Human Rights Violations as “a Threat to the Peace” 
Before World War II, the international order was based on the traditional view of the 
principle of state sovereignty. According to this principle, a sovereign state has 
complete freedom to deal with its own nationals.62 It was falling within the domestic 
jurisdiction and does not allow any interference. The U.N. is also based on the 
                                                 
53 U.N. Doc. S/Res/82 (1950). 
54 U.N. Doc. S/Res/502 (1982). 
55 U.N. Doc. S/Res/598 (1987). 
56 U.N. Doc. S/Res/660 (1990). 
57 Simma, supra note 43, at 609. 
58 U.N. Doc. GA/ Res /3314 (1974). 
59 Id. 
60 De Wet, supra note 34, at 147. 
61 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States of America), 
merits, ICJ Rep 1986, at 101. 
62 Richar B. Lillich and Hurst Hannum, International Human Rights: Problems of Law, Policy, and 
Practice, Little, Brown and Company 33 (1995). 
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principle of the sovereign equality63 and any intervention within the domestic 
jurisdiction of any state is not allowed.64 The Charter, however, declares “respect for 
human rights and for fundamental freedoms” as one of their purposes65 and has several 
remarks on human rights.66 The development of human rights after World War II has 
given the notion of “a threat to the peace” a new meaning.          
The Council has a broad discretion to determine the existence of a threat to the 
peace. In theory, the Council may determine whether the human rights situation in a 
country is a threat to the peace and security, and enforce economic sanctions67 or 
military action.68 Member states undertake to accept and carry out the decisions of the 
Security Council.69 However, the Council has refrained from considering human rights 
issues as a matter of international peace and security.70  
The discretionary power of the Security Council in determining the existence 
of a threat to the peace is so broad that arguably“any conduct whatsoever, either 
within or outside a State, such as the adoption of a certain political regime, a treatment 
of the economic interests of aliens that is not in conformity with international 
standards, the closing of ports to foreign ships, the extradite criminals, and the like” 
can constitute “a threat to the peace.”71 Malanczuk states that “a threat to the peace 
seems to be whatever the Security Council says is a threat to the peace.”72 As a 
consequence, if the Council determines as a threat to peace ethnic cleansing, genocide 
and other gross violations of human rights, it can play a pivotal role in promoting 
human rights. 
                                                 
63 Article 2(1) of the Charter. 
64 Article 2(7) of the Charter. 
65 Article 1(2) of the Charter. 
66 For example, the preamble and Article 55 of the Charter. 
67 Id., Article 41. 
68 Id., Article 42. 
69 Id., Article 25. 
70 Zdzislaw Kedzia, supra note 00, at 8. 
71 Benedetto Conforti, The Law and Practice of the United Nation 176 (3rd ed., Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, Leiden/Boston, 2005). 
72 P. Malanczuk, Akehusrt’s Modern Introduction to International Law 336 (1997). 
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In its Resolution 232 (1966), the Council determined the independence 
declaration by the white minority in Southern Rhodesia as a threat to the peace and 
imposed mandatory economic embargo against it.73 In this case, the racist regime was 
declared as a threat to the peace.  In its Resolution 392(1976), the Council determined 
the “policy of apartheid is a crime against the conscience and dignity of mankind and 
seriously disturbs international peace and security.”74 In its Resolution 418 (1977), it 
determined “having regard to the policies and acts of the South African Government, 
that the acquisition by South Africa of arms and related material constitutes a threat to 
the maintenance of international peace and security” 75 and applied economic 
sanctions against South Africa under Chapter VII. The Council, however, carefully 
avoided declaring apartheid itself as a threat to the peace. In those cases, the Council 
was criticized for violating the principle of non-interference in matters belonging to 
the domestic jurisdiction.76     
Even after the end of the Cold War, the Council avoided determining human 
rights violations as a direct threat to the peace under which U.N. enforcement 
measures could be adopted. For example, in its Resolution 688, the Council found that 
Iraqi governments’ oppression on the Kurdish minority and a massive exodus of 
refugees thereof into the surrounding states constituted a threat to the peace.77 The 
consequences of the oppression-influx of refugees into the neighboring states- rather 
than the oppression itself were taken into account more importantly.  Malanczuk 
argues that “the resolution cannot be cited as such, without trans-boundary effects, as a 
direct threat to international peace and security.”78   
                                                 
73 U.N. Doc. S/Res/232 (1966). 
74 U.N. Doc. S/Res/392(1976). 
75 U.N. Doc. S/Res/ 418 (1977). 
76 David Schweigman, The Authority of the Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter: 
Legal Limits and the Role of the International Court of Justice 152 (Kluwer Law International (2001). 
77 U.N. Doc. SC/Res/ 688 (1991). 
78 Peter Malanczuk, Humanitarian Intervention and The Legitimacy of The Use of Force 17-18 (1993). 
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In its Resolution 794, the Council, not referring to the cross-border refugee 
flows, determined that the magnitude of the human tragedy in Somalia constituted a 
threat to the peace and security, and authorized the use of force to facilitate 
humanitarian aid.79 The resolution enjoyed general support and was accepted by the 
international community.80 Some argue that the resolution is unique and the general 
rule not requiring the cross-border effects has not been established by this resolution.81 
This argument, however, disregards the clear wording contained in the resolution. The 
resolution should be understood that the Council interprets that gross human rights 
violations in a failed state can constitute a threat to peace.  
Finally, the Council’s position is confirmed clearly by the following resolution. 
In its Resolution 940, the Council determined that a military coup and non-democratic 
system of government in Haiti posed a threat to international peace.82 The resolution, 
after failed economic sanctions against Haiti, authorized the formation of a 
multinational force, and use of all necessary means to facilitate the departure from 
Haiti of the military leadership and the restoration of the legitimate authorities in 
Haiti.83 The Council declared that, without referring to the flow of refugees, the 
humanitarian situation in Haiti had constituted a threat to the peace and security in the 
region and authorized member states to use all necessary means including use of 
force.84   
In the Security Council’s practice, a threat to the peace has been frequently 
used as the basis of the intervention in what has been considered as a state’s domestic 
affairs where a gross violation of human rights is committed. Human rights are “the 
rights that one has simply because one is a human being,”85 Henkin argues that the 
                                                 
79 U.N. Doc. S/Res 794 (1992). 
80 De Wet, supra note 34, at 175. 
81 Id.  
82 U.N. Doc. S/Res/ 940 (1994). 
83 Id.  
84 Id.  
85 Jack Donnelly, Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice 10 (2003). 
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development of human rights has led to a “significant erosion of state sovereignty.”86 
According to the doctrine of state sovereignty, each state has an absolute autonomy in 
its internal affairs and other states are not allowed to interfere.87 It has contributed to 
limiting the possibilities of military or non-military intervention from outside powers. 
The development of international human rights after World War II has been 
remarkable. The dogma of state sovereignty gradually weakened as the system of 
international human rights developed. In December 1948, the United Nations General 
Assembly adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as a “common standard 
of achievement for all peoples and all nations.”88 The Declaration includes social, 
economic and cultural rights,89 as well as civil and political rights.90 In 1966, the 
International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights (CCPR) and Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights (CESCR)91 were adopted by the United Nations General 
Assembly.92 
The Vienna Declaration and Program of Action confirmed that the promotion 
and protection of all human rights and fundamental freedoms is a priority objective of 
the United Nations.93 It further declares that “the promotion and protection of all 
human rights is a legitimate concern of the international community.”94 “[T]he 
traditional understanding of state sovereignty should yield before considerations of 
                                                 
86 Louis Henkin, That “S” Word: Sovereignty, and Globalization, and Human Rights, Et Cetera, 68 
Fordham L. Rev. J, 3 (1999). 
87 See, Article 2(7) of the U.N. Charter. 
88 Javaid Rehman, International Human Rights 54 (2003). 
89 So-called “second generation rights.” 
90 So-called “first generation rights.” 
91 The CESCR includes the so-called "second generation" of human rights. The Covenant is far weaker 
in wording. States are only under the obligation of accomplishing progressive implementation of the 
rights. 
92 The separation of the CCPR from the CESCR was the intention of the West, which argued that 
economic, social and cultural rights were only programmatic. See, Rehman, supra note 88, at 63. 
93 Vienna Declaration and Program of Action, adopted by the United Nations World Conference on 
Human Rights, June 25, 1993. U.N. Doc. A/CONF.157/24 (Part I, 1993). 
94 Id. 
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human dignity and morality.”95 The fact that human rights have been accepted as an 
international concern means that the Security Council can take measures under Charter 
VII.     
It is notable that the International Commission on Intervention and State 
Sovereignty asserts that state sovereignty implies “responsibility to protect” its own 
citizens from avoidable catastrophe, and when it is not willing or unable to do so, the 
international community should intervene.96 To that extent, the principle of non-
intervention should yield to the international responsibility to protect.97 According to 
the Commission, the responsibility to protect is included in the obligations inherent in 
the concept of sovereignty, and the responsibility of the Security Council for the 
maintenance of international peace and security. The Commission also urged the 
permanent members of the Council not to use their veto power to obstruct the passage 
of resolutions authorizing military intervention for human protection purposes.98 Now, 
the Security Council is most likely to determine that if gross human rights violations 
occur in a failed state, there exists a threat to the peace.       
If a threat to the peace was found, in most cases, the Council imposed 
economic sanctions. Target countries were prohibited from importing certain goods.99  
Especially, arms embargoes were a useful means to contain armed conflicts.100 
Financial sanctions such as the freezing of funds were also imposed.101 Financial 
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sanctions were often aimed at specific activities or specific actors responsible for 
actions that threaten international peace and security.102 Targeting activities or actors 
responsible for actions threatening international peace is important as a means of 
smart sanctions.    
 
3. Unilateral Economic Sanctions 
Unilateral economic sanctions are generally referred to as economic sanctions without 
the U.N. Security authorization.103 Unilateral sanctions could be applied by a state or 
multi-states. Unilateral economic sanctions are not authorized by the Security Council 
and therefore their legality is quite often questioned. Some argue that “nearly all 
universal sanctions fail nearly all of the time.”104 On the contrary, multilateral 
sanctions are more likely to be considered effective.105 Although the possibility that 
multilateral sanctions can cause more harm than unilateral ones is higher, the 
dichotomy seems to be of limited utility in that economic harm does not guarantee the 
success of sanctions.106     
The U.N. Charter prohibits the use of force except in self-defense or with the 
approval of the Security Council under Chapter VII.107 The Charter, however, does not 
have any provision prohibiting unilateral interference, where sanctions are imposed by 
individual states. The traditional doctrine of state sovereignty includes “the national 
economic liberty to trade with other nations.”108 States are entitled to applying “trade 
embargoes or boycotts for any reason whatsoever, including simple economic 
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coercion to advance national political or economic interests against those of other 
states.”109  
On the other hand, the General Assembly urges individual states not to impose 
economic sanctions that violate international law and the U.N. Charter, and not to use 
unilateral coercive measures “as tools for political or economic pressure against any 
country, particularly against developing countries, because of the negative effects on 
the realization of all human rights.”110 Customary international law do not prohibit the 
international community or individual states from using economic sanctions to 
promote compliance with international norms or any other policy.         
Generally speaking, imposing sanctions to promote human rights may be 
allowed because the promotion of human rights is one of the main goals of the U.N.111 
Experience shows that many states including the U.S. have frequently imposed 
economic sanctions such as import and export prohibitions, and financial 
restrictions.112  The ICJ holds that “state sovereignty evidently extends to the area of 
its foreign policy, and there is no customary international law to prevent a state from 
choosing and conducting a foreign policy in co-ordination with that of another 
state.”113 The ICJ further states that economic sanctions do not violate the customary 
norm of non-intervention.114 The ICJ declares that one intervention prohibited by 
international law is the “one bearing on matters in which each state is permitted, by 
the principle of state sovereignty, to decide freely.”115 Generally speaking, unilateral 
economic sanctions are permissible by international law.         
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3. 1. State Practice  
Why do states such as the U.S. impose unilateral economic sanctions? First, it is 
mainly because resolutions that the U.S. pursue sometimes are not welcomed by other 
Security members. The U.S., for example, pursued a U.N.-mandated embargo against 
Libyan oil, but the Western countries that needed oil opposed it.116 In the early 1990s, 
the U.S. sought much harsher U.N. sanctions against North Korea but China opposed 
it.117 Where multilateral economic sanctions are blocked in the Council, the U.S. 
pursues unilateral economic sanctions with or without participation of other states.118         
Second, imposing unilateral sanctions is a good way for politicians to appease 
the demands from NGOs and constituents to do something.119 Satisfying domestic 
voters or making moral statements by imposing symbolic unilateral sanctions is quite 
attractive for politicians.120     
One of the issues related to unilateral economic sanctions is whether they are 
effective as foreign policy tools, or more effective than multilateral economic 
sanctions. Generally speaking, the greater the number of countries needed to 
implement sanctions, the greater the economic difficulty of the target country will 
be.121 Therefore, the majority opinion argues that multilateral sanctions are more 
effective than unilateral sanctions, or economic sanctions are rarely effective.122 In a 
global economy, unilateral economic sanctions tend to impose greater costs on 
sanctioning states than on the target country, which usually can find alternative 
sources of supply and financing.123 Where the target country depends heavily on the 
sanctioning country, the target country is more likely to be harmed.124 Even in this 
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scenario, it is argued that economic difficulties the target country receives do not 
guarantee the success of economic sanctions.125 Authoritarian regimes in the target 
country become more repressive and positive socioeconomic developments cannot be 
stimulated.126  In fact, the economic difficulties that the economic sanctions imposed 
against Haiti and Cuba could not alter their behavior.127      
The U.S. has sought to enhance the effectiveness of unilateral economic 
sanctions by threatening secondary sanctions against those third parties unwilling to 
sanction the target country.128 Where secondary sanctions are adopted, sanctions apply 
to overseas firms that violate the terms of the U.S. legislation. This strategy has some 
deterrent effects on individuals and firms that seek prohibited activities by the 
legislation, but with great challenges from other countries.129     
On the other hand, it is argued that multilateral sanctions are not necessarily 
more effective than unilateral sanctions.130 It is claimed that international support for a 
sanctions policy can hurt chances of success by “diluting the scope and impact of the 
common sanctions in the process of securing agreement among the senders.”131 
Therefore, international attempts to establish cooperation do not yield desirable 
results.132 It is an irony that regardless of its effectiveness, states are still employing 
unilateral economic sanctions.133  
The United States has overwhelmed other countries in the numbers of 
unilateral economic sanctions against other countries. During the Cold War, the 
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United States could achieve relatively high level of success with less cooperation.134 
After World War II, the U.S. maintained the strongest economy, supporting war-
stricken western economies. Until 1960s, the U.S. provided developing countries with 
economic assistance.135 These factors contributed to the level of success.136 The 
developing global economy, however, undermined the effectiveness of unilateral 
sanctions. As Europe and Japan has emerged as competitive economic superpowers, 
the U.S. position in the world economy has declined.137       
Nevertheless, even in the post-Cold War, the importance of unilateral 
economic sanctions has not diminished as a policy tool of the United States.138 The 
goals of economic sanctions by the United States vary including discouraging the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, promoting human rights, ending support 
for terrorism, thwarting drug trafficking, and discouraging armed aggression.139     
            
3. 2. U.S. Legislative Authority 
3.2.1.The Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA) 
Unlike U.N. based multilateral economic sanctions, unilateral economic sanctions 
have their bases in domestic legislations. Section 5(b) of the TWEA delegates to the 
President the power of economic sanctions during the periods of declared war.140 The 
TWEA is the primary source that the President could use to sanction states declared 
enemies of the U.S.141  After the North Korean invasion into South Korea, the U.S. 
imposed financial and commercial sanctions against the People’s Republic of China 
and North Korea under the TWEA. The U.S. maintained economic sanctions against 
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North Korea under the Foreign Assets Control Regulations promulgated under TWEA 
section (5) in 1950 until 2000.142 
 
3. 2. 2. The U.N. Participation Act (UNPA) 
In fact, UNPA is not an act that authorizes unilateral economic sanctions, but a U.S. 
domestic legislation for implementing domestically the U.N. authorized economic 
sanctions. Section 5 of the UNPA authorizes the President to apply economic 
sanctions against a target country under a mandatory U.N. Security Council 
decision.143 The UNPA is a legal basis to implement multilateral sanctions in the U.S. 
under Article 41 of the Charter. After the Cold War, the U.S. implemented under the 
UNPA Security Council resolutions in response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 
1990.144  
 
3.2.3. The International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) 
The IEEPA gives the President the power to apply economic sanctions in times of 
national emergency.145 Enacted in 1977, it was used to block Iranian government 
assets in the U.S. and the trade with Iran in response to the 1979-1981 hostage 
crises.146   In order for the IEEPA to be invoked, a specific national emergency with 
respect to a national threat is declared by the President.147 In 1985, under the 
increasing pressure to impose economic sanctions against the South African apartheid, 
the Reagan administration invoked the IEEPA to apply economic sanctions against 
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South Africa.148 The sanctions turned out to be unsuccessful and Congress enacted the 
Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986 over the Reagan’s veto.149     
 
3.2.4.The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solitary Act (CLDSA, Helms-Burton Act) 
The CLDSA, cited as the Helms-Burton Act, was enacted in 1996 after Cuba shot 
down two civilian U.S. airplanes off the Cuban coast.150 First of all, the act prohibits 
persons subject to U.S. jurisdiction from extending financing to finance transactions 
with regard to any property confiscated by Cuba from a U.S. national.151 Under the 
Act, U.S. nationals whose property was confiscated by Cuba are entitled to sue any 
person “trafficking” in confiscated property. “Trafficking” means wide range of 
transaction involving confiscated property.152 The Act was criticized from U.S. trading 
partners, especially from the E.U. because it, with wide extraterritorial effects, 
targeted third country nationals and companies that traded with Cuba.153    
 
4. Humanitarian Limitations of Economic Sanctions 
The fact that the Security Council has the power to impose economic sanctions under 
the Charter, or individual states may apply economic sanctions for their foreign policy 
goals does not mean that there is no limit on their power. While economic sanctions 
are designed to change the behavior of the target country, they cause human 
sufferings.154 Therefore, it has been argued that there should be some limits on the 
power or scope applying economic sanctions.155 The United Nations Secretary-
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General Kofi Annan noted that the humanitarian and human rights policy goals were 
hard to be reconciled with sanctions regime.156 
 The promotion of human rights is one of the main purposes of the U.N.157 and 
the Council, in discharging its duties, has to act in accordance with the purposes and 
principles of the U.N.158 Therefore, the United Nations purpose of promoting and 
encouraging respect for human rights in Article 1, paragraph 3, limits the scope and 
types of economic sanctions. Specifically, the U.N. is arguably restricted in its 
mandate by the human rights norms such as the right to life or right to food. 
 Then, to what extent the Council or individual states can apply economic 
sanctions are at issue. As far as human rights norms in times of emergency are 
concerned, certain human rights norms are derogable.159 On the other hand, right to 
life is non-derogable even in times of emergency.160 Further, the States Parties to the 
ICESCR has the obligation to respect the right to food, and to the continuous 
improvement of living conditions.161 The right to life and food are most likely to be 
endangered by economic sanctions because economic sanctions may restrict the flow 
of food and other materials necessary for the survival of human beings.  
 The other side of the right to life and food suggests that economic sanctions 
must not target “civilians who are uninvolved with the threat to or breach of the 
peace.”162 Economic sanctions may not target goods needed to ensure the basic 
subsistence of the civilian population such as food and basic medicines.163 Economic 
sanctions that continue for too long may cause a negative humanitarian effect and to 
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be ineffective.164 In short, although a threat to or breach of the peace are found, 
selecting the types and scope of economic sanctions is not unlimited.          
 This humanitarian concern has been recognized by the Council. It stated that: 
“further collective actions in the Security Council within the context of any future 
sanctions regime should be directed to minimize unintended adverse side-effects of 
sanctions on the most vulnerable segments of targeted countries.”165 Further, in its 
practice, the Council’s resolution imposing economic sanctions usually include 
exemptions for humanitarian purposes to minimize the effect of economic sanctions 
on the oppressed or innocent people in the target country. For example, in its 
Resolution 661 against Iraq, the Council allowed the import of “supplies intended 
strictly for medical purposes, and, in humanitarian circumstances, foodstuffs.”166 
 The effectiveness of the humanitarian provisions included in comprehensive 
economic sanctions which are designed to mitigate humanitarian disasters, however, is 
doubtful. The humanitarian exception in Resolution 661 has been criticized to have 
failed to mitigate the human sufferings of Iraqi people.167 Now, I will analyze the 
limits of economic sanctions, especially focusing the right to life and food. Those 
fundamental rights could be at risk by economic sanctions.        
 
4.1. Right to Life 
Every human being has the inherent right to life.168 The Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights stipulates the right to life169 and the right to freedom from inhuman or 
degrading treatment.170 The right to life is the supreme right171 and no derogation is 
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allowed.172 Children’s right to life is also protected.173 States have to ensure to the 
maximum extent possible the survival of the child.174  
Any sanctions regime imposed during a war is governed by international 
humanitarian law.175 The civilian population must be protected from war and its effect. 
This means that the civilian population must be provided with the essentials for 
survival such as food.176  In its Resolution 3318, the General Assembly declared: 
 
 Women and children belonging to the civilian population and finding 
themselves in circumstances of emergency and armed conflict…shall not be 
deprived of shelter, food, medical aid or other inalienable rights. 177     
        
The right to life has both a negative component, a right not to be arbitrarily 
deprived of life by the State, and a positive component, meaning state’s obligation to 
take active measures to protect the right.178 It is prohibited to attack, destroy, remove 
or render useless objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population.179 
Further, states are required to “take all possible measures to reduce infant mortality 
and to increase life expectancy, especially in adopting measures to eliminate 
malnutrition and epidemics.”180  Sanctions, therefore, must not result in undue 
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hardships for the people of a country. Sanctions that directly or indirectly cause deaths 
are likely to a violation of the right to life.181        
The U.N. economic sanctions against former Yugoslavia raised the issue of the 
right to life. The sanctions started from a mandatory arms embargo against it,182 and 
through trade embargo,183 and a prohibition of fuel shipments,184 finally resulted in the 
freezing of the financial assets and overseas property.185 The sanctions had a 
substantial impact on the right to life of the civilian population, threatening the right to 
life of civilian people.186 The economic elites and militia leaders prospered but the 
vast majority of the populations suffered.187    
 
4.2. Right to Food 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights declares that, “everyone has the right to a 
standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, 
including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social 
services….”188 Article 11 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (ICESCR) declares a state’s obligation to acknowledge the right to 
food.189 The Universal Declaration on the Eradication of Hunger and Malnutrition, 
adopted in 1974 by the World Food Conference in Rome, declared that freedom from 
hunger and malnutrition was a basic human right.190  
Food should be available “in a quantity and quality sufficient to satisfy the 
dietary needs of the individuals, free from adverse substances, and acceptable within a 
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given culture,”191 and accessible “in ways that are sustainable and that do not interfere 
with the enjoyment of other human rights.”192 Food should be accessible economically, 
meaning that, “personal or household financial costs associated with the acquisition of 
food for an adequate diet should be at a level such that the attainment and satisfaction 
of other basic needs are not threatened or compromised.”193 Food should also be 
available physically, i.e., “everyone, including physically vulnerable individuals, such 
as infants and young children, elderly people, the physically disabled, the terminally ill 
and persons with persistent medical problems, including the mentally ill can have 
access to food.”194 
The ICESCR declares the right to be free from hunger as fundamental.195 It is 
fundamental because “the right to adequate food is indivisibly linked to the inherent 
dignity of the human person and is indispensable for the fulfillment of other human 
rights.”196 States parties are obligated to “take steps to achieve progressively the full 
realization of the right to adequate food.” States parties should “ensure for everyone 
under their jurisdiction access to the minimum essential food which is sufficient, 
nutritionally adequate and safe, to ensure their freedom from hunger.”197  
States must respect, protect and fulfill the right to food.198 They must not 
violate the right to food and must protect their citizens against violations by other 
actors.199 For example, in 1998 the Sudanese government did not respect or protect the 
right to food of its people, by turning a blind eye on the looting of grain, abduction of 
women and children, burning of crops and cattle-rustling by the muraheleen militia, 
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believed to be a central part of the government's counter-insurgency strategy. This 
resulted in mass starvation.200 If it had not been for these human rights abuses, “there 
would have been no famine in the Sudan in 1998.”201  
Further, states must facilitate the right to food by providing an enabling 
environment for people to feed themselves, and lastly, they must provide people with 
food when they cannot feed themselves.202 The right to adequate food is satisfied 
“when every man, woman and child, alone or in community with others, has physical 
and economic access at all times to adequate food or means for its procurement.”203 
The right to adequate food is violated “when a state fails to ensure the 
satisfaction of, at the very least, the minimum essential level required to be free from 
hunger.”204 The state must make every effort to use all the resources at its disposal in 
an effort to satisfy…those minimum obligations.”205  Any discrimination in the access 
to food, or in the means and entitlements for its procurement, nullifying or impairing 
the equal enjoyment or exercise of economic, social and cultural rights is a violation of 
the right to adequate food.206 
The right to adequate food is not a narrow or restrictive notion that would 
provide people with a minimum package of calories, proteins and other specific 
nutrients. Governments must take appropriate actions to prevent hunger.207 The right 
to food, first of all, should be satisfied by national governments.208 States should 
protect the work of NGOs who assist the victims in the realization of the right to 
adequate food.209 
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The sanctions against Iraq were often criticized as causing undue harm to the 
civilian population of Iraq. One report said that 170,000 children under the age of five 
died in 1991 because of disease and malnutrition.210 The United Nations Children’s 
Fund (UNICEF) reported that “the vast majority of the civilian population lives in 
poverty, and the greatest threat to the health and well-being of the Iraqi people remains 
the difficult economic conditions created by internationally mandated sanctions.”211  It 
is undeniable, first of all, that the Iraqi government was responsible for the 
humanitarian crisis. Clearly, however, the long-lasting comprehensive economic 
sanctions aggravated the situations into a catastrophic disaster.212 It has been argued 
that the Security Council had to design its economic sanctions in a fashion that 
minimize their impact on civilians, especially on vulnerable groups such as women 
and children.213 In 2000, the Secretary Council urged that it should “seek every 
opportunity to alleviate the suffering of the population, who after all are not the 
intended targets of sanctions.”214 One U.N. official commented that economic 
sanctions against Iraq were destroying the whole society and therefore “illegal and 
immoral.”215  As we see in the U.N., economic sanctions against Iraq, comprehensive 
economic sanctions, whether they are authorized by the Council or not, are likely to 
threaten the right to life or food.  
 
5. Comprehensive or Smart Sanctions 
Comprehensive economic sanctions prohibit all forms of trade and financial 
transactions with the target country. The Council has adopted in three cases 
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comprehensive economic measures. After the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the Council 
adopted comprehensive economic sanctions against Iraq. It prohibited all forms of 
trade and financial transactions with Iraq and Iraqi-occupied Kuwait.216  The Council 
banned “the import into the territories of all commodities and products originating in 
Iraq and Kuwait exported therefrom.”217 It also prohibited any activities to promote 
exports from Iraq and Kuwait as well as arms and financial transactions.218 In May 
1992, the Council adopted comprehensive economic sanctions against the Former 
Yugoslavia to deter its military intervention against Bosnia.219 In May 1994, when the 
junta in Haiti refused to return power to civil leadership, the Council imposed 
comprehensive economic sanctions.220     
The United States has adopted several comprehensive economic sanctions 
against communist countries under the U.S. legislation.221 Although comprehensive 
economic sanctions are more effective in harming the target country,222 it is doubtful 
that comprehensive sanctions are, in reality, more effective in altering the target 
country’s behavior. It is because the success of economic sanctions depends on not 
only the magnitude of economic harm but also “the domestic setting of the target 
government.”223  
One of the dilemmas that comprehensive economic sanctions have, as in the 
U.N. economic sanctions against Iraq, is that they could have a disastrous effect on 
the oppressed in the target country.224 In his Millennium Report, the Secretary-
General states:  
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 When robust and comprehensive economic sanctions are directed against 
authoritarian regimes a different problem is encountered. Then it is usually 
the people who suffer, not the political elites whose behavior triggered the 
sanctions in the first place. Indeed, those in power, perversely, often benefit 
from such sanctions by their ability to control and profit from black market 
activity, and by exploiting them as a pretext for eliminating domestic sources 
of political opposition.225   
 
It has been argued that comprehensive economic sanctions must have 
humanitarian exceptions to mitigate civilian suffering, in which humanitarian goods, 
for example, are exempted from the banning of sanction program. The example of 
this humanitarian exception is the “oil-for-food” program in Iraq.226 The first “oil-for-
food” program was implemented in December 1996. Resolution 986 (1995) permitted 
the sale of $ billion of Iraqi oil over 180 days.227 About half of revenues from the sale 
would be used for the purchase of humanitarian goods.228 The program did not 
prevent widespread human sufferings and deaths from happening and turned out to be 
unsuccessful.229 The lessons from the Iraqi sanctions made opponents of 
comprehensive sanctions argue for smart or selective sanctions. 
Smart sanctions target directly political leaders or those responsible for the 
breach of peace, without damaging the overall economy and imposing exceptional 
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hardship on the general public.230 Smart sanctions, if properly designed and applied, 
can impose significant pressure on the target country’s leadership or the elite, 
eliminating civilian sufferings.231 For example, smart sanctions target the personal 
foreign assets and access to foreign financial markets of members of the government, 
the ruling elite, or members of the military.232 The assets of government owned or 
elite controlled businesses may be frozen.233 Imports of luxury goods generally 
consumed by the ruling elite can be prohibited. After the North Korea nuclear test in 
2006, the Security Council, rather than adopting comprehensive sanctions, targeted 
the North Korea’s leader Kim Jong-Il and banned the sale of luxury goods to North 
Korea.234 
Arms embargo is often used as a method of smart sanctions. One purpose of 
arms embargo is to reduce the flow of weapons to a conflict area. During the 1990s the 
Security Council, to prevent imported arms from being used to aggravate armed 
conflicts, imposed several arms embargos to conflict areas.235 It is clear that, to 
mitigate unnecessary human sufferings, smart sanctions can be an alternative to 
comprehensive economic sanctions. 
 
6. Types of Economic Sanctions 
If the Security Council determines the existence of a threat to the peace, it may adopt 
measures to maintain or restore international peace and security under Article 40, 41 
and 42. Provisional measures can be adopted under Article 40. Military measures and 
non-military coercive measures can be adopted respectively under Article 41 and 41. 
Provisional measures under 40 and military measures under 42, however, will not be 
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discussed in my study. Article 41 stipulates other types of sanctions including the 
severance of diplomatic relations, which also will not be touched in this part. I will 
only focus on various types of economic sanctions. Economic sanctions are roughly 
divided into two groups: comprehensive and partial sanctions. Smart sanctions, 
designed to focus on the ruling elites of the target country, can be included in partial 
sanctions. Partial sanctions can be imposed to mitigate or avoid the harmful effect that 
comprehensive sanctions might cause to happen. 
 
6.1. Financial Sanctions     
Financial sanctions include “blocking government assets held abroad, limiting access 
to financial markets and restricting loans and credits, restricting international transfer 
payments and restricting the sale and trade of property abroad.”236 There is substantial 
overlap between financial and trade sanctions when they are employed 
comprehensively.237 The Council, in its Resolution 1267, froze funds and other 
financial resources owned or controlled by the Taliban when Taliban did not cooperate 
with international community to turn over Osama bin Laden.238 In September 2005, 
the U.S. Department of Treasury designated Banco Delta Asia (BDA), a bank in 
Macau, as a “primary money laundering concern” under Article 311 of the Patriot 
Act239 and restricted U.S. financial institutions from doing financial transactions with 
it. North Korea has had accounts at BDA. It was not officially a sanction because it 
aimed at banks rather than countries. However, the designation hampered North 
Korea’s international transactions, making banks doing international business reluctant 
to transact with North Korea.240  
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6.2. Trade Sanctions 
Trade sanctions restrict imports and exports to and from the target country. Trade 
sanctions restrictions can be comprehensive or selective only restricting certain goods 
connected with a dispute.241 The Security Council Resolution 1306, which prohibited 
all states from importing diamonds from Sierra Leone, can be included in a selective 
trade sanction to reduce the level of armed conflicts and human rights violations 
funded by diamonds exports.242    
After the North Korean invasion into South Korea in June 1950, the U.S. 
imposed a total trade embargo against North Korea under Section 3 of the Export 
Control Act of 1949.243 The total trade embargo continued in the Export 
Administration Regulations, where North Korea was classified as the most restricted 
member of Country Group Z.244 
In 1951, North Korea was designated as a communist country under the Trade 
Agreement Extension Act of 1951, which required the suspension of Most-Favored-
Nation trade status. Tariffs on goods imported from North Korea are set at the highest 
level under the Harmonized Tariff Schedule. Preferential trade treatment under the 
Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) under the Trade Act of 1974 is denied to 
North Korea. 245 The Export-Import Act of 1945 denies North Korea guarantees, 
insurance, credit and other Bank funding programs because it is designated as a 
Marxist-Leninist country under the Export-Import Bank Act.246  Even without 
sanctions, trade is not likely to rise up dramatically because of the tariff barriers.  
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6.3. Aid Restriction 
The U.S. has aid program under the U.S. Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and has used 
it as a tool of imposing sanctions. Non-humanitarian aid to North Korea is prohibited 
under the Act because it was designated as a state sponsor of acts of international 
terrorism,247 and a Marxist-Leninist country by the Export-Import Bank Act of 1945. 
According to exceptions to the law, however, programs in child survival, conservation 
and biodiversity, food aid, health and disease prevention, and international disaster 
assistance may be funded in spite of a country's specific restrictions.    
North Korea has been a country of “particular concern” under the International 
Religious Freedom Act of 1998248 and classified as a Tier 3 (most severe) country for 
slavery or sex trade under the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000.249 In 
compliance with these Acts, comprehensive aid restrictions are imposed against North 
Korea. 
 
6.4. Arms Sales Restrictions 
Arms sales restrictions, which could be imposed either by itself or as part of a broader 
trade embargo, are to prohibit the supply of arms to the target country.250 Specific 
arms embargos were imposed on Haiti251 and arms trade with Iraq were totally 
prohibited by the comprehensive sanctions after it invaded Kuwait.252  The main goals 
of arms sales restrictions include: (1) to lessen armed conflicts by restricting the flow 
of arms to fighting parties; (2) to weaken the military capabilities of a state; (3) to 
constrain the oppressive abilities of a repressive regime; (4) to stop arms flow to 
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terrorist groups.253 In its Resolution 1540, the Council prohibited the supply of 
weapons of mass destruction and related items to non-state actors.254    
The U.S. International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) authorized by the 
Arms Export Control Act has denied North Korea “licenses and other approvals for 
exports and imports of defense articles and defense services” since 1955.255 The ITAR 
also denies a supporter of international terrorism the export of any munitions item, 
lease or loan, credits, guarantees, or other financial assistance.256 
 
7. Conclusion 
Economic sanctions can be imposed multilaterally under the Chapter VII of the U.N. 
Charter or unilaterally by individual states. Under the U.N. mechanism, the Security 
Council must determine the existence of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or 
an act of aggression under Article 39 before it adopts mandatory measures under 
Chapter VII.  
During the Cold War, the Council was reluctant to determine that the existence 
of a humanitarian crisis within a country constituted a threat to peace.      
The principle of state sovereignty was more stressed than human rights. The 
development of human rights after the Cold War II has changed the Security Council’s 
practice. The Council found that human sufferings in Iraq and a refugee influx in 
neighboring countries constituted a threat to the peace. Further, it found that the 
human tragedy in Somalia itself was a threat to the peace. In Haiti case, it also 
declared that the humanitarian situation in Haiti had constituted a threat to the peace.  
Economic sanctions, especially comprehensive ones may cause humanitarian 
sufferings in a target country.  David Cortright has raised the question of whether it is 
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possible to make sanctions both more effective and more humane. 257 In a sense, 
civilian suffering is “an inevitable and even intended result of sanctions.”258 He argues 
that although there are tensions between enhancing the effectiveness of sanctions and 
mitigating human sufferings, harmonizing those two objectives is “both possible and 
necessary.”259 Economic sanctions are limited by humanitarian causes. This argument 
is not only moral but also enhances the effectiveness of sanctions. David Cortright 
states: 
 
The greater the attention to minimizing adverse humanitarian impacts, the deeper 
and broader the support for such sanctions within the coalition of sender states. 
Also, the more sensitive sanctions designers are to limiting the harm on innocent 
bystanders, the less likely sanctioned leaders will be able to mobilize support 
within the targeted state. Efforts to reduce unintended humanitarian impacts also 
make it more likely that sanctions will be targeted against decision-making 
elites.260     
 
Many scholars consider humanitarian sufferings caused by sanctions as an 
issue of effectiveness of sanctions, which is usually termed untended consequences.261 
They are, however, a moral or legal issue that should be carefully addressed before 
imposing economic sanctions. If economic sanctions are found to threaten the right to 
life and food in the target country, sanctions must be stopped or re-designed. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
EFFECTIVENESS OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS 
 
1. Introduction 
 Multilateral or unilateral economic sanctions are used to force foreign states to 
comply with international norms or to change the target country’s policy.1 States and 
the international community, by applying economic sanctions, also confirm 
international standards, monitor international behavior, and express dissatisfaction 
over violations of human rights norms.2  
The effectiveness of economic sanctions has been hotly debated. There are 
four different views on the effectiveness of economic sanctions. The first view is that 
economic sanctions can be effective in obtaining foreign policy goals. Sarah H. 
Cleveland argues: “[E]conomic sanctions are an important weapon in the 
transnational efforts to promote respect for fundamental human rights and can have 
substantial behavior-modifying potential.”3 The basic assumption of this argument is 
that economic pressure on civilian population will translate into pressure on the 
government for change.4 A corollary of this argument is that the greater the suffering 
of the target country, the more the possibility of success of economic sanctions will 
be. Sanctions should be employed with maximum impact.5           
The second view is that economic sanctions are ineffective in changing the 
target country’s policy. According to this argument, where political decision-making 
                                                 
1 Literally, sanctions by one entity are unilateral and all others are multilateral. See, Hossein G. Askari 
et al, Economic Sanctions: Examining Their Philosophy and Efficacy 31 (Praeger, Westport, 
Connecticut, 2003). For my study, however, I use multilateral sanctions as ones authorized by the U.N. 
Security Council.  
2 Sarah H. Cleveland, Cleveland, Sarah H. Norm Internalization and U.S. Economic Sanctions 26 Yale 
J. Int’l L.1 87 (2001).     
3 Id. 5. 
4 Marc Bossuyt, Commission on Human Rights, Working Paper on the adverse consequences of 
economic sanctions on the enjoyment of human rights (E/CN.4/Sub.2/2000/33 ), para 48. 
5 Gary Clyde Hufbauer et al, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered 168 (Peterson Institute for International 
Economics, 2007). 
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in a country is not democratic, the civilian population cannot bring about policy 
changes in the government by pressuring it.6 The ruling regime, usually with a strong 
grip on the media, may easily take advantage of the economic hardship to unite the 
population and support the regime in defiance of foreign employed economic 
sanctions.7 Economic sanctions also may be used to conceal their structural problems 
and to trigger political extremism in the target country.8 Economic sanctions should 
not be imposed especially against a non-democratic country.9 Where economic 
sanctions are inevitable, they should focus on the activities that bring the sanctions, or 
on those responsible for the offending behavior, and humanitarian exceptions should 
be included.10  
The third view tries to find factors that make economic sanctions effective or 
ineffective. According to the Institute for International Economics (IIE), the 
effectiveness of sanctions can be measured in points. IIE found that only 34 percent of 
the analyzed cases were successful in achieving their goals.11 IIE suggests 5 
recommendations on the effectiveness of economic sanctions: (1) sanctions are seldom 
effective in bringing about major policy changes of the target country; (2) economic 
sanctions on autocratic  regimes are not likely to succeed; (3) economic sanctions are 
likely to succeed when used  against friends; (4) there is a better chance to succeed if 
sanctions are adopted with maximum impact; (5) many sender countries does not 
necessarily make economic sanctions more likely to succeed; (5) domestic costs must 
be considered.12 IIE argues:  
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 Although it is not true that sanctions never work, they are of limited utility in 
achieving foreign policy goals that depend on compelling the target country to take 
actions it stoutly resists. Still, in some instances, particularly situations involving 
small target countries and relatively modest policy goals, sanctions have helped 
alter foreign behavior.13 
 
According to this argument, sanctioning states are required to evaluate various 
factors before applying economic sanctions. The selected means of sanctions must be 
appropriate to the circumstances.14  
The fourth view argues that free trade and economic integration could 
promote both economic prosperity and political freedom.15 According to this 
argument, under economic sanctions, the middle class is eliminated, they get poorer, 
and the rich get richer.16 The elite group actually benefits economically from 
economic sanctions because of the monopoly on illegal trade.17 In the long run, 
democratic participation and independent institutions become weakened.18 Craig 
Forcese argues that if “constructive engagement” through economic integration 
strengthens “the staying power of a human rights-abusing regime, or prompts it to 
engage in additional human rights abuses,” the engagement should not be allowed.19 
He argues, however, that engagement can be tolerated if it does not give rise to “the 
very human rights ills it is said to cure.”20 Engagement policy posits that economic 
integration enhances democracy and human rights.21 Contact with the outside world is 
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said to expand “the flow of information”.22 As stated by Forcese, “[A]ll the various 
forms of popular entertainment and intellectual thought begin to flow, spreading ideas 
like democracy, human rights, and the rule of law.”23 In order to force a state to 
comply with international norms, economic engagement with the target country, 
rather than sanctions, is encouraged.  
One of four theories alone cannot explain the effectiveness of economic 
sanctions, encompassing all the cases. Each theory has its own value, with its 
limitations and applicable scope.  It seems that finding a suitable theory for a certain 
situation is more important.  In this Chapter, I will discuss the general effectiveness of 
economic sanctions, but only to the extent that is needed to find an effective strategy 
against North Korea.      
 
1. 1. Definition of Effectiveness of Sanctions 
In order to discuss the general effectiveness of sanctions, I will define what the 
effectiveness of economic sanctions means. Very often, sanctioning states apply 
economic sanctions not to change the target country’s policy, but to mainly 
satisfy domestic constituents. Some scholars argue: 
 
[S]anctions can be imposed for symbolic purposes. These may include 
deterring future wrongdoing, demonstrating resolve to allies or domestic 
constituencies, upholding international norms, and sending messages of 
disapproval in response to objectionable behavior. All these multiple 
purposes need to be considered in evaluating the political effectiveness of 
sanctions.24  
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The symbolic purposes of sanctions are, of course, important in upholding 
international norms.25 When it comes to measuring the effectiveness of sanctions, 
however, the focus should be given on the possibility of changing target countries 
policy. 
First, the effectiveness of sanctions should be evaluated against the professed 
purpose of the sanction. Malloy argues that the effectiveness of economic sanctions 
cannot be measured by “a direct and palpable causal relationship between the 
imposition of specific sanctions and the achievement of broad policy objective.”26 He 
argues therefore that the U.S. economic sanctions against Vietnam provided necessary 
bargaining chips for the normalization of relations.27 However, the U.S. economic 
sanctions against Vietnam cannot be considered effective to the extent that they had 
not been intended as bargaining chips when initially imposed. In my study, economic 
sanctions are imposed to alter the target country’s behavior. Where they are not 
intended to affect the target country’s policy or behavior, it seems there is no need to 
analyze its effectiveness on the target country’s behavior.         
Second, in the same context, the effectiveness of sanctions should be evaluated 
against their effect on the target country and its change of the policy. Economic 
sanctions are meant to change the target country’s certain policy, rather than just 
harming its economy. Therefore, it is critical to evaluate whether the economic 
sanctions have effectively resulted in the achievement of the proposed policy goals.28 
Sanctions inspired primarily by domestic or moral motives are very often weak and 
therefore can rarely be effective in changing the target country’s behavior. Where 
sanctioning states impose sanctions mainly because of domestic or moral motives, it 
                                                 
25 Id. 
26 Michael P. Malloy, United States Economic Sanctions: Theory and Practice 379 (Kluwer Law 
International, 2001). 
27 Id., at 344. 
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sanctions must be considered. Cortright et al, supra note 24, at 15. 
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means either that they do not seriously intend to accomplish the professed foreign 
policy goals, or that they have simply chosen an inappropriate (ineffective) means of 
sanctions. For example, on May 7, 1994, after a month of genocide in Rwanda, John 
Shattuck, Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, 
stated that, “Rwandan leaders must end all forms of violence against civilians.”29 As a 
result, the U.S. government refused entry visas into the U.S. to representatives of the 
genocidal government, a measure, which can be called either too weak or 
inappropriate to stop the massive genocide. 
Third, in assessing the success of economic sanctions, time is also important. 
The goals of economic sanctions cannot be obtained in a short period of time, and 
sanctions may become more effective or less effective over time. However, the 
effectiveness of certain sanctions should be questioned if for a considerable period of 
time, there is no positive trend in altering the target countries’ behavior. For example, 
the U.S. sanctions against Cuba have lasted for almost 50 years;30 those against North 
Korea, almost 60 years.31 Do we need more time to know whether those sanctions 
would succeed or not?  In short, economic sanctions, in order to be effective, should 
achieve the intended policy goals of changing the target country’s behavior within a 
certain time period.        
 
1. 2. Sanctions Effectiveness and Political Structure 
Economic sanctions are likely to result in a policy change in the targeted country 
through a bottom-up policy change or the dissolution of an elite group.  First, in a 
democratic society, economic hardships or a failure caused by economic sanctions 
may raise the possibility of a policy change caused by public dissatisfaction or 
                                                 
29 U.S. State Department, “Joint Press Statement by President Museveni of Uganda and U.S. Assistant 
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pressure from the public. Economic sanctions can force the economy in the sanctioned 
country to collapse. The affected people then apply political pressure on the regime to 
change the policy that has caused the economic sanctions. In a democratic society, the 
bottom-up policy change is secured through elections.32 Elections provide “the public 
with a clear formal opportunity to influence the political process, and also help, 
directly or indirectly, to determine who will hold government power.”33 If the regime 
refuses to change the policy, the public might change the regime itself through 
elections. The winning party can “reasonably claim that its policies most closely 
correspond to the interests of the largest group of voters,”34 and adopt new policies. 
Second, in a totalitarian state economic failure creates tensions within the 
ruling elite and may increase the possibility of reforms, coups or even a regime change. 
Economic sanctions can give rise to dissatisfaction among elite groups, and reduce the 
loyalty of the political and military elite. A new political group may arise out of the 
tensions within the elite, which is likely to result in a policy change. For example, a 
state's military includes “interest groups that seek to shape or influence the content of 
policy.”35 They try to build up the size and the status of the armed forces, and increase 
the military budget.36 When the economic sanctions threaten the interests of the 
military groups, their loyalty tends to dissolve, and a policy or regime change may 
occur. In a totalitarian state, “political change is more likely to result from a rebellion 
within the political or military elite than a popular revolution.”37 
Analyzing economic sanctions only through economic consequences is 
mistaken. The political, economical and societal impact that economic sanctions may 
bring in the target country, especially whether the sanctions strengthen opposition 
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movement against the elite in the target country should be  carefully considered. 
Therefore, in order for sanctions to be effective, there should be a possibility that 
either the public could change the regime through elections, or elite groups could raise 
dissatisfactions against the regime. Without the possibility of changing the regime 
through elections or the hope of showing dissatisfaction from elite groups, there is no 
hope of changing the target countries’ policy by imposing sanctions. I will analyze 
economic sanctions against Iraq, Cuba, Myanmar and South Africa, and find out what 
made the sanctions effective or ineffective.  
  
2. The United Nations Sanctions against Iraq 
2.1. Economic Sanctions against Iraq 
After the Iraqi invasion into Kuwait, on August 6, 1990, the U.N. Security Council 
imposed comprehensive economic sanctions against Iraq by adopting Resolution 
661.38 The U.N. sanction banned all Iraqi imports except food and medicine, and all 
Iraqi exports, including oil. The resolution created the Sanctions Committee to direct 
and coordinate the sanction program. Exemptions were made for supplies intended 
strictly for medical purposes and food stuffs.39 The Security Council imposed marine 
and air blockades in its Resolutions 665 and 670. Oil embargo was enforced by cutting 
off pipeline through Turkey and Saudi Arabia and remained in effect until the oil for 
food program began in 1996.40 In its Resolution 678, the Security Council authorized 
member states to use “all necessary means” to liberate Kuwait.41 In February, 1991, 
the U.S. and its coalition partners, using military power, drove Iraqi force out of 
Kuwait.  
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The U.N. Security Resolution 687 required that, in order for the sanction to be 
lifted, Iraq must restore Kuwait’s autonomy, and cooperate with the United Nations 
for the monitoring and destruction of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction.42 The 
Sanctions Committee had the authority to permit imports of petroleum originating 
from Iraq to allow Iraq to pay for imports of food, medicines.      
In April 1995, the U.N. Security Council passed Resolution 986, which 
increased the amount of oil Iraq could export under the “Oil-for-Food” program from 
$1.6 billion to $ 2 billion every six months.43 The resolution was implemented with 
the signing of a memorandum of understanding between the Secretariat and the Iraqi 
government. The program was to reduce human suffering caused by the sanctions. 
Therefore, all civilian items with potential military use were still banned.  
In May 2002, the Security Council Resolution 1409 lifted restrictions on 
shipping goods to Iraq.44 While military items were still not allowed to be imported, 
civilian trade was allowed. On May 22, 2003, the Security Council formally lifted the 
U.N. economic sanctions against Iraq after Saddam Hussein was removed from power 
following the U.S. invasion into Iraq.45  
 
2. 2. Impact of the Economic Sanctions against Iraq    
Before the Gulf War, Iraq imported about two-thirds of its food. Oil accounted for 
over 90 percent of Iraq’s exports amounting to $13.2 billion before 1990.46 In 1989, 
the U.S agricultural shipments to Iraq totaled about $1 billion.47 The economic 
sanctions, however, shut off 97 percent of Iraqi exports and more than 90 percent of its 
imports.48 The oil-for-food program did not seem to have mitigated the civilian 
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suffering. Instead of weakening the regime’s capacity for threatening international 
peace and security, the sanctions had a devastating effect on the Iraqi people. Because 
of the oil export embargo, Iraq could not import food since it had no oil revenue and 
the Iraqi population faced persistent deprivation and severe hunger. Infant mortality 
skyrocketed and malnutrition among Iraqi children under five years of age doubled 
between 1991 and 1996.49 It was reported that the sanctions were responsible for the 
deaths of up to 5,000 children per month.50 The Iraqi health case system was 
significantly impacted and diseases such as malaria became epidemic.51 The Iraqi 
sanctions caused severe humanitarian sufferings on Iraqi people.   
In general, the Iraqi government did not cooperate with the U.N. for the 
monitoring and destruction of weapons of mass destruction, a cooperation that was the 
prerequisite for lifting the economic sanctions. The U.N. economic sanctions were 
lifted only after the removal of Saddam Hussein in 2003. The economic sanctions 
failed in the sense that they could not force the Iraqi government to abide by the U.N. 
Security Council resolutions. On the contrary, the sanctions produced severe 
humanitarian suffering among innocent and vulnerable Iraqi people. 
 
 Factors that Made the Sanctions Unsuccessful 
Before the sanctions, Iraq’s economy was heavily dependent on oil exports. The 
sanctions against Iraq were multilateral and relatively well managed by the 
international community. Therefore, Iraq was extremely vulnerable to sanctions.52 
However, it is generally considered that the Iraqi sanctions failed.53  The failure of the 
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sanctions against Iraq can be attributed to several factors. First, the goals of the 
sanctions were to impair Iraqi military power, forcing it to withdraw out of Kuwait 
and to accept the inspections of weapons of mass-destruction.54 Economic sanctions 
are not effective “in impairing the military potential of an important power or in 
bringing about major changes in the politics of the target country.”55 The ultimate goal 
against Iraq was achieved by the military operations.    
Second, Iraq was an authoritarian state. An authoritarian state is stronger in 
resisting sanctions than a democratic state.  Iraq was “one of the most ruthless 
repressive and undemocratic governments on the planet.”56 Iraq’s political structure 
was a strong mitigating factor against the likely effectiveness of sanctions.  One of the 
wrong assumptions in regard to sanctions is that the more economic hardship the 
sanctions cause, the more likely for the target country to change its behavior. IIE 
recommended to “impose the maximum cost on your target” to change the policies of 
the target country.57 The Iraqi experience discredits the general notion that the 
imposition of massive economic harm must necessarily result in an authoritarian 
regime’s submission.58            
Third, Iraq maintained a hostile stance against the international community 
during the entire sanction period. Economic sanctions directed against target countries 
that have long been adversaries of the sanctioning country, or against countries that 
have little trade with the sanctioning country, are less successful.59 Hostility between 
those countries makes economic sanctions less effective.60 The animosities between 
Iraq and the West prevented the development of a bargaining dynamic.  
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        Fourth, the sanctions against Iraq did not strengthen the opposition groups in 
Iraq.61 During the sanctions period, unemployment and inflation soared. Market prices 
for food were beyond the reach of most families. Many Iraqis depended for their 
survival on the government’s food-rationing program.62 However, the sanctions did 
not strengthen the opposition movements in Iraq; this is mostly due to the fact that Iraq 
was an authoritarian state ruled by Saddam Hussein.  
 
3. The U.S. Economic Sanctions against Cuba 
3. 1. Background of the Economic Sanctions against Cuba 
In 1960, when the Soviet Union agreed to buy sugar from Cuba and to supply it with 
crude oil, the U.S. companies refused to refine oil purchased from the Soviet Union, 
and Cuba nationalized its oil refinery industry,63 the U.S. imposed a unilateral 
economic embargo against Cuba, banning its export of sugar to the U.S. It was a 
typical Cold War confrontation. The U.S. severed its diplomatic relations with Cuba 
and restricted travel to the country. In 1962, Congress tightened up the embargo, 
prohibiting U.S. aid to any country giving assistance to Cuba.64 This prohibition 
effectively stopped most of Cuba’s trade with the U.S. The Cuban embargo was a 
complete trade and financial embargo.  
The U.S. froze all Cuban assets amounting to $33 million in the U.S. under the 
Trading with the Enemy Act in 1963.65 The U.S. also cancelled the general license 
permitting the export of food and medicine, and imposed a prior approval requirement 
for each individual transaction. The U.S. also pursued collective sanctions in the 
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Organization of American States (OAS). In 1964, OAS adopted a resolution calling 
for mandatory sanctions covering all trade except food and medicine. 
            The U.S. economic sanctions against Cuba, however, could not prevent Cuba’s 
active involvements in military activities around the world. In 1975, Cuba deployed 
36,000 combat troops in Angola and, in 1978, 20,000 troops in Ethiopia.66   
            In 1992, the U.S. enacted the Cuban Democracy Act, which prohibited foreign 
subsidiaries of U.S. companies from trading with Cuba and banned any ship that had 
docked in Cuban harbors from entering U.S. ports for 180 days. The Cuban 
Democracy Act was not welcome by the international community. The United 
Kingdom prohibited U.S. subsidiaries located in its jurisdiction from complying with 
the provisions of the Cuban Democracy Act. Russia signed a trade agreement with 
Cuba, which enabled Cuba to buy oil from Russia in exchange for sugar.67  Between 
1994 and 1995, the U.S. loosened its economic sanctions against Cuba. In September 
1994, the U.S. and Cuba signed an immigration accord to stem Cuban refugees from 
entering the U.S. President Clinton eased restrictions on travel to Cuba for educational, 
religious and human rights purposes.  
In March 1996, the Helms-Burton Act68 was passed in the U.S. after a Cuban 
fighter shot down two civilian planes of a Cuban-American exile group, “Brothers to 
the Rescue.”69 The Act contains a number of extraterritorial provisions. In Title III, the 
Act stipulates, inter alia, that Americans with claims to property expropriated by the 
Cuban government could sue for damages against foreign corporations or individuals 
that “traffic” such property, and that the U.S. must deny entry to the executive and 
major shareholders of firms that had such expropriated property. The Act infuriated 
Canada and Mexico. Both countries adopted a legislation penalizing companies that 
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would comply with the Act.70 OAS declared that the Helms-Burton Act did not 
conform to international law.  In response to the international community’s criticism, 
President Clinton had to waive the Title III private right of action provision. The U.S. 
economic sanctions against Cuba were unilateral because they were pursued by the 
U.S. alone without any U.N. intervention. 
 The goals of the U.S. sanctions against Cuba are to contain Cuba in response 
to its promotion of a leftist revolution, especially during the Cold War and ultimately 
to overthrow the regime.71  
 
3. 2. Impact of the Economic Sanctions against Cuba 
Before the collapse of the Soviet Union, Cuba could maintain its economy by 
exporting its sugar to, and importing oil from the Soviet Union. The loss of Soviet 
economic assistance after 1990 caused a severe downturn in the Cuban economy. In 
the mid-1990s, Cuba could not repay its huge loans. In 1989, sugar exports had 
accounted for over 75 percent of Cuban foreign currency earnings, and in 1996, for 
less than 20 percent.72 It was estimated that between 1960 and 1992 the embargo 
damages were over $40 billion.73 The Cuban Vice President said that the U.S. 
embargo cost the Cuban economy a minimum of $800 million in 1998.74 The U.S. 
economic sanctions against Cuba have had a significant impact on the Cuban economy.  
 However, the U.S. economic sanctions against Cuba did not deter Castro from 
"meddling in Central America and Africa during the Cold War, nor had [they] 
provided the leverage required for democratic change in Cuba itself.”75 Instead, Castro 
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used the sanctions to perpetuate his power. Sanctions spanning over three decades did 
not lead to the overthrow of the Castro regime.        
 
3. 3. Factors that Made the Economic Sanctions Unsuccessful 
The U.S. sanctions against Cuba had a substantial economic effect on Cuba. The 
sanctions, however, failed to achieve the proposed goals. The failure of U.S. sanctions 
against Cuba can be attributed to several factors. First, the goals of the sanctions are 
containment of communism and ultimately overthrowing of the regime.76 The goal of 
overthrowing a regime cannot be obtained by imposing economic sanctions. Second, 
there were major trading partners: the Soviet Union.77 Where the rest of the major 
trading partners refuse to join in economic sanctions, sanctioning states cannot achieve 
their goals. The survival of the Castro regime after the collapse of the Soviet Union 
needs more explanation. Third, Cuba, like Iraq, is an authoritarian state. Cuba has 
been ruled by Fidel Castro since he overthrew the Batista regime in 1959. An 
authoritarian regime is by far stronger in resisting against sanctions than a democratic 
one. Fourth, Cuba also has been maintaining antagonistic stance against the U.S.78  
Because of hostility, economic sanctions may simply strengthen the target government 
at home as they incite nationalism or animosity against the sanctioning states. Fifth, 
the economic sanctions did not strengthen the opposition movement in Cuba. There is 
no sign that economic difficulties caused by the sanctions trigger opposition 
movement in Cuba.  
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4. Economic Sanctions against Myanmar 
4. 1. Human Rights Violations in Myanmar 
Burma had been ruled by General Ne Win since 1962, when in the spring of 1988, 
pro-democracy demonstrations broke out all over the country after 42 students were 
killed by the police. In 1989, the military regime changed the countries’ name to 
Myanmar.  In May 1990, Myanmar’s National League for Democracy (NLD) led by 
the 1991 Nobel Peace Laureate Aung San Suu Kyi, won the majority seats in the 
National Assembly against Myanmar’s military regime.79 After the election, however, 
the regime annulled the result and refused to hand over the power to NLD. Aung San 
Suu Kyi was placed under house arrest for over 6 years. Other NLD leaders were 
arrested. The regime closed indefinitely all university campuses and colleges, the 
strongholds of the anti-military movement. The military regime has used widespread 
forced labor for military purposes and relocated thousands of civilians. In 1991-1992, 
over 2,000,000 Muslim refugees fled to Bangladesh to escape religious persecution.80  
 
4. 2. Sanctions by the International Community 
Although the U.N. General Assembly and the Human Rights Commission repeatedly 
adopted several resolutions condemning Myanmar’s human rights violations,81 the 
U.N. Security Council has never adopted a mandatory resolution against Myanmar. 
Instead, individual states took the responsibility of applying sanctions against 
Myanmar.       
After the regime’s refusal to hand over power to the opposition, in July 1991, 
President Bush, under Section 138 of the Customs and Trade Act of 1990, refused to 
renew the bilateral textile agreement that had lapsed the previous year.82 In 1993, the 
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U.S. reduced a $40 million grant to Myanmar to $18 million.83 In April 1994, 
Congress placed Myanmar on the list of outlaw states under the Foreign Assistance 
Act of 1961 and no fund made available under the Act could be used toward financing 
the U.S. share in international organizations for Myanmar. In October 1996, President 
Clinton banned Myanmar’s government officials’ entry into the U.S. In May 1997, 
President Clinton prohibited new investment in Myanmar, under Section 570 of the 
Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act (OCAA) of 1997, while allowing existing 
contracts to be fulfilled.84  He reasoned that the government of Myanmar had 
committed large-scale repression of the democratic opposition in Burma and the 
actions of the regime constituted “unusual and extraordinary threat to the national 
security and foreign policy” of the U.S under the International Emergency Economic 
Powers Act (IEEPA).85  
In 1996, Massachusetts adopted legislation that added a 10 percent premium 
on contracts with state agencies for companies that did business in Myanmar and 
prohibited those companies from purchasing or leasing state-owned property.86 Other 
states and cities soon followed this by adopting similar restrictions.  
     In 2003, President Bush signed the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act of 
2003. The Act banned U.S. imports from Myanmar, froze U.S. assets of Myanmar’s 
government, prohibited U.S. firms from providing financial services to any Myanmar 
entity, expanded the visa ban and opposed to international loans and technical 
assistance to Myanmar.87 In August 2006, President Bush approved a renewal of the 
sanctions under the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003 for another 3 years.     
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     Since 1990, the E.U. has maintained an arms embargo and suspended military 
cooperation and bilateral aid to Myanmar.88 The E.U. put in place economic sanctions 
against Myanmar in 1996 when Yangon failed to meet E.U. demands for greater 
democratization. The sanctions restrict travel by Burmese officials and prevent 
investment in the country. The E.U. has renewed the sanctions annually. In March 
1997, the E.U. voted to cancel Myanmar’s trade benefits under the Generalized 
System of Preferences (GSP) because of the existence of 800,000 forced workers.89 
     Companies also participated in the campaign to condemn human rights 
violations in Myanmar. In July 1994, the U.S. company Levi-Strauss announced its 
withdrawal from Myanmar, saying that “under present conditions, it is not possible to 
do business in Myanmar without directly supporting the military government and its 
pervasive violations of human rights.”90 In July 1996, Carlsburg of Denmark 
abandoned its plan to invest in Myanmar and Heineken of the Netherlands announced 
its withdrawal from a $30 million venture in Myanmar.91 Before long, Kodak, Apple, 
Walt Disney and PepsiCo withdrew from Myanmar.  
     Asian countries have been less critical of Myanmar. In 1995, Japan provided 
Myanmar with $10 million in agricultural assistance and a $16 million grant as part of 
Overseas Development Assistance funds.92 Japan allowed a $19.5 million business 
project to enlarge the Yangon airport in 1998, justifying it as humanitarian aid. In 
1998, Japan provided Myanmar with $16 million in debt relief.93 In 1993, Singapore 
signed $465 million in trade and tourism agreements with Myanmar. China has been 
an important trading partner of Myanmar, as well. Throughout the 1990s, China 
provided Myanmar with millions in loans for roads and infrastructure development.  
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     In 1996, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), ignoring U.S. 
opposition, granted Myanmar observer status, a first step for full membership in the 
group.94 In May 1997, ASEAN officially accepted Myanmar as its member. When the 
E.U. called for a United Nations contact group to be established for political reform in 
Myanmar, Asian countries denounced it as an unwarranted intervention into the affairs 
of a sovereign state.95  
     Japanese companies such as Nissan and Mitsubishi Motor Companies have 
pursued business in Myanmar. Unocal and Texaco of the United States continued to 
do business in energy exploration during the 1990s.96 The U.S. sanctions did not harm 
the existing U.S. oil investments in Myanmar.   
 
4.3. Impact of the Economic Sanctions against Myanmar 
Myanmar had pursued a policy of economic isolation over 30 years. Before 1988, the 
only foreign company allowed to set up joint venture in Myanmar was Fritz Werner, a 
West German engineering firm, which made machinery for manufacturing weapons.97 
The isolationist military regime has never heavily relied on the international 
community for commerce and trade. Myanmar is extremely rich in natural resources 
such as gems and oil. It has increased its foreign-exchange reserves by selling off 
rights to exploit its natural resources to foreign interests.98 Therefore, the effects of the 
sanctions against Myanmar have been relatively weak. 
       Moreover, the economic sanctions adopted by the international community 
were not multilateral. The U.N. Security Council has not adopted any resolutions 
relating to human rights violations in Myanmar. In May 2006, the U.S. only called for 
a non-punitive U.N. Security Council resolution to change Myanmar’s human rights 
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policies.99 Therefore, Myanmar has had trading partners including Japan, China, 
Singapore and Thailand. They were reluctant to abandon economic ties with Myanmar, 
which contributed to weakening of the effectiveness of the economic sanctions by 
other countries.  
        On top of that, even the economic sanctions adopted by the U.S. and E.U. were 
not comprehensive. The U.S. imports from Myanmar had not been prohibited until 
2003. In 2002, the U.S. imports from Myanmar totaled $356 million.100 The existing 
investments of U.S. companies were not prohibited by the sanctions. In October 1996, 
a consortium of international oil companies, composed of Texaco of the U.S., Premier 
Oil of the U.K., and Nippon Oil of Japan, signed a memorandum of understanding to 
supply Thailand with gas from Myanmar.101  
        The regime’s response to international pressure has not been sufficient to meet 
the expectations of the international community. The regime released Aung San Suu 
Kyi from her 6-year house arrest when the U.S. Congress was considering sanctions. 
However, her ability to travel and meet her supporters has been severely restricted. 
There is no hope that the military regime will hand over power to civilian rule. The 
sanctions by the international community have not accomplished the desired aim, i.e. 
promoting democracy by restoring civilian rule and protecting human rights. John J. 
Brandon concludes that, “U.S. sanctions have not had any success in fostering greater 
democracy or improving the human rights situation in Myanmar. In fact, conditions 
worsened.”102  
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4.4. Factors that Made the Economic Sanctions Unsuccessful    
The failure of the sanctions against Myanmar is due to several factors. First, the goals 
of the sanctions were to re-establish a civilian rule and to improve human rights 
situations in Myanmar. The goals are not likely to be achieved by imposing economic 
sanctions because they are major policy changes for the military regime. Second, the 
regime is an authoritarian one ruled by military junta. Again, the repressive political 
system contributed to the failure of the sanctions. Third, Myanmar has not maintained 
a close diplomatic and economic relationship with the international community. 
Further, Western states, that have relatively close relationship with Myanmar and 
therefore whose attitude are critical in the effectiveness of sanctions, have been 
reluctant to impose stricter sanctions. Fourth, the economic sanctions did not 
strengthen opposition movement in Myanmar. 
 
5. Economic Sanctions against Apartheid in South Africa 
5. 1. The Struggle of the International Community to Abolish Apartheid 
In 1946, even before the formal enactment of apartheid in South Africa, India brought 
a formal complaint in the U.N. against the Union of South Africa for discrimination 
against persons of Indian origin.103 The South African National Government, after 
winning the 1948 elections, formally established racism based on white privilege and 
domination,104 as its official policy. Afterwards, it passed many laws to enforce 
apartheid.105 The South African Government challenged the discussion in the U.N. as 
an improper intervention in its domestic jurisdiction.106         
        The General Assembly overrode the South African government’s objections, 
adopting a resolution asking the two governments to report on measures to correct the 
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situation.107 The resolution was to legitimize international concern on apartheid.  All 
this took place before the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.108 
Soon, the U.N. dealt with discrimination against other Asian nationals in South Africa. 
In 1949, the General Assembly asked South Africa, India, and Pakistan to have 
discussion and negotiate an amicable settlement based on the principles of the U.N. 
Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.109  
        However, in 1950, South Africa passed the Group Areas Act which required 
strict racial segregation for residence and work.110 The General Assembly criticized 
the law and urged South Africa to repeal it.111 The South African government argued 
that it had internal jurisdiction to impose apartheid but earned little support 
internationally. Since India and Pakistan were legally interested in the treatment of 
their nationals in South Africa, the issue was no longer an internal affair.112   
        In 1952, the question of the racial discrimination against the native Africans by 
the South African government was raised in the General Assembly.113 The objection 
by South Africa and other Western nations were stronger, because in this case the 
native Africans had no other states to argue for their rights, and according to the 
traditional notion in international law, South Africa had an absolute sovereignty over 
them. Part of the problem was that United Kingdom and France had colonies where 
they practiced racial discrimination. A commission to study the racial situation in the 
country submitted to the General Assembly a report declaring apartheid “injurious to 
human dignity” and impairing “the general welfare or friendly relations among the 
nations.”114  
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        The U.N. could not frustrate South African apartheid during the 1950’s. The 
Nuremberg Charter, which indicted Nazi leaders, included crimes against humanity as 
well as war crimes. It was the first formal declaration of the international law of 
human rights because it made it clear that how a state treated its own people was of 
international concern.115 The abolition of apartheid is of human rights and 
international concern; but the traditional notion of state sovereignty was still strong 
among states. 
        Many U.N. member states were reluctant to pursue the Security Council 
resolution on South Africa because it could turn out to be a precedent for a U.N. 
intervention in the traditionally domestic area of human rights. At that time, many U.N. 
members de facto discriminated against their racial or ethnic minorities. After the 
massacre of Sharpeville in March 1960,116 the Security Council condemned the South 
African government and adopted a resolution urging South Africa to abandon racial 
discrimination and apartheid.117 In 1962, the General Assembly established a Special 
Committee on Apartheid while affirming its support of international efforts to end 
Apartheid.118 The Special Committee recommended a program against apartheid that 
emphasized a global information and grassroots campaign to establish international 
support for comprehensive sanctions against South Africa.119  
        In August 1963, the Security Council adopted a resolution requesting all U.N. 
members to voluntarily stop the sale and shipment of arms to South Africa.120 
However, it did not take any further action. France, opposing mandatory economic 
sanctions, stated that it would distinguish between weapons for internal suppression 
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and external defense.121 Adlai E. Stevenson, U.S. Ambassador to U.N. argued that 
punitive measures against South Africa would only harden the existing situation.  
 During that time the General Assembly was more active in implementing various 
programs such as support for various international civic, religious, and educational 
groups working against apartheid.122 In December 1965, the General Assembly 
adopted the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination.123  
        In July 1970, the Security Council recognized “the legitimacy of the struggle 
of the oppressed people of South Africa in pursuance of their human and political 
rights as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights.”124 The same year the General Assembly declared apartheid a 
“negation of the Charter” and “a crime against humanity.”125  
 
5. 2.  From Engagement to Sanctions  
Until the mid 1970s, the General Assembly aggressively pursued the abolition of 
apartheid, by adopting in 1973 the International Convention on the Suppression and 
Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid,126 and in 1974 a resolution on the Decade of 
Action to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination.127 On the other hand, the 
Western countries with veto powers in the Security Council, including the U.S., 
France and the United Kingdom, refused to impose diplomatic, cultural and economic 
sanctions on South Africa beyond condemnation.128 Even after the 1976 massacre of 
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Soweto that resulted in the deaths of hundreds of people,129 the U.S. and the United 
Kingdom insisted that the killings were still matters within the domestic jurisdiction of 
South Africa, not allowing further intervention.130  As a result, in November 1977, the 
Security Council only adopted a resolution rendering the 1963 voluntary arms 
embargo mandatory under Chapter VII under the U.N. Charter.131 The Security 
Council declared that “arms trade with South Africa” was “a threat to peace” and 
illegal. Even at this time, the Security Council did not find that apartheid was threat to 
peace.   
        U.S. President Reagan’s policy toward South Africa was called “constructive 
engagement.”132 Regional security was stressed to contain expanding Soviet influence 
in Africa. South Africa was expected to play a role as a pro-Western regional power 
against Soviet influence. Its proponents insisted that the white minority in South 
Africa was the key in introducing any change, and apartheid could and should be 
abolished gradually.133 The policy included the “relaxation of diplomatic and 
economic sanctions” imposed previously.134 The U.S. goal was “to foster change 
through enlightened private enterprise and support for moderate forces of social 
change, such as trade unions and education.”135 The Reagan and Thatcher 
administration refused to impose sanctions on South Africa and kept a close 
relationship with the regime.136 However, the Clark Report in the U.S. Senate 
Committee on Foreign Relations asserted:  
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       Collectively, U.S. corporations operating in South Africa have made no 
significant impact on either relaxing apartheid or in establishing company 
policies, which would offer a limited but nevertheless important model of 
multinational responsibility. Rather, the net effect of American investment 
has been to strengthen the economic and military self-sufficiency of South 
Africa’s apartheid regime, undermining fundamental goals and objectives of 
U.S. foreign policy.137  
    
        The U.S. engagement policy was criticized by black Africans. In January 1985, 
Desmond Tutu, Nobel Peace Prize Laureate, said that the U.S. could end apartheid 
“tomorrow” by adopting sanctions.138 The U.S. Congress was more responsive than 
the President to the calls for sanctions against South Africa. In October 1986, it passed 
the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act, overriding Reagan’s veto.139 The Act 
included comprehensive economic sanctions against South Africa. The policy was 
quickly adopted by some European states. The sanctions banned loans to, new 
investments in, and imports of iron from, South Africa.140 Although, the Security 
Council failed to impose comprehensive sanctions against South Africa, major trading 
partners with South Africa began to participate in voluntary economic sanctions 
against apartheid around the mid-1980s.   
        Along with the U.N. efforts to abolish apartheid, NGOs and corporations 
began to participate in the campaign against apartheid. In July 1978, Rev. Leon 
Sullivan published the first version of Sullivan Principles and many companies 
committed themselves to apply them. The Global Sullivan Principles, which offer a set 
of business rules abroad, recommend that companies which accept the Principles, 
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respect universal human rights, the rights of their employees, the communities within 
which they operate, and parties with whom they do business.141 NGOs persuaded and 
forced international corporations to participate in the campaigns against apartheid. 
Corporations’ participation into the campaigns made incomprehensive international 
sanctions effective.  Of the approximately 350 U.S. companies with direct investment 
in South Africa in 1984, 119 U.S. companies committed themselves to Sullivan 
Principles to repeal all apartheid law and policies.142 Seven U.S. companies withdrew 
in 1984 and 39 in 1985. In 1986, forty left and thirteen announced their intention of 
leaving, including Eastman Kodak, Coca-Cola, Exxon, General Motors and IBM. In 
1988, only 136 U.S. companies were still remaining in South Africa.143    
 
5. 3. Impact of the Sanctions against South Africa    
The South African government faced with growing pressures internally as well as 
internationally. First, economic sanctions began to threaten the South African 
economy and white South Africans called for negotiations with the opposition. In 
August, 1985, South Africa’s four main business groups called on the government to 
negotiate with black leaders, asserting political changes is necessary to solve the 
economic crisis caused by the economic sanctions.144 Second, opposition groups in 
South Africa were strong and vigorously pursued international sanctions against South 
Africa. Anti-apartheid activities were supported by the international sanctions. These 
two factors made international sanctions effective.  
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        Amid international pressure against apartheid, South Africa tightened its 
domestic policy, including the banning of all major nonwhite opposition groups, and 
declaration of state emergency.145 This hard-line policy could not last long. The South 
African regime was losing control and opposition leaders openly challenged the 
regimes authority. In February 1990, the government declared the end of apartheid and 
released the anti-apartheid leaders, including Nelson Mandela. The laws supporting 
apartheid were repealed by the end of June 1991 and the state emergency was lifted. In 
June 1994, the Security Council lifted its arms embargo imposed against South Africa 
in 1977. As a result of the multilateral sanctions of the mid 1980s, South Africa 
experienced economic hardships, including a decrease of foreign trade and capital 
outflow, and even a financial crisis.146 The pressure by the international community, 
especially the economic sanctions imposed by many states obviously played a 
significant role in abolishing apartheid. Stephen R. Lewis says:  
 
       [E]conomic pressures have played a major role in forcing the South African 
government to change its policies on a wide range of issues from labor 
reform to the release of political prisoners; and in the absence of 
fundamental political change, the prospects for economic growth in South 
Africa are bleak.147      
 
5.4. Factors that Made the Sanctions Effective 
There is no evidence that the economic effect made by the sanctions on South Africa 
were more severe than that on Iraq and Cuba. South Africa, however, succumbed to 
the sanctions and abandoned apartheid policy. The demise of apartheid after the 
sanctions against South Africa can be attributed to several factors. First, the goals of 
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the sanctions were to frustrate apartheid. Abolishing apartheid is on the one hand a 
human rights issue, which means that the blacks would not be discriminated against. 
On the other hand, for the white South African regime, apartheid must have been a 
critical policy because the abolition of apartheid meant that the whites might lose their 
power.  In fact, after the official abolition of apartheid, in May 1994, Nelson Mandela 
was inaugurated as the first democratically elected president of South Africa. 
Sanctions by the international community brought about the major policy changes in 
the country. As international sanctions were tightened, however, the white minority 
began to accept that the abolition of apartheid was a human rights issue and necessary 
for their survival.   
        Second, South Africa was not an authoritarian state. The South African regime 
in time of apartheid was not a democratic one. Democracy, however, was operative 
anyway in the whites and this made the regime vulnerable to public opinion.148 
The withdrawal of the U.S. support raised concern among white South Africans.149 
They called for negotiations with the opposition. The parliamentary system for whites 
in South Africa contributed to the demise of apartheid.150   
      Third, the close political and economic relationship between South Africa and 
the major sanctioning states played an important role. White South Africans wanted to 
rejoin the world community,151 and to see the economic sanctions end by abolishing 
apartheid.  Foreign investment had played a key role in the development of the South 
African economy and in maintaining a high rate of economic growth. The white 
regime cared about economic development.152 Philip L. Levy argues that the 
international economic actions against South Africa that were most damaging were 
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taken by private actors.153  Since the mid-1980s, many companies withdrew from 
South Africa or announced their intention of withdrawal.154 With continuing unrest 
and economic downturn in South Africa, foreign banks refused to renew loans. In 
September 1985, South Africa announced a temporary freeze of repayments of its 
commercial debt principal.155 The sanctions by the states that had close political and 
economic relationships with South Africa turned out to be effective in abolishing 
apartheid.     
        Fourth, the sanctions did not strengthen the regime at home. Even white South 
Africans questioned the regime’s policy and the sanctions weakened their confidence 
in this policy.156  On the contrary, the international sanctions against South Africa 
actually strengthened domestic opposition groups in South Africa.157  The South 
African regime was under strong internal challenge.158 The African National Congress 
was a popular opposition group. The regime failed to stop the opposition even with a 
declaration of a state of emergency, mass arrests, treason indictments and 
assassinations.159 The anti-apartheid movement was strengthened by the international 
assistance and influence. The United Democratic Front (UDF), the African National 
Congress (ANC), and the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) 
supported international sanctions against apartheid.160        
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6. Conclusion 
It has been argued that, “sanctions are seldom effective… in bringing about major 
changes in the policies of the target country.”161 Whether a certain policy change is 
major or not is another controversy. For example, in 1974, Congress voted to reduce 
military assistance to South Korea by $20 million when the South Korean government 
stepped up its political repression after the suspension of the constitution in 1972.162 In 
1977, President Carter reduced aid to Argentina because of human rights violations 
and the U.S. Export-Import Bank refused to authorize a $270 million loan to 
Argentina until human rights in Argentina were improved.163 In both cases, however, 
the U.S. sanctions played little role in improving human rights. Although human rights 
issues have been considered a modest issue, altering human rights policy by imposing 
sanctions does not seem to be as easy as expected.  
        The international community succeeded in bringing about the demise of 
apartheid in South Africa by imposing sanctions. Economic sanctions still remain as 
“a necessary and important policy instrument.”164 Sanctions harm certain groups of 
people or industries in the target country. The economic success of sanctions, however, 
does not automatically lead to political compliance of the target country.165 In order 
for sanctions to be effective, the harmed people or industries should have tools or 
power to influence a change of the target country’s policy. The existence of a strong 
private sector such as NGOs, corporations and opposition parties would play a critical 
role in that process. In a democratic country, this process would be secured through 
elections. If, in an authoritarian country, sanctions affect the ruling elites’ interests 
significantly, they are likely to succeed. Where the target country is ruled by a sole 
absolute power, sanctions are least likely to succeed.       
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        Over the decades many world powers, especially the Western powers had 
economic interests in South Africa and had been reluctant to impose economic 
sanctions on the country. Not all states were active in the campaign to end apartheid. 
However, in the mid-1980s, former supporters of the South African regime began to 
participate in the campaign to abolish apartheid without adopting comprehensive U.N. 
sanctions.166 The effect of the sanctions was substantial and the pressure by the 
international community had never been stronger.  
        South Africa was ruled by the whites and the economic sanctions threatened 
their interests. Even though white people in South Africa belonged to an elite group, 
they had the power to change the regime if their interests would be harmed.167 They 
had the power to change South Africa’s policy of racial discrimination.  In contrast, 
Myanmar has been ruled by an elite military group, and Iraq and Cuba by an absolute 
sole leadership, respectively that of Saddam Hussein and Fidel Castro. It would have 
been almost impossible to change Iraq's or Cuba's behavior because the people could 
not influence the leaders in order to change the governments’ policies. In the 
Myanmar case, it would be hard to expect any change of human rights policies unless 
the military elite’s interest is significantly harmed.   
Further, close political and economic ties when sanctions are imposed will 
significantly increase the effectiveness of the sanctions. When the major powers 
joined the sanctions against apartheid after the constructive engagement policy of 
many years, South Africa could not help but accept the international norms. The 
economic sanctions after a long-lasting economic engagement with South Africa 
forced the country to accept more seriously the message of the international 
community. The close political and economic relationship between South Africa and 
Western states before sanctions were imposed played a significant role in South 
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Africa's abolition of apartheid. The relationship between the sanctioning and the target 
countries when sanctions were imposed against Iraq, Cuba and Myanmar was hostile 
rather than close. In establishing an effective strategy toward North Korea, these 
lessons should be considered.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
EFEECTIVE STRATEGY REFGARDING NORTH KOREA 
 
1.  Introduction 
Economic sanctions may, when properly tailored, play an important role in 
changing the human rights policy in the targeted country.1 Apartheid in South Africa 
was abolished because of the (economic) sanctions imposed by the international 
community.2 Sanctions are an important tool in foreign policy; however, they are 
sometimes ineffective and costly. The comprehensive economic sanctions against Iraq 
were unsuccessful to force the Iraqi government to comply with the Security Council’s 
resolution.3 The key is “to identify circumstances in which economic sanctions can 
succeed in attaining foreign policy goals.”4 In chapter 2, I argue that the North Korean 
weapons of mass destruction program and human rights situations in North Korea are 
of great international concern that might trigger international intervention. In chapter 3, 
I argue that economic sanctions may be imposed to force a target country to comply 
with international norms. Imposing economic sanctions, however, is limited by human 
rights norms. Right to life and food in a target country should not be violated by 
imposing sanctions. Comprehensive economic sanctions are likely to threaten the right 
to life and food. In chapter 4, I argue that, mainly 4 factors, the goals of sanctions, the 
political structure of the target country, the relationship between sanctioning states and 
target country, and the sanctions’ possibility of strengthening opposition movements 
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in the target country, decide sanctions’ effectiveness. In this chapter, I will discuss on 
economic sanctions against North Korea, and what alternatives are available.         
 
2. The Possible Goals of Economic Sanctions against North Korea 
2.1. War and Terrorism 
After North Korea invaded South Korea on 25 June 1950, the Security Council 
determined that the North Korean invasion into South Korea constituted a breach of 
peace.5 The following resolution recommended that the Member States assist South 
Korea to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security.6 The 
Council, however, did not adopt economic sanctions against North Korea.7  
On December 16, 1950, after the North Korean invasion of South Korea, 
President Truman declared a national emergency under the Trading With the Enemy 
Act of 1917.8 Soon, the Department of Treasury issued the Foreign Assets Control 
Regulations (FACR) and banned any financial transactions involving North Korea 
including the access to North Korean assets under U.S. jurisdiction. The North Korean 
invasion of South Korea, however, ended over 50 years ago. Moreover, the end of the 
Cold War drastically reduced North Korea’s capacity to wage war or commit 
provocative acts.   The security concerns that North Korea may pose to the 
international community have been over-emphasized. The U.S. has been imposing 
sanctions against North Korea since the outbreak of the Korean War.  
After the destruction of Korean Air Lines Flight 858 in November 1987 by two 
North Korean agents, in 1988, the U. S. State Department designated North Korea as a 
state sponsor or supporter of international terrorism under the Export Administration 
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Act of 1979.9 Trade, foreign aid, access to sales of items on the U.S. Munitions List, 
Export-Import Bank assistance, and support through international financial institutions 
were denied under the Act.10      
In 1989, the U.S. sanctions against North Korea were slightly relaxed. The 
export of commercially supplied goods for basic human needs would be allowed on a 
case-by-case basis; travel restrictions to North Korea were also relaxed.11 After the 
1994 Agreed Framework,12 President Clinton lifted some export restrictions against 
North Korea. Many items that had previously required it were now eligible for export 
without a license. Donations to North Korea were allowed to reduce the hardship 
caused by flooding and famine. In 2000, President Clinton lifted many trade and travel 
sanctions when North Korea stopped its missile testing. Licensing and trade for 
civilian use were allowed.  Most travel restrictions against North Korea were 
abolished in 2000. Terrorism during the period of the Cold War is also losing ground 
for international sanctions.  
 
2.2. Weapons of Mass Destruction 
The North Korean weapons of mass destruction have been of continuous concern in 
the Security Council. In 1993, the Council, after North Korea announced its intention 
to withdraw from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, called 
upon North Korea to reconsider its withdrawal and honor its non-proliferation 
obligation under the Treaty.13 After the North Korea’s launching of ballistic missiles 
in 2006, which could be used as a means to deliver weapons of mass destruction, the 
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Council demanded North Korea suspend all activities related to its ballistic missile 
program.14  
In the following resolution, the Council expressed the gravest concern at the 
claim that North Korea had conducted a nuclear test, posing danger to international 
peace and security.15 The resolution prohibited armed trade with North Korea and 
imports of luxury goods into North Korea.16 The inclusion of luxury goods in imports 
prohibition was to target the elite group in North Korea who might use luxury goods. 
The Council, in the resolution, allowed humanitarian exceptions such as allowing 
imports of foodstuffs and medicine.17 The Security Council already found that the 
North Korean nuclear test had posed danger to international peace. If the nuclear crisis 
is not solved peacefully, the Council is likely to take further actions under Chapter VII 
of the Charter.         
One difficulty is that North Korea considers its nuclear program as the last tool 
that would guarantee its survival and the North has already secured nuclear technology 
and materials, and already has nuclear weapons.18 It would be almost impossible to 
denuclearize it simply by imposing economic sanctions. 
 
2.3. Violations of Human Rights 
Human rights are of international concern and state sovereignty cannot be a valid 
defense where gross human rights violations are committed under the acquiescence, or 
the direct involvement of the regime. The development of international human rights 
and state practices support the priority of human rights over state sovereignty. For 
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many years, the international community has engaged in the promotion of North 
Korean human rights.        
        In 1997 and 1998, the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and 
Protection of Minorities under the Commission on Human Rights adopted two 
resolutions on the human rights situation in North Korea.19 These were the first U.N. 
steps to address the North Korean human rights issue. Those resolutions expressed 
“concerns on persistent allegations of grave violations of human rights” and “extreme 
difficulty in obtaining accurate information on the situation of human rights” in North 
Korea.20 
        On April 16, 2003, the resolution on North Korea by the UNCHR requested 
Pyongyang to cooperate with the U.N. system in the field of human rights, in 
particular the Special Rapporteur on the right to food, the Special Rapporteur on 
torture, and the Special Rapporteur on religious intolerance.21 The resolution also 
asked for a comprehensive dialogue between Pyongyang and the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights.22 Pyongyang complained that using human rights as 
a political tool was an imperialistic tactic to transform socialism.23 
        On April 8, 2004, UNCHR adopted a second resolution,24 which specifically 
recommended the appointment of a Special Rapporteur on North Korean human rights. 
Further, it called for all relevant special rapporteurs and special representatives to 
examine alleged human rights violations in North Korea.25 Consequently, Vitit 
Muntarbhorn was appointed Special Rapporteur on human rights in North Korea. In 
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April 2005, UNCHR again “expressed deep concern about continuing reports of 
systematic, widespread and grave violations of human rights” in North Korea.26  
        Pyongyang did not allow Vitit Muntarbhorn to visit North Korea and 
investigate alleged human rights violations. Nevertheless, in 2005, he submitted his 
report “The Situation of Human Rights in the Democratic Peoples’ Republic of 
Korea” to both the U.N. General Assembly27 and UNCHR.28 The report concluded 
that, “while there have been some constructive developments… there have been 
various discrepancies and transgressions-several of an egregious nature-in the 
implementation of human rights.”29  
 
2. 3. 1. The General Assembly 
The General Assembly has an overall authority to deal with all the matters covered by 
the U.N. Charter, except for matters belonging exclusively to the Security Council.30 
The General Assembly often adopts resolutions to encourage or recommend actions on 
human rights issues by the international community or governments.31 While General 
Assembly resolutions are not legally binding, they may present evidence of state 
practice and develop into binding customary international law.32  
        On March 14, 2006, the U.N. General Assembly adopted a resolution 
expressing serious concern over human rights and the humanitarian situation in North 
Korea. The Assembly expressed its serious concern over the refusal of North Korea to 
cooperate with the Special Rapporteur on North Korean human rights, and "continuing 
reports of systematic, widespread and grave violations of human rights” in North 
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Korea,33 “including torture, public executions, extrajudicial and arbitrary detention, 
the absence of due process and the rule of law, imposition of the death penalty for 
political reasons, the existence of a large number of prison camps and the extensive 
use of forced labor.”34  It urged North Korea to allow the international community full, 
free, safe and unimpeded access to all parts of the country, and fully respect all human 
rights and fundamental freedoms.35 
        The efforts by the General Assembly to address North Korean human rights 
have continued. On November 17, 2006, the 3rd Committee of the General Assembly 
again passed a resolution on North Korea.36 It requested that the U.N. Secretary 
General submit a comprehensive report on the human rights situation in North Korea, 
expressing deep concern over the humanitarian situation in North Korea.37 In the 
resolution, the representative of the European Union, noting the EU’s efforts to initiate 
dialogue with North Korea, said that “so long as [North Korea] continued to refuse the 
offers of advice, assistance and capacity-building from the United Nations in the field 
of human rights, the international community had little choice but to continue drawing 
attention to the deplorable situation there.” 38 
 
2. 3. 2. The Security Council 
The U.N. Security Council has the primary responsibility of maintaining international 
peace and security.39 The Council has discretion to determine whether a threat to 
peace and security under Chapter VII exists. Therefore, the Council can determine 
whether the human rights situation in a country is a threat to peace and security and 
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enforce economic sanctions40 or military action.41 Member states undertake to accept 
and carry out the decisions of the Security Council.42 
The Council has not dealt with the North Korean human rights issue until now.  
The severity of the violations of human rights in North Korea is as serious as that of 
the human rights violations against the Kurdish minority in Iraq. It has been argued 
that the Security Council should deal promptly with the North Korean human rights 
issue.43 The argument recommends that the Security Council adopt a resolution 
requesting North Korea to improve human rights based on widespread human rights 
violations, outflow of refugees, drug trafficking and currency counterfeiting; if it fails, 
the Security Council should adopt a resolution under Chapter VII.44 Economic 
sanctions would be an option under Chapter VII unless humanitarian intervention or 
use of force based on human rights is considered.  Security Council Resolution 1718, 
imposing economic sanctions against North Korea for its nuclear test, restricted 
economic activities related to the nuclear program and the luxury goods trade with 
North Korea.45 China opposes comprehensive economic sanctions against North 
Korea. First, China stresses “the right of each country to formulate its own policies on 
human rights protection in light of its own conditions.”46 Second, China has its own 
national security interests on the Korean peninsula. Its strategic goals in the region are 
to increase its influence and to prevent the North Korean regime from collapsing.47 
Therefore, it is unlikely that it will vote for a resolution authorizing economic 
sanctions because of human rights violations. 
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However, the argument that the U.N. Security Council should deal with the 
North Korean human rights is likely to gain strength. One of the common features in 
the cases where the Council has ever invoked its power with regard to human rights 
violations under Chapter VII is that human rights violations are gross in their 
magnitude and they happened in failed states where central governments lost their 
control over their populations partially or totally.  
In Somalia case, a civil war broke out between rivaling clans and state function 
ceased to operate.48 The civil war resulted in anarchy, massive human rights violations. 
In Haiti case, after the military coup, violent political turmoil ensued. A considerable 
number of refugees attempted to escape from Haiti. The Council is not likely to invoke 
Chapter VII solely because of the North Koran human rights situations. One 
possibility is that the Council may take actions based on the influx of North Korean 
refugee into China. Where the Council determines the existence of a threat to the 
peace because of the gross human rights violations and the flux of refugees into China, 
it is likely to take measures under Chapter VII of the Charter.  
 
3. Political Structure 
In order to analyze whether economic sanctions can frustrate North Korea’s nuclear 
program and force it to respect international human rights norms, I will first study 
through its constitution the political structure of North Korea. 
 
3. 1. The Constitution of 1948 
The initial North Korean Constitution adopted at the First Supreme People’s 
Assembly (SPA) in 1948 was modeled after the 1936 Stalinist Constitution of the 
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former Soviet Union.49 It was three years after Japanese rule ended in 1945. Korean 
peninsular had been already divided into the North and South. SPA representatives 
were selected by elections50 but after carefully being screened and approved by the 
party. The SPA was entitled to exercise exclusive legislative power. In reality, 
however, the Presidium of the SPA, comprised of a small group of top members of 
Korea Worker’s Party (KWP) wielded the power of the SPA. The SPA was only a tool 
to legitimize legislative power of Presidium.  The Cabinet exercised executive power. 
Kim Il Sung held a position as Prime Minister and a member of the SPA.  
 
3. 2.  The Constitution of 1972 
The second Constitution confirmed Kim Il Sung’s absolute power over North Korea. 
Kim Il Sung consolidated his power into an undisputable dictatorship.  Private 
ownership for means of production was eliminated.51 The taxation system was 
abolished because the state was responsible for providing the daily necessities through 
a rationing and public distribution system.52 The socialist economic planning system 
as the principle of collectivity was introduced. The Constitution declared that “class 
antagonisms and all forms of exploitation and oppression of man by man have been 
eliminated forever.”53 It was based on proletarian dictatorship, and Juche ideology was 
incorporated in the Constitution as a creative application of Marxism-Leninism.54 The 
collectivist principle of “one for all and all for one,” “mass line” and “mass 
movement” was introduced. 55 Collectivism became the basic orientation of education.     
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3. 3. The Constitution of 1992  
The end of the Cold War forced North Korea to find its way to survive in a new 
environment. The amendment of the constitution reflected this change. Juche ideology 
was institutionalized without referring to Marxism-Leninism.56 The leading role of 
KWP was stipulated.57 The National Defense Commission (NDC) was established as a 
separate constitutional organ and the Chairman of the NDC was provided with the 
highest military authority.58 Kim Jong Il took the position of the NDC chairman. Two 
years later, North Korean leader Kim Il Sung died.  
 
3. 4. The Constitution of 1998  
The 1998 Constitution declares itself “Kim Il Sung Constitution” which embodies his 
Juche ideology and achievement. Kim Il Sung was idolized as “the founder of North 
Korea and originator of the Socialist North Korea.” Kim Il Sung was given the title of 
“the Eternal President of the Republic.”59 Kim Jong Il, his son, could inherit his 
father’s formidable authority through the Constitution. NDC became the highest 
military leading organ of the state and the chairman of NDC has the power to direct 
and command all of the armed forces.60 Presidential power concerning foreign and 
external affairs as the Head of State was transferred to the Presidium of SPA.  The 
Cabinet became the general state management organ. The 1998 Constitution 
confirmed that military force is the backbone of Kim Jong Il’s leadership and 
supported Kim Jong Il’s absolute authority as top leader of the state. He became the 
General Secretary of the KWP, the Chairman of the NDC and the Chief Commander 
of the Korean People’s Army. 
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       In North Korea, the rule of law does not govern. Therefore, the directives of the 
administration very often override the law. Although the constitution has provisions 
for the protection of citizens’ rights, it is a tool of propaganda. North Korea is under 
the absolute rule of Kim Jong Il and therefore, as in Iraq and Cuba, economic 
sanctions are not likely to force North Korea to comply with international norms. 
 
4. The Juche Ideology  
Kim Il Sung waged his fight for the liberation of Korea from the Japanese as 
communist. He became North Korea's leader after Japan’s surrender in 1945 and the 
immediate division of the Korean peninsula by the Soviet Union and the United 
States,61 and remained so until his death in 1994.62 He developed a unique ideology 
called “Juche,” which first emerged in 1955 as Pyongyang moved away from Moscow, 
and then re-appeared in the mid-1960s as Kim tried to keep his distance from both 
Moscow and Beijing.63 
         Juche can be translated as “self-reliance. The 1998 Constitution defined it 
without mentioning Marxism-Leninism.64 Juche's stresses independence from foreign 
influence. Juche means independence from foreign rule and influence, and autonomy 
of the state.65 In practice it translates to, “putting Korean things first, always”66 and 
therefore it is "a type of nationalism” in its North Korean version.67 Self-reliance is not 
just an empty slogan.68 North Korea, after the Korean War, consciously withdrew 
from the capitalist world system and attempted to construct an independent, self-
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contained economy. Bruce Cummings states that, “unlike Albania in the socialist 
world and Burma in the free world, two countries that “withdrew” to no apparent 
purpose as their economies idled along or got worse, North Korea never idled but 
always raced.”69  
        Given the total isolation from the outside world and the lack of freedom of 
religion and thought, the effect of the dominant Juche ideology was enormous. North 
Korea was able to remain strong after the collapse of the Eastern bloc and China’s 
shift toward capitalism, because it was governed by the Juche ideology, and not by 
communism. North Korea is “a socialist fatherland of Juche, which embodies the idea 
and guidance of the Great Leader Kim Il Sung.”70 The entire North Korean population 
is required to defend and carry forward his ideas and complete the Juche revolution.71 
The Constitution itself legally embodies the Juche ideology and achievements. One 
North Korean defector testifies: 
 
       I also thought Kim Il Sung was the greatest man who created such a great 
ideology [Juche]. I believed that Kim Il Sung provided for all of our needs. 
Therefore, I could not even imagine being disloyal to Kim Il Sung. When 
he died, I was sad as much as when my father died.72 
 
        The absolute charismatic order made possible the hereditary succession of his 
son, Kim Jong-Il. Another defector testifies:  
 
       We were educated often in the deification of Kim Il Sung…. We were 
taught Juche beginning in the primary school. During middle school, we 
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learned about Kim Il Sung’s revolutionary history. Intensive study on 
ideology was provided in college. From the moment they learn to speak, 
children are taught to say ‘Thank you Kim Il Sung, wonsunim (Venerable 
Great Leader).’ Parents help children learn to say this well. We were 
educated to clean the portraits of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il every day. 
Through this education we had no doubts about Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong 
Il, or the Party. [The Korean Workers’ Party]73 
 
        As stated above, the North Korea has an extremely authoritarian political 
structure and the power is centered on the sole leader Kim Jong Il. This regime 
structure of North Korea would make economic sanctions less effective. 
 
5. Relationship between North Korea and the International Community 
Pyongyang insists that the U.S. should is using the nuclear issue and the human rights 
issue as leverage in its policy of isolation of North Korea74 Pyongyang claims that the 
U.S. does not intend to renounce its hostile policy towards North Korea, nor is it 
willing to co-exist with it.75 
      Pyongyang denounced the U.S. North Korean Human Rights Act of 2004 as 
“interference in [their] internal affairs and building justification to invade the North”.76 
North Korea denounced the U.N. human rights resolution as “falsehood and 
fabrications.” It argued that the EU and U.S. were "abusing human rights issues for 
their political purposes and pursuing interference in internal affairs and regime 
change.”77 
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        Therefore, the U.S. allegation that North Korea is violating human rights is “a 
psychological warfare” to tarnish the image of North Korea and to lay an 
“international siege” on it.78 Nuclear and human rights issues are, according to 
Pyongyang, used to isolate and stifle North Korea.79 The country denounced the U.N. 
General Assembly resolution on the North Korean human rights, saying that the 
concern of the international community was “to use aid as leverage for spying” on 
what was really going on in North Korea, not to enhance human rights.80 At the 
adoption of the resolution on North Korea by the U.N General Assembly, the North 
Korean representative said that “[the resolution] was a political plot of the United 
States and its satellite countries.”81 
      If a sanctioning country has little economic interests engagement in the target 
country, economic sanctions are not the most effective means of compelling the target 
country to comply with international norms.82 The U.S. has little leverage to impose 
economic sanctions because it has only minor economic relations with North Korea. 
The U.S. imposed a total economic embargo on North Korea83 after the invasion of the 
North Korean forces into South Korea in June 1950. The U.S. embargo on the trade 
with North Korea still remains active today.84      
        North Korea’s relationship with the international community also has been far 
from being close.  In response to the growing international pressure for the 
improvement of the human rights situation in North Korea, in 1997, Pyongyang gave 
notification that it was withdrawing from the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
                                                 
78 Korean Central News Agency, July 4, 2003.  
79 Korean Central News Agency, July 27, 2004. 
80 Korea Central News Agency, November 21, 2005. 
81 GA/SHC/3874. 
82 Clevelend, supra note 1, at 85. 
83 Hufbaur et al., Institute for International Economics, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered: 
Supplemental Case Histories 110-114 (2nd ed, Washington, DC, 1990). 
84 On the overall U.S. economic sanctions against North Korea see, Julia Choi and Karin Lee, North 
Korea: Economic Sanctions and the U.S. Department of Treasury Actions. 1955-September 2006 
(National Committee on North Korea); North Korea: Economic Sanctions, CRS Reports for Congress 
Order Code RL 31696 . 
 
 
132
and that it would also withdraw from other international human rights agreements.85 
However, the U.N. Human Rights Committee informed Pyongyang that withdrawal 
was not possible, and the Committee on Covenant Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights also notified North Korea that withdrawal was not possible.86 Pyongyang has 
responded to the international pressure by denying or countering the accusations of 
human rights violations.  
      The North Korean delegate commented that the U.N. resolution was “an illegal 
document to debase his country’s sacred sovereignty,” and “a typical example of 
politicization, selectivity and double standards.”87 One North Korean delegate insisted: 
 
       The main obstacle in the efforts of the international community to improve 
the effective enjoyment of human rights and basic freedom is actions to 
infringe on sovereignty, and change the system and interfere in the internal 
affairs of other countries under the signboard of democracy and protection of 
human rights.88 
 
      He claimed that human rights abuses by the U.S. and British troops had been 
occurring in Iraq.  Pyongyang reaffirmed its will “to consolidate even more the 
Korean-style, man-centered system of ensuring socialist human rights under the 
banner of the Juche.”89 North Korea’s relationship with the international community is 
far from being close. It is rather hostile. This hostility makes it difficult for North 
Korea to accept international norms implied by economic sanctions.   
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      In South Africa, there were many foreign invested companies in the mid-1980s 
and under the growing international pressure to pull out from South Africa, they began 
to abandon doing business in that country.90 This affected the regime’s policy change 
on apartheid. The North Korean Constitution of 1992 stipulated that foreign 
investments were permitted in special economic zones, and the Rajin-Sunbong Free 
Economic and Trade Zone was created. The investment law and regulations related to 
the Zone were heavily state-regulated. 91 Rajin-Sunbong was not successful in 
attracting foreign investments. Today, there are two major foreign investments in 
North Korea, the Mt Keumgang Tourism Project and the Kaesong Industrial Complex 
Project. Both are implemented by the South Korean government and South Korean 
companies, which are the best source of cash for the North Korean government. 
Except for those two projects, there is no considerable foreign investment or corporate 
activities in North Korea. Sanctions might contribute directly to the economic 
hardship of North Koreans, without harming the cash source of the North Korean 
government because of the lack of foreign investment and corporate activities in North 
Korea.            
 
6. No Possibility of Opposition Movement  
In North Korea the sovereignty resides “in the workers, peasants, working intellectuals 
and all other working people,”92 and not in all people. Only one candidate in each 
electoral district, carefully selected by the Korean Workers' Party, is nominated for 
election.93 Voters are instructed to cast a yes-or-no vote for a single candidate.  
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        In North Korea elections are not a part of the democratic political process 
where various political factions freely contend based on their policies, but are a 
political mobilization of the population to sanction the regime's power.94 After Kim Il 
Sung died in 1994, North Korea, as part of its tribute to Kim Il Sung, suspended for 
three years all events related to political participation, including the Supreme People’s 
Assembly, Party Congress, and elections at all levels.  
        Free expression of opinion by citizens is impossible in the candidate 
nominating process and casting votes. After, the election of deputies for the 11th 
Supreme People’s Assembly on August 3, 2003, the North Korean Central Election 
Committee announced that 99.7 percent of those listed on the eligible voter registry 
voted in the election and 100 percent of those voted for the candidate nominated by 
the district.95 There is no political party except the Korea Worker’s Party. 
         In general, the harm caused by sanctions would pressure the target country's 
behavior through corporations, NGOs and oppositions groups. Without them, it is hard 
to expect that the economic hardship caused by the sanctions might change the 
government policy. There is no hope that sanctions may strengthen NGOs, opposition 
groups or movements in North Korea because the freedom of association and 
assembly is not allowed and opposition groups or movements in North Korea simply 
do not exist at all. 
 
7. Humanitarian Limitations of Economic Sanctions against North Korea 
Sanctions against authoritarian countries are likely to cause human sacrifice; and the 
poor and the unemployed are the most seriously affected. For example, except in rare 
cases, economic sanctions often have little impact on government behavior, “because 
sanctions add to the misery of a society’s most oppressed citizens.”96 While the 
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leaders of the targeted country are responsible for the actions that lead to the sanctions, 
the common citizens suffer the most.97 Economic sanctions very often inflict suffering 
on the already much-abused people without punishing the elite decision-makers.98  
Economic sanctions result in some economic hardship, but this impact is often 
insufficient or incapable of producing the desired political change in the targeted 
country. In an authoritarian state like North Korea, wealth and food are distributed 
according to the degree of power. The elite and the military do not suffer while the rest 
of the population starves.    
       The effect of the economic sanctions imposed by the international community 
has been, and will be disastrous for the North Korean population. One to three million 
North Koreans are estimated to have died of starvation during the famine in the mid-
1990s, and hundreds of thousands of refugees fled, mostly to China. The North 
Korean Core Class, however, mainly living in Pyongyang, was not harmed.99 Harold 
Hongju Koh notes: 
 
In evaluating the consistency of [U.S.] action with international law and 
human rights, the best single benchmark will be the number of innocent 
civilians - of whatever nationality - who are killed, injured, or whose human 
rights are violated by acts committed on all sides.100  
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        North Korea out-powered South Korea in every sector of the economy until the 
end of the 1970s.101 It was producing enough food to feed its people or at least had the 
capability to purchase food from the outside world until the beginning of the 1990s.  
In September 1995, however, the North Korean government appealed for food aid to 
the United Nation’s World Food Program (WFP) and the international community. 
Pyongyang claimed that the food shortage was caused by severe flooding and 
drought.102 The collapse of the Eastern-bloc economic system and natural disasters are 
allegedly the main reasons for North Korea’s food shortage.103 
         The Eastern economic bloc collapsed around 1990-1991.104  With the 
dissolution of the Eastern economic bloc North Korea also lost its market for goods 
through which it could earn foreign currency.105 This reduced its buying capabilities.  
Further, severe flooding occurred in successive years and a drought followed in 
1997.106 The country had to cope with the catastrophic famine years of 1995-98, which 
claimed hundreds of thousands of lives. Natsios argues: 
 
 [P]unishing the common people in a totalitarian regime as a means of 
forcing their government to change its behavior has seldom been successful 
given that that the people have not control over their government’s 
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behavior, and their government cares little what happens to them. The 
government officials eat and the people die.107  
 
        The great North Korean famine in the mid-1990s was not due to economic 
sanctions from abroad. Considering that North Korea has not fully recovered from the 
devastated economy during the mid-1990s, however, comprehensive economic 
sanctions could devastate the North Korean economy and might threaten ordinary 
North Koreans’ lives. 
 
8. Alternative: Engagement  
Craig Forcese argues that “trade with, and investment in, repressive countries will 
promote political liberalization and greater respect for human rights by exposing 
populations to liberal, human rights-supporting values.”108 The argument that the 
international community should adopt engagement policy with North Korea is based 
on several practical reasons. 
        First, an economic engagement would strengthen reformer groups within the 
North Korean government, empower entrepreneurs, produce a middle class and 
interest groups, and eventually stimulate some form of civil society that would 
demand more social, political and economic rights.109 Even if the North Korean elite 
or military would benefit in the reform process, for example by setting up their own 
companies, their doing business in and outside North Korea, and their interaction with 
international financial institutions would give them the experience of a market 
economy and the opportunity to conform to international law and order.110  
Engagement can be a catalyst for those changes.  
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        Second, an engagement with North Korea will weaken the regime’s authority 
to control the people. The repeated indoctrination of the Juche ideology under a total 
isolation from the outside world and the lack of freedom of religion and thought 
contribute to the regime’s absolute control over the people. North Koreans can gather 
information on the development of South Korea and the world through their 
communication with various business companies' representatives. With engagement, 
there is hope that North Koreans can access the Internet. In an isolated country like 
North Korea, this kind of flow of information would have enormous impact upon the 
way of thinking about the regime. It is a long-term process, but an effective one.111     
        Third, engagement would directly secure the right to food by providing North 
Koreans with food and jobs. They are still experiencing economic hardship. If foreign 
invested corporations could hire North Koreans directly, their right to food could be 
drastically improved. Further, engagement policy would facilitate the humanitarian aid 
to North Korea. 
       Fourth, engagement expands the international community's alternatives as far 
as North Korea is concerned. The failure of the sanction strategy against North Korea 
is in part due to the lack of leverage available to the international community. In order 
for sanctions to be effective, the existence of the private sector and close economic 
and diplomatic ties are necessary. If engagement with North Korea is sufficiently 
developed, when the country fails to protect the international human rights norms, the 
international community will impose economic sanctions against it and they will be 
effective in making it conform to international norms.  
        After the U.S. decision to adopt an engagement strategy toward China, the two 
countries cooperate on major international issues including combating terrorism and 
solving the North Korean nuclear crisis. China has moved from a state-controlled to a 
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market economy and has become engaged with the outside world. It has begun to 
recognize the norms of universal human rights. It is getting more and more responsive 
to international pressure to improve its human rights situation. As a result of the 
engagement policy, the international community now has leverage toward China for 
the promotion of human rights. In conclusion, engagement is a much more effective 
way for enforcing international norms.         
        The validity of engagement in promoting human rights and democracy, and 
maintaining international peace security is shown by the U.S. engagement with China. 
I will analyze this in terms of human rights.      
 
8. 1. U.S. Engagement with China 
8. 1. 1. From Hostility to Engagement 
The U.S. has the experience of engaging with a previously adversarial country. The 
most prominent instance is the engagement policy toward China since the early 1970s. 
The U.S. did not recognize the People’s Republic of China for twenty years after its 
official establishment in 1949.112 Instead, it recognized the Nationalist government of 
Taiwan as the true representative of China. The U.S. imposed a complete trade 
embargo against China after it military support of North Korean in the Korean War in 
1950.113  U.S. oil companies embargoed petroleum shipments to China. Travel to 
mainland China was prohibited. The U.S. continued to prevent China from having a 
seat in the U.N.  Ideological hostility dominated the relations between the U.S. and 
China, and China was almost isolated from the rest of the world.114  
         In 1969, the U.S. eased restrictions on trade with and travel to, China, 
signaling the administration’s desire to improve relations. Most of the communications 
were relayed through a back channel, not through official and institutional 
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processes.115 Henry Kissinger visited Beijing in 1970 and President Nixon in 1972, 
paving the road to the normalization of relations between the two countries in 1979.116 
Of course, the U.S. engagement with China was not for the promotion of human rights. 
Rather, it needed an ally against the Soviet Union, as well as access to the vast 
Chinese market.117 Therefore, China’s human rights abuses did not prevent the U.S. 
from pursuing diplomatic normalization.   
        The U.S. decision to adopt an engagement strategy toward China seems to be 
quite successful. The U.S. and China cooperate on major international issues including 
combating terrorism and solving the North Korean nuclear crisis. China has moved 
from a state-controlled to a market economy and has become engaged with the outside 
world. Engagement has contributed to the change of the Chinese economic system to 
capitalism. The 1993 Chinese Constitution stipulates that, “the state practices a 
socialist market economy.”118 China has adopted market economy system. China is 
now one of the U.S. leading trading partners. In 2005, the U.S. exports to China 
totaled $41.8 billion and the U.S. imports from China, $243.5 billion.119 
 
8. 1. 2. Impact on Human Rights 
The Western engagement with China has contributed to the promotion of human rights 
in China. China was going through the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) when the 
normalization began. The period witnessed some of the worst political persecutions in 
Chinese history. Obviously, the record of human rights in China has not been 
satisfactory. The U.S. Country Reports on Human Rights Practices of 2006 estimated 
that China’s human rights record remained poor and China is “an authoritarian state”, 
                                                 
115 Id. 
116 Id. 
117 Id. 
118 Article 15 of the People’s Republic of China Constitution. 
119 Fact Sheet, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, released on April 18, 2006. available at 
http://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/64718.htm (last visited on May 3, 2007). 
 
 
141
where “the Chinese Communist Party is the paramount source of power.”120  The 
Chinese people do not have the right to change their government. Severe limitations 
on civil and political rights exist when “such rights are deemed by the government to 
threaten the regime and stability.”121  
        China is tightening its restrictions on the freedom of speech and the press. 
NGOs are under strict government control. Extrajudicial killings, torture and coerced 
confessions of prisoners, as well as forced labor have been widely reported.122  The 
rule of the law is obstructed because of a lack of due process and restrictions on 
lawyers. China is still implementing its coercive birth control policy. The government 
is repressing minorities in Tibet and Xinjiang. It imposes more death sentences that 
any other nation, with Amnesty International confirming 1,639 death sentences in 
2003. 123 China also imposes content-based restrictions on religious beliefs and 
practices.124  
       However, political discussion is possible and scholars can publish works that 
criticize the government and call for more civil and political rights. Voices for legal 
reforms including judicial independence have been raised.125 The socialist ideology is 
still an official commitment but is not a matter of everyday life. The Chinese can 
access the Internet even though the government tries to block sites that are deemed to 
be dangerous to the regime. Choosing jobs and one's residence, as well as travel, are 
now possible. Elections for village leaders and village councils were first allowed in 
1987 and spread drastically throughout the country.126  
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        The Chinese perspective on human rights also changed drastically. During the 
1970s, the concept of national sovereignty was the core of all Chinese international 
law issues.127 However, in 1981, China became a permanent member of the 
Commission on Human Rights and its sub-commission. Through the 1980s and 1990s 
China began to recognize the norms of universal human rights. In 1988, its foreign 
minister stated that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights had exerted “a far-
reaching influence on the development of the post-war international human rights 
activities and played a positive role in this regard.”128 China signed the Covenant on 
Economic, Cultural, and Social Rights in 1997 and the Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights in 1998. It has actively participated in the international human rights regime 
and approved of sanctions against the former apartheid regime of South Africa.        
        How should we then consider the Tiananmen Square massacre of 1989? Firing 
at unarmed protesters and killing hundreds of people is obviously a gross human rights 
violation. However, I find a light of hope in the Tiananmen demonstration itself. The 
Chinese people stood against their government for democracy. During the 10-year 
period of the Cultural Revolution, millions were persecuted and killed and no 
opposition against Mao was raised. In 1989, pro-democracy demonstrations continued 
from April 22 to June 3. By May 17, over 1 million people had participated in the 
street demonstrations.129  The energy for democracy and human rights changes “more 
frequently comes from the inside, bottom-up, than from the outside, top-down.”130 
China is getting more and more responsive to international pressure for improving 
human rights situation. In 1990, it released two hundreds detainees, prior to Bush’s 
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MFN decision.131 The overall situation of human rights in China is improving at a 
speed that otherwise could not have been expected.   
         One of the important lessons to remember is that, as a result of the engagement 
policy, the international community now has leverage toward China for the promotion 
of human rights. After the Tiananmen Square massacre, the U.S. imposed an arms 
embargo and suspended new aid.132 The E.U. also imposed economic sanctions 
against China.133 The World Bank suspended loans to China.134 Japan froze its aid 
program amounting to $7 billion. China lost about $11 billion in bilateral aid alone for 
four consecutive years.135 In 1990, China desperately tried to block any resolution 
against it in the Human Rights Commission.136 Now, it is more sensitive about its 
image in the international community, which in turn has an effective mechanism to 
impose economic or multilateral sanctions for human rights violations. If China had 
not joined the international community and had not had a close economic engagement 
with the rest of the world, as was the case in the 1960s, the international community 
would not have had any leverage in the Tiananmen Square massacre, and China would 
not have cared what the outside world thought of it.      
 
9. Limitations of Engagement Policy 
Economic engagement, however, does not always promote the human rights in a 
targeted country.  It can be “a key component of an effective human rights 
implementation strategy” when adopted appropriately.137 Engagement policy can 
augment the staying power of repressive regimes. In other words, engagement may 
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prolong dictatorships rather than undermine them.138  Therefore, several factors should 
be considered before adopting an engagement policy to promote human rights. 
        First, the economic integration should not encourage “the regime to increase its 
repressive activity and engage in human rights abuses that would otherwise not 
occur.”139 A company’s activities may bolster the repressive capacity and the staying 
power of a regime that systematically violates human rights.140 For example, 
companies may be a major source of revenue that increases a regime’s repressive 
capacity.141 According to Forcese, “the firm may create infrastructure in the form of 
roads, railways, power stations, oil refineries, communications or the like, that 
increases a regime’s repressive capacity.” 142 Moreover, foreign companies may 
provide “international credibility to an otherwise discredited regime.143 The U.S. 
engagement in South Africa was based on the belief that “the government of P.W. 
Botha was pragmatic and committed to managing an ongoing transition from 
apartheid.”144 However, “[t]he Botha government was willing to modernize apartheid 
but not to eliminate it.”145  
        Second, economic engagement should overcome the moral question of helping 
the oppressors. The ultimate goal of economic engagement is to promote democracy 
and human rights. Seeking engagement with rogue regimes such as North Korea is 
morally not appealing to policy-makers and constituents alike. Therefore, economic 
engagement should formulate clear strategies to improve human rights. Sandy Rios 
states that “any negotiating with the North Korean regime” cannot be tolerated as long 
as the regime “continues to starve and torture” the people, because this is un-
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American.146 She demanded that, “the South cease to aid and abet the murderous 
regime of the North.”147   
 
10. Evaluation of the South Korean Engagement Policy 
The South - North engagement has continued on a wide range of economic, cultural, 
sports, and transportation fronts. Seoul’s “Sunshine Policy” is believed to be slowly 
accomplishing something once thought impossible: the restoration of a measure of 
trust between the North and the South.148 The hostility between the North and the 
South has been dramatically reduced and the possibility of war also has been curtailed. 
However, the engagement policy pursued by the South has been followed without a 
clear strategy to promote North Korean human rights. 
      According to data released by the South Korean Reunification Ministry, from 
March 1998 to August 2006 South Korea, including the government and the private 
sector, paid North Korea nearly $1 billion in cash.149 The payment included $500 
million paid in June 2000 for securing the exclusive right to run the Keumgang Tour 
Project, $21 million in relation to the Kaesong Industrial Complex, including the 
wages of the North Korean workers, and several million dollars for some South 
Koreans to attend the Arirang Festival. Other humanitarian aid, such as food or 
medicine, was not included in the data.  
        The South Korean economic engagement with North Korea has several 
problems. First, it has not been carefully calculated whether the economic gains 
obtained by the North Korean regime through economic cooperation with the South 
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are helping the North Koreans to enjoy civil, political and economic rights. For 
example, the Hyundai Group paid North Korea $500 million without any mechanism 
of monitoring that the money not be diverted to military uses.150 Further, the South 
Korean special prosecutor who looked into the secret payment concluded that it had 
been made to induce Pyongyang to agree to the historic South - North summit talks on 
June 15, 2000.151  
       Second, Pyongyang has compartmentalized the economic cooperation into 
blocks and has placed it under heavy regulations. For example, the South Korean 
tourists visiting Mt. Keumgang are not allowed to have tours outside of the iron fence 
surrounding the tour area. They can communicate with only a few well-trained North 
Korean guides. Pyongyang places strict regulations on the tourists. On January 6, 2000, 
a South Korean tourist visiting Mt. Keumgang was detained for several hours for 
criticizing the North Korean government and showing the guide her mobile phone 
made in South Korea.152         
        Third, Seoul does not take full advantage of the economic cooperation to let 
the North Koreans experience the market economy. Although the Kaesong Industrial 
Complex Project is more effective than the Mt. Keumgang Tour Project in giving the 
North Koreans the experience of market economy,153 the South Korean companies at 
the Complex are not allowed to hire or pay North Korean workers at their discretion. 
The workers are provided by the regime and wages are paid by North Korea. On top of 
that, the working conditions at the Kaesong Industrial Complex are not good enough 
to secure the workers' rights, the standards of South Korean labor regulations, and the 
international human rights.154  
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        Fourth, Seoul’s reluctance to raise the North Korean human rights issues 
undermines the basis of the engagement policy within the international community. 
The engagement policy itself does not guarantee the promotion of human rights in 
North Korea. It should be carefully designed to encourage democracy and promote 
human rights. Seoul should support the international efforts to promote North Korean 
human rights and should participate in the discussion within the international 
community. Further, Seoul should include the human rights issues in the dialogue or 
the economic cooperation with North Korea. 
 
11. The Engagement Is Necessary, but with Human Rights Components 
Mike Mochizuki suggested that international community should “engage 
diplomatically with Pyongyang and initiate confidence-building measures such as 
continuation of food aid without conditionality and avoid sanctions.”155 As Albright 
stated, “there is no automatic connection between trade and democracy, but people 
can’t help being shaped by their own experiences and observations.”156 In an isolated 
country like North Korea information and knowledge, once they begin to flow in and 
be disseminated, are hard to block and can be a violent force in changing the society. 
In fact, “[t]he dynamics of politics on the divided Korean peninsula are ultimately a 
lasting contest for pan-Korean legitimacy.” South Korea’s engagement would 
eventually swallow up North Korea “no matter how sunny and benign the South’s 
façade might be.”157 Engagement with North Korea should be encouraged, but with 
the human rights component in it.  
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        The engagement policy may send the wrong message to human rights violators 
such as the North Korean leaders that their tactics are succeeding without 
consequences for their actions.158 Engagement should not be the same as endorsement. 
Therefore, the engagement strategy with an authoritarian state must make sure that the 
policy promotes the economic and social rights of the people, and leads to the 
enhancement of their civil and political rights. After all, “[a]ll human rights are 
universal, indivisible, and interdependent and interrelated.”159 As Sen stated, “political 
freedom in the form of participatory opportunities as well as civil rights and liberties 
are ultimately crucial even for economic rights and for survival.”160 Providing an 
authoritarian regime with economic benefits without encouraging democracy and 
improving human rights is helping the regime oppress the people. 
        The economic engagement with North Korea must have a clear message and 
purpose, that it is designed to promote North Korean human rights. For example, the 
South Korean government should make sure that the South Korean companies at the 
Kaesong Industrial Complex provide their North Korean workers with internationally 
recognized human rights such as the right to freedom of association and the right to 
collective bargaining.161 The South Korean companies should not be allowed to make 
money by simply paying the North Korean regime.  
        Engagement policy has been criticized for contributing to the survival of the 
regime responsible of human rights violations. This argument arose during the North 
Korean famine. Noland argues:  “[W]hile we are ethically obligated to feed starving 
North Koreans, we are not obligated to do so in ways that strengthen the existing 
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political regime there.”162 The engagement policy should be implemented in a 
responsible way and reviewed regularly through careful monitoring. Further, after 
reviewing the results of such monitoring, a new strategy to address the special 
problems arising from carrying out the engagement policy should be developed and 
implemented. It turned out that the South Korean Keumgang Tour Project, in which 
South Korean citizens take a tour in a restricted area and pay fees to North Korea, did 
not contribute to the promotion of North Korean human rights; therefore, it should be 
reduced, revised or abandoned. 
 
12. North Korea’s Willingness to Accept Engagement 
If engagement could force North Korea to comply with international norms including 
international human rights and democracy, not strengthening the basis of the regime, 
will the regime accept the engagement, an apple with poison?  One of the aims of the 
South Korean engagement toward North Korea is to change the North Korean system. 
As for Pyongyang, this change, however, may mean replacing the present leadership 
with new leaders with close economic ties with Seoul.163 For this reason, although 
Pyongyang wants to get cash, investment and economic help from Seoul, it scrutinizes 
each transaction to minimize economic dependency on the South.164 Pyongyang 
allows isolated economic projects that provide the foreign currency necessary for its 
survival but tries to keep North Koreans away from foreign contacts as much as 
possible. This is the North Korean version of the separation of economics from 
politics.165 One scholar explains the dilemma that North Korea now faces: “North 
Korea is still caught helplessly between the necessity for an economic opening to 
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salvage its faltering economy and the threat that capitalistic contamination could pose, 
leaving the regime’s legitimacy in doubt.”166 
        Pyongyang appears not to have embarked upon “a path to reform and 
opening.”167 Contrary to widespread understanding, however, it does appear that 
Pyongyang is trying to engage with Seoul and Washington.168 For example, the 
Agreed Framework of 1994 stipulated that in return for a freeze in North Korea’s 
nuclear program, with substantial economic aid to North Korea, North Korea wanted 
to normalize its diplomatic relations with the U.S., and requested the U.S. to reduce 
trade and investment barriers.169 The primary goal of North Korea is to secure the 
regime survival.170 The regimes’ survival can be secured by political and economic 
stability.    
      First, North Korea finds that the only way to ensure its security is to change its 
relationship with the U.S. from hostility to reconciliation.171 It pursues diplomatic 
normalization with the U.S. and Japan.  Second, the collapse of communism of former 
Soviet Union and the economic transformation of China force North Korea to 
maintain normal economic relationship, for aid and investment, with capitalist 
countries. Security concerns and economic interests are the main forces that drive 
North Korea to come forward for engagement with South Korea, the U.S. and Japan.           
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13. Conclusion 
Harold Koh notes that an isolationist approach is unlikely to affect North Korea 
because it is already “the most isolated country on earth.”172 According to Koh, 
“Sanctions and the fear of sanctions may spur short-term compliance, but will just as 
likely incur long-term resentment and non-cooperation.”173 Audie Klotz comments 
that countries with high degrees of cultural autonomy are not responsive to 
international normative pressures.174 North Koreans are extremely endoctrinized with 
the self-reliance philosophy and not likely to be responsive to sanctions. A state is not 
a homogeneous entity, and an authoritarian state consists of the oppressor and the 
oppressed. Where a ruthless leader rules the target country, sanctions cannot change 
its policy while inflicting the population. This lesson can be drawn from the study on 
the economic sanctions against Iraq and Cuba. 
        Where the sanctions are applied because of human rights violations, the 
population is likely to be victimized even more.175 Katarina Tomasevski points out, 
“[t]he hardships imposed upon the populations in the target country can be hidden 
behind legal rhetoric, whereby sanctions are imposed against the state rather than its 
population.”176  
        A strategy to prevent or remedy violations of human rights can succeed only 
with “considering the values, strengths, and vulnerabilities of the specific nation or 
leader being targeted.”177 Strategies toward a country, especially for promoting human 
rights should take into account the unique history, culture, psychology, and politics of 
the target country. 
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        An effective international strategy to force North Korea to respect international 
norms such as for the promotion of human rights as well as for international security is 
to fully engage the country, and help it become a part of the community of nations. 
Economic engagement will contribute to the dismantling of North Korean isolation. 
Moreover, the collapse induced through the application of sanctions, can create a 
social and economic nightmare for the South, leaving it with 22 million starving 
people at its borders, and with an army of 1 million just across the border that could 
spin out of control. An engagement policy with North Korea can be an alternative to a 
sanctions strategy. 
        An engagement policy may be the first step to solve the North Korean human 
rights crisis. Economic engagement can go side by side with a policy of promoting 
human rights.  The EU’s foreign policy may be a good example. The E.U. “is founded 
on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental 
freedoms, and the rule of law, principles which are common to the Member States.”178 
The relatively active human rights policy toward the outside world can be attributed to 
the effective human rights mechanism in the European Union. The E.U. has conducted 
human rights talks with third countries or regional groups.179 The talks take place at 
the level of senior human rights officials or at the local level. According to the E.U. 
foreign policy the respect for human rights and democracy is a condition for signing 
trade and other agreements with third countries.180 Since 1995, the E.U. has required 
that all agreements on trade or cooperation with third countries have a clause 
according to which human rights are an essential element in the relations between the 
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parties.181 In case the agreements are breached, the E.U may sanction the country or 
suspend the agreement.182 The E.U. approach to the improvement of human rights 
abroad is cooperative and long-term based. The E.U. approach could be summarized 
as economic engagement with human rights components in it. 
        In dealing with the North Korean issues such as regional and global security, 
nuclear, humanitarian, and human rights issues, there are two different approaches: the 
individual or the comprehensive one. The individual approach, espoused by most 
states and the international community, aims at solving the issues one by one 
according to their priority. For example, the United States considers denuclearizing 
North Korea a priority. South Korea, on the other hand, views humanitarian aid and 
economic cooperation as a priority and argues that human rights can be pursued after 
the peninsula is stabilized through the building of mutual trust.     
        However, the regional and global security including the nuclear crisis and the 
refugee and human rights issues in Northeast Asia are closely interrelated, and a more 
comprehensive approach should be contemplated. Vladimir Petrovsky argued that “the 
problems of military security, economic development, human security and human 
rights on the Korean peninsula could be resolved only as a package deal, as a set of 
mutual obligations.”183 Michael O’Hanlon suggests a “Grand Bargain” with North 
Korea: diplomatic ties, end of economic sanctions, a binding promise not to use 
weapons of mass destruction first, a non- aggression pledge and a formal peace treaty 
ending the Korean War.184 Given that the most pressing issues include military 
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security, economic development, and human rights, a comprehensive approach, 
similar to the Helsinki Accords, should clearly be considered as an alternative.     
        The Helsinki Final Act of 1975 can be a model strategy against North Korea 
by the international community.185 The Helsinki process enabled the Soviet Union and 
the East European countries to make concessions on human rights provisions in return 
for security guarantees and economic aid from the Western countries.186 It contributed 
to the collapse of the Soviet bloc by promoting democracy in the Eastern bloc.187 
Whether the Helsinki model can be applied to the current security and human rights 
situation in North Korea has been hotly debated. As Youngho Kim argues, “[b]ilateral 
and multilateral security guarantee and assurances are necessary for North Korea to 
accept the human rights agenda in the Northeast Asian version of the Helsinki 
process.” 188 After all, the Agreed Framework of 1994 focused on resolving the 
nuclear issue; therefore, it lacked sufficient structure to secure the success of the 
agreement. A comprehensive strategy to deal with North Korea, which includes the 
nuclear, the security, the human rights and the refugee issues should be contemplated. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
CONCLUSION 
     
The international community has been engaged in the efforts to promote North Korean 
human rights. The international mechanism, including the Human Rights Commission 
and the U.N. General Assembly, has shown the international commitment to 
addressing the North Korean human rights crisis. However, North Korea has made no 
significant progress in its human rights practices and its legal reforms seem to be 
minimal and in fact, not operative or enforced as norms. The severity of the North 
Korean human rights situation demands that the international community tackle the 
issue more seriously and urgently.        
      The North Korean nuclear program is another issue that the international 
community has been tackling for many years. The Agreed Framework of 1994, in 
which North Korea promised to abandon its nuclear program, and South Korea, the 
U.S. and Japan promised to provide energy aid and diplomatic normalization with 
North Korea, collapsed when George W. Bush named North Korea as “an axis of evil” 
in his January 2002 State of the Union speech. In October 2006, North Korea 
announced its successful nuclear test. Although the U.N. Security Council imposed 
selective economic sanctions against North Korea, North Korea does not seem to 
succumb to the international sanctions. In February 2007, North Korea agreed to close 
its main nuclear facilities in return for 50,000 tons of fuel oil. The future of the North 
Korean nuclear crisis remains to be seen.  
        Economic sanctions can force a state to comply with international norms. The 
controversy also applies to the North Korean crises. Can the international community 
force North Korea to comply with international norms by imposing sanctions?  
        During the Cold War, the United States actively imposed unilateral economic 
sanctions. After the Cold War, the U.S. has refrained from imposing unilateral 
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sanctions; it is in part because the number of multilateral economic sanctions adopted 
by the U.N. is dramatically increasing.1 The collapse of the Cold War has made it 
possible for the Security Council to act on a common ground. The Security Council 
has the authority to maintain international peace and security under the Chapter VII of 
the Charter. The Council has used this power to protect human rights, which was 
traditionally considered as domestic affairs.        
        In its Resolution 794, the Council determined that the magnitude of the human 
tragedy in Somalia constituted a threat to the peace and security, and authorized the 
use of force to facilitate humanitarian aid.2 In its Resolution 940, the Council 
determined that a military coup and non-democratic system of government in Haiti 
pose a threat to international peace.3 The resolution authorized the formation of a 
multinational force, and use of all necessary means to facilitate the departure from 
Haiti of the military leadership and the restoration of the legitimate authorities in 
Haiti.4 Today, the Council tends to consider gross human rights violations as a threat 
to the peace under Chapter VII of the Charter.       
        It is well established that comprehensive economic sanctions are likely to 
produce unintended and undesirable consequences.5 Comprehensive economic 
sanctions do not discriminate within the target country and therefore tend to cause 
undue sufferings to those not responsible for making the policy.6  This raises a legal 
and moral issue, where innocent people, not the elite, in the target country are affected 
and the target country does not change its policy that triggers the sanctions. In this 
situation, a middle class and civil society are weakened, and the regime is 
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strengthened. Gross humanitarian sufferings caused by sanctions undermine domestic 
and international support for sanctions.7 This was clearly shown in the sanction against 
Iraq. Economic sanctions should be designed to avoid causing undue sufferings in the 
target country. This is not only a moral issue but also a legal issue that limits the scope 
of economic sanctions.  
        Economic sanctions are an important weapon in the transnational efforts to 
enforce international norms and can have a substantial behavior-modifying potential. 
However, the conventional assumption that sanctions against small countries or 
sanctions to accomplish modest policy goals are likely to succeed might be wrong. In 
many cases, small countries have resisted sanctions and it is hard to distinguish 
between major policy goals and modest policy goals. The dichotomy between major 
policy goals and modest goals does not work in reality and improving human rights 
abroad is often more difficult than changing other so-called major policies.  
        In order for sanctions to be effective, there should be a possibility that either 
the public could change the regime through elections, or elite groups could raise the 
dissatisfaction with the regime. In a democratic society, economic hardships or a 
failure caused by economic sanctions may raise the possibility of policy changes by 
public dissatisfaction or pressure from the public. In a totalitarian state, economic 
failure creates tensions within the ruling elite and may increase the possibility of 
reforms, coups or even a regime change. Economic sanctions can give rise to 
dissatisfaction among elite groups, and reduce the loyalty of the political and military 
elite. In a state ruled by an absolute dictator, economic hardships are not likely to 
result in policy changes.  
        The magnitude of economic hardship caused by sanctions, or whether 
sanctions are unilateral or multilateral is not determining factors for the effectiveness 
of sanctions. Economic sanctions were able to bring about the abolition of apartheid in 
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South Africa. At least within the white minority its democracy was operative. The 
close economic and diplomatic relationship between South Africa and major 
sanctioning states when sanctions were imposed played an important role. Economic 
sanctions directed against target countries that have long been adversaries of the 
sanctioning country, or against countries that have little trade with the sanctioning 
country, are less successful. The demands and supports for sanctions within South 
Africa did not strengthen the regime at home when sanctions were imposed.  
        In other sanctions cases such as the sanctions against Iraq, Cuba and Myanmar, 
the goals of sanctions were beyond human rights issues; military issues in Iraq case, 
restraining communism or regime change in Cuba case, and restoring democracy in 
Myanmar case.      
        Since 1990s, especially after the sanctions against Iraq and Haiti that caused 
severe human sufferings, the Security Council has taken steps to improve sanctions 
design, “applying more targeted measures, strengthening monitoring and enforcement, 
and prioritizing humanitarian concern.”8 The Council has developed more limited 
measures such as “arms embargoes, travel restrictions, and asset freezes.”9 
Restrictions on trade were limited to strategic commodities such as oil and 
diamonds.10 These types of sanctions, so-called smart sanctions, can be an alternative 
to comprehensive sanctions in the future. 
        The effect of comprehensive economic sanctions imposed by the international 
community would be disastrous for the North Korean population because sanctions 
against an authoritarian country cause serious human sacrifice and the poor and the 
unemployed are the most deeply affected. The elite and the military do not suffer 
while the rest of the population starves. Several factors can be noted.     
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        First, disarming the North Korea’s nuclear program by imposing economic 
sanctions would be almost impossible.11 The North Korean regime considers its 
nuclear program as the last resort that would guarantee its survival.12 North Korea has 
already secured nuclear technology and materials, and already has nuclear weapons, it 
would be almost impossible to denuclearize it by imposing economic sanctions unless 
the very threat that has caused it to engage in the nuclear program has been completely 
removed. The Security Council Resolution 1718, which aims at forcing North Korea 
to abandon the nuclear program, is not likely to bear fruits.  
       Second, North Korea is an authoritarian state completely controlled by a sole 
absolute leadership. North Korea maintains strict government control over “the flow 
of information, the movement of people, and the means of production,”13 and they are 
important tools to control the people, isolating them internally and internationally.14 
Contacts with foreigners or foreign information are completely banned or controlled 
by the central government. The government has an absolute monopoly of mass 
media.15 Information is provided, omitted, exaggerated or fabricated by the 
government. Sale of foreign newspapers and magazines are prohibited in North 
Korea.16  
        Third, where sanctioning states and the target country stand hostile to each 
other, economic sanctions often result in an unintended bolstering of an authoritarian 
regime. No state has any substantial political and economic relationship with North 
Korea because Pyongyang has not maintained substantial diplomatic and economic 
relations with other countries. Where a sanctioning state has little economic interest in 
the target country, economic sanctions are not the most effective means of compelling 
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the target country to comply with international norms. North Korea’s stance toward 
the international community has been hostile. In response to the Security Council 
Resolution 1718, North Korea insisted that the nuclear test was attributable to the U.S. 
and called the resolution “gangster-like.”17 The North Korea’s hostile stance against 
the international community, in combination of government propaganda of the threats 
from foreign forces, strengthens the people’s reliance on the current regime.18  
       Fourth, economic sanctions against North Korea are not likely to strengthen 
opposition movement in North Korea. Social associations and groups in North Korea 
are not interest groups or pressure groups, but “primary control mechanisms over the 
people.”19 Employment assignments, food rationing, and travel constraints were all 
tied to a political system of comprehensive surveillance.20 North Koreans are 
classified in 3 classes and 51 categories according to their family background and 
loyalty to the regime.21 The social classification in North Korea has contributed to the 
enhancing of the loyalty of core class to the regime. The regime seems to be 
maintaining the full control over the population. Further, there are various kinds of 
prison or detention camps in North Korea. It is estimated that approximately 200,000 
prisoners are detained in all the Gwalliso throughout North Korea.22 In reality, there is 
no private sector in North Korea to be stimulated by economic sanctions.         
        The effective strategies to resolve the North Korean crises, I think, should be to 
engage fully with North Korea. If necessary, smart sanctions can be adopted. 
Comprehensive economic sanctions should not be imposed. For a fundamental change 
in domestic institutions and attitudes, for example, the promotion of human rights, “a 
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18 Yun-Jo Cho, The Sources of Regime Stability in North Korea: Insights from Democratization Theory, 
Stanford Journal of East Asian Affairs, 97 (2005 Volume 5) 
19 Id. at 149. 
20 McCormack, supra note 65, at 74. 
21 KINU, supra note 23, at 101-127. 
22 Id. 
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slower process of socialization” is necessary to strengthen “reformist actors and 
promote peaceful solutions to international conflicts.”23 
  Engagement strengthens the private sector such as corporations, NGOs and 
promotes democracy in North Korea. It also reduces the level of isolation from the 
outside world, and provides North Koreans with information on democracy and 
universal values and beliefs.     
        Engagement policy will contribute to the solution of the North Korean nuclear 
crisis. Providing North Korea with a non-aggression treaty, food aid, foreign aid and 
investment, cultural exchange, and normalization of economic and diplomatic 
relations, could solve the North Korean nuclear crisis. Further, an engagement strategy 
will contribute to the solution of the North Korean human rights crisis. 
        Economic engagement would strengthen reformer groups within the North 
Korean government, empower entrepreneurs, produce a middle class and various 
interest groups and will weaken the regime’s authority over the people. Further, 
engagement will expand the international community's alternatives in dealing with 
North Korea. As shown in the sanctions against South Africa, sanctions against a state 
with a close relationship engaged with the world would be most effective. Where 
engagement with North Korea progress substantially and the North Korea’s hostile 
attitude against the international community is reduced, the international community 
would have a very powerful tool to force North Korea by imposing sanctions.  
       In conclusion, as effective strategies to force North Korea to respect 
international norms, I suggest several recommendations. First, the international 
community must fully engage with North Korea for a substantial period of time to 
stimulate the development of a private sector such as NGOs, corporations, in North 
Korea. Second, the international community must maintain close political and 
economic relationships with North Korea. Third, humanitarian aid toward North 
                                                 
23 Audie Klotz, supra note 2, at 275. 
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Korea should be continued and sanctions against North Korea, where economic 
sanctions are inevitable, should have humanitarian exceptions. Fourth, a package deal 
with North Korea can be considered. The Helsinki Final Act of 1975 can be a model 
strategy against North Korea by the international community, which enabled the 
Soviet Union and the East European countries to make concessions on human rights 
provisions in return for security guarantees and economic aid from the Western 
countries.24 It contributed to the collapse of the Soviet bloc by promoting democracy 
in the Eastern bloc.25 Engagement policy with human rights components toward North 
Korea should be adopted.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
24 Id. 
25 Id. 
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